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PREFACE
Fernand LEPAGE
VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE LUXEMBOURG ASSOCIATION
OF SOCIAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS
(aloss)
Ladies and Gentlemen, dear readers, 
The 18th volume of the Luxembourg bulletin of the social questions is
devoted to the contributions of the international conference on "Access to
Health Care in an Internal Market: Impact for Statutory and Complementary
Systems" which was organized within the framework of the Luxembourg EU
Presidency. 
The objective of the conference was to create a better insight in the impact of
the existing and projected Community Law in the field of health and social
protection. 
At a moment when the discussions about the Bolkestein proposal for a
Directive on services in the internal market were booming and when in
France, in the Netherlands and in Luxembourg the campaign for the
referendum about the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe started,
the conference took place on 8 April 2005 in Luxembourg. 
The board of directors of the Luxembourg Association of Social Security
Institutions (aloss) is proud to have taken part in the organisation of the
conference, together with the Ministry of Social Security, the International
Association of Mutual Benefit Societies (AIM) and the Luxembourg High
Council of Mutuality (CSML). 
The following publication consists of two parts. The first part reproduces the
remarkable basic report of professor Yves JORENS from Ghent University. In
the second part you find the interventions of the experts, in the original
language, gathered around the subjects of the three working sessions,
namely: "Health services and the internal market", "Health insurance and the
internal market" and "The notion of social services of general interest as
counterweight to the internal market rules". 
My thanks and compliments go to all those who contributed to the success
of the conference and the realisation of this publication.
To conclude, I hope that the present publication will constitute a useful input
for a better notice of access to health care in an internal market.
PART I
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE IN AN 
INTERNAL MARKET: 
IMPACT FOR STATUTORY AND 
COMPLEMENTARY SYSTEMS
BASIC REPORT

Access to health care in an
internal market: impact for
statutory and complementary
systems
Yves JORENS
PROFESSOR OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW
AND EUROPEAN SOCIAL LAW
Michael COUCHEIR
RESEARCHER
Filip VAN OVERMEIREN
RESEARCHER
General introduction
Welfare states are national states. Social security, and in particular
health care, was and still is considered as belonging to the core
elements and competences of national states. The organisation of
health care systems, their funding and planning as a function of the
needs of the population are therefore a matter for the Member States,
notwithstanding the gradual, but limited expansion of the
competences of the European Union in the field of social policy and
public health. Although for example the Treaty clearly shows that the
European Community will ensure a high level of human health
protection,1) it leaves the organization of the system to the national
legislation. Article 152 (5) of the Treaty foresees that "Community
action in the field of public health shall fully respect
responsibilities of the Member States for the organisation and
delivery of health services and medical care."
But far more important than the increase in competences attributed in
the European Treaty to the European Union, has been and is the
influence of the internal market rules. As a result of internal market
rules, the EU has reduced the sovereignty (i.e. legal authority) and
autonomy (de facto capacity to act) of the Member States' social
protection system The gradual expansion of EU law has gradually
eroded national control on beneficiaries (Member States can no longer
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restrict welfare access to their own citizens only); spatial control on
consumption (the insured of a given national system can increasingly shop
around and consume services of other EU systems); the exclusivity of
coverage on their own territory (Member States are increasingly obliged to
accept infiltration within their territory of other countries' regimes); control of
access to the status of benefit producer (states must grant foreign providers
access to their national welfare systems) and control over administrative
adjudication cases (Member States must accept that the determination of
beneficiary status such as being sick will be carried out by bureaucratic
agencies of other Member States).2) European welfare states have therefore
witnessed an increasing erosion of their external boundaries and of their
capacity to control them; states have become semi-sovereign entities.
However limited the direct influence may be of European Community law on
national social protection law and in particular national health policy, this by
no means implies that the social security sector is an island beyond the reach
of Community law and that as a consequence all national rules relating to
social security fall outside its scope.3)
The impact of European law on the national health care systems has become
a burning issue since the landmark cases on the mobility of European
patients affirmed that health care is a service according to the Treaty
establishing the European Community. Although long expected, it applied for
the very first time the fundamental economic freedoms to the health care
sector.
As the Court of Justice emphasised that health care is an economic activity
that falls under the field of application of the principles of free movement of
goods and services, it is clear that also other fields of EU law and in particular
competition law, will apply to health care systems.
From then on, it became very clear that the influence of the European Union
on "health matters" would not remain restricted to the field of "public health",
dealing with communicable and rare diseases, blood and tissues, injury
prevention, tobacco and nutrition, etc. European law had proven itself
capable of having a direct impact on the way health care, and in particular the
reimbursement of costs of health care, is organised in the Member States,
even with Article 152(5) of the EC Treaty clearly stating the opposite. Health
care suddenly became a much more "European issue".
Some of these issues related to the influence of the Common market on
health care4), will be discussed in this report.5)
The cases on cross-border health care made it clear that health care
providers as well as private health care insurers can benefit from the
provisions of free movement of persons and services. Health care should not
only be regarded from the supplier's side where responsibility was taken in
order to keep the financial balance, increasingly the patient himself can now
choose where to take his medical treatment.6) But not only the patient can
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benefit from this Europeanisation of health care. Member States will also have
to open their system to foreign medical providers. Many directives have been
adopted to facilitate this free movement.7) The way foreign medical providers
can offer services gained particular interest last year with the proposal for a
Directive on Services in the Internal Market. These elements are further
discussed in Part II of our report.
Insofar as they can be classed as undertakings within the meaning of the
relevant ECT provisions, health care providers' and health insurers' activities
may be scrutinised under the competition rules. This topic will be dealt with
under Chapter III of this report.
It cannot be denied that health care is an economic market where goods and
services are delivered and that in principle could be supplied by private actors
operating in a purely commercial market. On the other hand, health care is not
a normal market as there is information asymmetry: suppliers still determine
demand, rather than the well-informed consumers. In health care, users are
still not in the position that they can be trusted to make decisions on their own
and in their own best interests. In addition, health care is regarded as an
essential facility, access to which should not be determined by ability- or
willingness to- pay. On the contrary, it is a fundamental right, laid down in
most European constitutions. Indeed, all Member States endorse the
fundamental goal of access to necessary health care for the whole
population, irrespective of individual health and financial status.8)
The health care market, therefore, cannot be left completely open to free
competition. This partly explains why European health care systems are to a
large extent, organised and funded by public authorities.9) In all of the health
care systems, Member States have a widely developed system of collective
responsibility and solidarity. Dealing with the topic of competition law in
social security and health care, is therefore a very complicated matter, not
least because competition law and social policy seem to be two completely
different concepts and contrary to each other. Where competition law just
wants to pull down every possible barrier and limit to the fundamental
principle of free trade and the individual freedom to take initiative and
choices, social policy seems to go the opposite direction.10) Social protection
seeks to cover and protect the population against so-called social risks.
However, state intervention, embodied in the principle of compulsory
membership within public schemes for nationals (or residents) of a given
territory implies collective action and certain mechanisms of financial
redistribution between individuals or categories of people.
The combination of these two elements of solidarity on the one hand and
more economic oriented elements from the free market on the other hand,
requires legal fine-tuning. This fine-tuning is an ongoing process, where the
European Court of Justice plays the most important role. It has to be admitted
that in its case law, the Court of Justice has sought to find a delicate balance,
4 Bulletin luxembourgeois des questions sociales
perhaps not always in a very understandable way, between the common
market and the concerns of the Member States to guarantee national
solidarity.
This fits in a particular kind of evolution where the EU is increasingly engaged
in a kind of activist social policy, affirming itself as source of market breaking
social rights. In order to avoid a full application of the internal market rules to
the health care sector, the idea is to examine if health care could be
considered as a service of general (economic) interest. This issue is further
developed in Part IV of our report.
Before exploring in more detail the influence of the internal market on health
care, we first want to examine how the EU reacted politically to national and
European developments on health care.
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I. Health policy on the European political agenda
The EU's approach to health care (excluding the "public health"
responsibilities) can roughly11) be divided into two different but
interconnected influential policy trends, namely health care systems as a core
issue in the "Lisbon Strategy" on the modernisation of social protection
systems and health care as a discussion topic in a new reflection process on
"patient mobility and health care developments", the latter being more
directly related to the Court's Kohll & Decker-jurisprudence.12)
Health care is not "new" on the EU Policy Agenda. As early as 1992, a Council
Recommendation on the convergence of social protection objectives and
policies called on the Member States "to maintain and, where necessary,
develop a high-quality health care system geared to the evolving needs
of the population, and especially those arising from dependence of the
elderly, to the development of pathologies and therapies and the need to
step up prevention".13) In the late nineties several reports and subsequent
communications of the Commission relating to social protection in Europe
and in 1999, the European Parliament called on the Commission to set in
motion a process of voluntary alignment of objectives and policies in the area
of social protection, modelled on the European Employment Strategy.14) In
November of the same year, health care was designated by the Council as
one of the four fields of social protection where closer cooperation between
the Member States was needed. Presidency Conclusions of successive
European Councils made references to the need to reform and adapt social
protection systems. The important Lisbon European Council15) of March
2000, adopting an integrated approach to employment, economic reforms
and social cohesion, set the goal (2000-2010) for the European Union to
"become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy
in the world, capable of sustainable growth with more and better jobs
and greater social cohesion". According to these conclusions, reiterated
and elaborated in almost all of the following European Council meetings, the
social protection systems needed to be adapted as part of an active welfare
state to ensure that work pays, to secure their long-term sustainability in the
face of an ageing population, to promote social inclusion and gender equality,
"and to provide quality health services". This way, the development of the
health care systems in the Member States was incorporated in an overall EU
process, the "Lisbon Strategy", presumably under the influence of the 1999
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, recommending that the Member States
should review their pension and health care systems in order to cope with
increased welfare spending on an ageing population and to influence the
supply of labour in the future.16) Accessibility, highquality and financial
sustainability were pointed out by the Commission17) as the essential points
in this modernisation process for social protection. For health care, these
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three cruces were approved by the Barcelona European Council18) in March
2002.
On the basis of these conclusions the Social Protection Committee19) (SPC)
has also been working intensively on the future of health care and care for the
elderly. Being a part of the Council and functioning as an advisory committee,
the SPC was established in 2000 to strengthen cooperation between Member
States on social protection policies.20) The main tasks of the SPC are to
monitor social protection in the Member States and the Community and to
foster an exchange of information, experience and good practices between
Member States and the Commission and thus it is directly involved in the
process of modernising health care systems, in close cooperation with the
Employment Committee (EMCO)21) and the Economic Policy Committee
(EPC),22) as one of its four objectives is to "ensure high quality and sustainable
health care". The open method of coordination, "spreading best practice
and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals", is the
method of governance that seems to be gaining importance also in health
care matters. Instituted at the Lisbon European Council of 2000, it was
designed to help the Member States develop their own policies but towards
commonly defined targets. It usually includes the establishment of
quantitative or qualitative benchmarks between the Member States and
involves monitoring, evaluation and peer review, organised as a mutual
learning process between the Member States. Not being legally binding and
lacking sanctions, the "peer pressure" through the open method of
coordination nonetheless encourages the Member States to compete and to
improve their performance, by establishing high standards and agreeing to
recommendations and feedback. In the field of health care and care for the
elderly, the Lisbon European Council of March 2000 stressed that social
protection systems needed to be able to continue providing good quality
health services. Subsequently, in June 2001, the Göteborg European
Council23) called on the Council, "in conformity with the open method of
coordination and on the basis of a joint report of the Social Protection
Committee and the Economic Policy Committee (...) to prepare a
progress report for the Spring 2002 European Council on guidelines in
the field of health and care for the elderly", which was based on a
Commission Communication on the future of health care and care for the
elderly.24) The Council delivered an initial Orientation Report on health care
and care for the elderly to the 2002 Barcelona European Council,25) which
assigned the Commission and the Council to explore further the issues of
accessibility, high quality and sustainability in the domain. Subsequently, the
SPC and the Economic Policy Committee distributed a questionnaire26) to all
the Member States, which formed the basis for a Joint Report "Supporting
national strategies for the future of health care and care for the elderly",27)
accepted at the Brussels Spring European Council of March 2003.28)
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Finally the Commission continued cooperation in the field by issuing its
Communication on the modernisation of social protection for the
development of high-quality, accessible and sustainable health care and
long-term care in April 2004, giving support for the national strategies using
the open method of coordination. After the European Parliament, in a
Resolution of March 2004, had called for greater cooperation on health and
long-term care and called on the Commission to present relevant proposals29)
and as announced in the Spring Report 2004, the Commission issued this
communication in order to define a common framework to support the
Member States in the reform and development of health care and long-term
care, borne by the social protection system, using the "open method of
coordination". In this Communication the Commission expressed its desire to
come to an agreement on the joint objectives in 2004. The Member States
were instructed to present 'preliminary reports' covering the challenges
facing their systems at national level, current reforms and medium-term
policy objectives by March 2005. These reports should include statistical data
and, where relevant, quantified objectives. At this preliminary stage, they
would be concise. They would subsequently be analysed by the Commission,
to be taken into account when the joint objectives of the streamlined social
security process are established. This streamlining should lead in 2006 to an
initial series of "development and reform strategies" in health care and long-
term care for the period 2006-2009. The conclusions of the assessment of
these strategies will be presented in the Joint report on social protection
and social inclusion in 2007. Given the wide range of topics and issues
tackled by the joint objectives, the SPC and the other competent bodies
(EMCO, EPC, the future High Level Group on Health Services and Medical
Care30) created in parallel by the Commission) should forge close links,
including the establishment of a work programme to identify the topics
relevant to each.
Next to this work, which is to be situated in and around the "Lisbon Process"
concerning the modernisation of social protection systems, there is a closely
linked but still discernable process going on that is focusing more on the
impact of the internal market on the national health care systems, and in
particular on patient mobility in the European Union facilitated by the ECJ's
case law. Raising many health policy issues, such as quality and access in
cross-border care, information requirements for patients, health
professionals and policy-makers, cooperation in health matters and the
reconciliation of national health policy with European obligations, these
rulings have caused a considerable interest and activity from the EU in health
care matters EU involvement in health care matters. As a direct product of the
fundamental freedoms on which the Community is based, patient mobility
and related health care developments received priority on this agenda. After
exchanges regarding the implications of these judgments had already taken
place during a Conference organised by the Belgian Presidency in Ghent in
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December 200131) and the High Level Committee on Health in its report of
December 2001 on the internal market and health services had already
identified important concerns (Health in the European Union, The
Coordination of Social Security Payments Systems, Recent Developments
concerning the Free Movement of Patients, Cross Border Care Projects, the
Internal Market and Health Care), further discussions were organised by the
Spanish Presidency at an informal meeting of health ministers in February
2002 in Malaga. This meeting considered questions on highly specialised
reference centres sharing spare capacity, facilitating care in neighbouring
countries for people living in border areas and providing care for those who
reside for a long time in another Member State. The meeting made it clear that
action was imperative. The diversity of the health care systems in Europe was
recognised in the report, and the principles of solidarity, equity and
universality were deemed to be shared by all these systems. The Ministers
maintained that health care policy should be the result of the work of
politicians and not of judges. A work programme was developed. They
agreed to take up the discussion again at an expert meeting to be held in
Menorca in May 2002. This meeting studied the options presented by
Regulation 1408/71 on the coordination of social security systems for the free
movement of patients and identified whether the Regulation covers all
possible situations that might arise. Other subjects were information needs,
a review of cross border care and the quality of health services at a European
level. Proposals for a basic benefit package that would be reimbursed without
prior authorisation, a European quality policy and a European alert system on
health care safety, patient information networks, exchange of medical care
information and protocols for patients and medical personnel are examples
of the initiatives discussed that seem to clear the path for a "European health
care approach".
Still it was mainly the following Health Council of June 2002 that really
boosted a process of reflection on the interaction between health systems
within the European Union. This Council, in its conclusions, recognised fully
the emerging interaction between health care systems, the Member States'
responsibilities for the organisation and delivery of health services and
medical care, but it also recognised the impact of other developments, such
as those relating to the single market, on health systems. The Council
considered that there was a need to strengthen cooperation in order to
promote the greatest opportunities for access to high quality health care
while maintaining the financial sustainability of health care systems in the
European Union. To this end "the Council and the representatives of the
Member States meeting in the Council recognise that there would be
value in the Commission pursuing in close cooperation with the Council
and all the Member States – particularly health ministers and other key
stakeholders - a high level process of reflection", which should aim at
"timely conclusions for possible further action". In this "High level
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reflection process on patient mobility and healthcare developments in the
European Union", the Commission brought together Health Ministers of the
Member States with representatives of patients, professionals, providers and
purchasers of health care and the European Parliament to develop a shared
European vision in the health area, whilst respecting national responsibility.
The High level reflection experts met three times, supported by additional
meetings of their personal representatives, and concluded in December 2003
with 19 specific recommendations on European cooperation to enable better
use of resources (rights and duties of patients, sharing spare capacity and
transnational care, European centres of reference, Health Technology
Assessment); information requirements for patients, professionals and policy
makers (EU Framework for information); access to and quality of care
(improving knowledge on access and quality issues, analysing the impact of
European activities on access and quality); reconciling national health policy
with European obligations; and on health related issues and the Union's
cohesion and structural funds. The Commission, after the production in July
2003 of a synthesis report32) on the application at national level of the Court's
case law on the issue of reimbursement for medical services incurred in
another Member State, recently responded to the challenges issued by the
High level reflection process through an overall strategy set out in two
communications: the abovementioned communication on the application of
the open method of coordination in the field of health care and long-term care
and the Communication from the Commission as a follow-up to the high level
reflection process on patient mobility and healthcare developments in the
European Union.33) A further communication sets out an "e-Health action
plan"34) within the framework of a European e-Health Area for using
information and communication technologies to help improve access, quality
and effectiveness for health services across the Union. In addition, in the light
of the Court of Justice's jurisprudence mentioned above, the Proposal for a
Directive on Services in the Internal Market35) together with the modernised
and simplified Regulation (EC) No 883/2004,36) which will replace Regulation
No 1408/71 on the entry into force of a new implementing regulation, on the
application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families
moving within the Community, provides the legal framework for
reimbursement of healthcare costs incurred in another Member State than
the patient's Member State of insurance. Together, these initiatives should
enable patients to exercise their rights under Community law to healthcare in
other Member States and to facilitate European cooperation on health
systems whilst respecting the responsibilities of the Member States for the
organization and delivery of health services and medical care.
Also important was the meeting of the first EU Health Policy Forum in
November 2002, another informal mechanism in the field of health care at the
European level.37) The aim of the Forum is to bring together umbrella
organisations representing stakeholders in the health sector to ensure that
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the EU's health strategy is open, transparent and responds to the public
concerns. The EU Health Policy Forum is a part of a three-tiered structure
also consisting of an Open Health Forum (extending the work of the Health
Policy Forum to a broader set of stakeholders having approximately 300
participants, held for the first time on 17 May 2004 in Brussels38) and, in the
future, a Virtual Health Forum.
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II. Access to health care in an internal market: impact for
statutory and complementary systems
1. Free movement of patients: the relation between the Treaty-based
and the Regulation-based Method of Patient Mobility
A. Two methods of mobility
Up until 1998, Community nationals seeking medical treatment in another
Member State at the expense of their national health insurance institution had
no choice other than to rely on Article 22 § 1 (c) of Regulation (EC) No 1408/
71. Pursuant to that provision, insured persons who obtained authorisation to
receive appropriate medical treatment in another Member State are entitled
to health care on behalf of their competent institution by the institution of the
place of stay or residence in accordance with the provisions of the legislation
which it administers, as though they were insured with it. By virtue of
paragraph 2 of Article 22, authorisation cannot be refused when the treatment
would be available under the legislation of the Member State on whose
territory the insured person resides and the treatment which that person
intends to undergo in another Member State could not be given to him within
the time normally necessary for obtaining the treatment in question in the
Member State of affiliation, taking account of his current state of health and
the probable course of the disease39).
The 1998 Kohll judgment40) of the Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as
"ECJ" or "Court"), the ambit of which was clarified in subsequent rulings,41)
paved the way for a second method of planned health care abroad, stemming
directly from the Treaty establishing the European Community (henceforth
"ECT" or "Treaty"), in particular from its Articles 49 and 50. The gist of this
case law is well-known and can be briefly summarised. Medical treatment,
provided both in and outside a hospital environment,42) constitutes a service
within the meaning of the Treaty, irrespective of the way Member States
organise and finance their social security systems. The requirement for an
authorisation for the reimbursement of medical costs incurred in another
Member State is an obstacle to the free provision of services for both patients
and providers of medical services. However, as regards intramural care, the
Court indicated that the authorisation requirement is justified in the light of
hospital planning, which is necessary in order to ensure sufficient and
permanent access to a balanced range of high quality hospital treatment as
well as to control cost and prevent wastage of financial, technical and human
resources. By contrast, in respect of extramural care, the Court pointed out
that the authorisation requirement could not be justified, as material barriers
(e.g. of a geographic or linguistic nature) would prevent large numbers of
patients from seeking extramural care abroad and in any event,
reimbursement of costs for such care would be limited to the cover provided
by the sickness insurance scheme in the Member State of affiliation. Given its
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limited financial impact, the removal of the prior authorisation requirement
would not seriously affect the financial balance of national social security
systems.43)
B. The compatibility of Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71 with the ECT
In Kohll, Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms and Müller-Fauré and Van Riet,44) the
disputed national rules were tested only against the ECT provisions on
services. For various reasons, none of these cases fell within the ambit of
Article 22(1) (c) of Regulation 1408/71. However, in Kohll, the issue of the
validity of the said Article was raised in an indirect manner. In response to the
logical contention of the Luxembourg authorities - whose legislation
constituted an accurate implementation of Article 22 of the Regulation - that
the challenging of the former amounted to calling into question the validity of
the latter, the Court indicated that the fact that a national measure may be
consistent with a provision of secondary legislation does not have the effect
of removing that measure from the scope of the provisions of the Treaty. The
ECJ went on to state that Article 22 of the Regulation is intended to regulate
the assumption of health care costs incurred in another Member State "in
accordance with the provisions of the legislation of the State in which the
services are provided".45) The Court, interpreting the said Article in the light of
its purpose, concluded that "[it] is not intended to regulate and hence does
not in any way prevent the reimbursement by Member States, at the tariffs in
force in the competent State, of costs incurred in connection with treatment
provided in another Member State, even without prior authorisation.46)
In the recent Inizan ruling,47) the Court was directly asked to give its opinion
on the compatibility with the Treaty Articles on services of the prior
authorisation scheme set up by Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71. In his
Opinion, Advocate General Colomer extensively highlighted the differences
between the Regulation- and the Treaty-based method, stressing that only
under the former was the border-crossing patient entitled to be treated in the
same manner as the affiliates of the national social security scheme.48) He
concluded that Article 22(1) (c) was not incompatible with Article 49 ECT. The
Court, on its part, reached the same conclusion. Having reiterated its findings
in Kohll, it stated that Article 22, instead of constituting an obstacle to the free
provision of services, helps to facilitate the free movement of patients and the
cross-border provision of medical services between the Member States. This
is so because insured persons thus have access to treatment in the other
Member States on conditions of reimbursement as favourable as those
enjoyed by insured persons covered by the legislation of those other States.
Accordingly, the beneficiaries of Article 22 are granted rights which they
would not otherwise have since, as they involve reimbursement by the
institution of the place of stay in accordance with the legislation administered
by it, those rights cannot by definition be guaranteed to those persons under
the legislation of the competent Member State alone.49) The circumstance
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that the Community legislature has made the benefit of these rights subject
to stringent conditions is immaterial in the Court's view, as Article 42 ECT
does not prohibit the EC legislative institutions from attaching conditions to
the rights and advantages which they accord in order to ensure freedom of
movement for workers or from determining the limits thereto.50)
As a result of the Court's refusal to invalidate Article 22 (1) (c) of Regulation
1408/71, two different procedures - the one having  no primacy over the
other51) - govern the assumption of health care costs incurred in another
Member State. Leaving aside the complexity to which this coexistence gives
rise,52) one can wonder whether the Court was right to uphold the validity of
the Regulation-based procedure. After all, it is difficult to understand how the
prior authorisation scheme established by the Regulation could alleviate the
free provision of services where the Court consistently condemns such
schemes falling outside the scope of Article 22 as barriers to that fundamental
freedom. Some authors contend that the Court should have qualified Article
22 as a prima facie restriction to Articles 49 and 50 ECT and then have
proceeded to analyse the possible justifications.53)
However, the option chosen by the Court becomes understandable when one
considers the alternative, i.e. setting aside the relevant provisions of the
Regulation as incompatible with a hierarchically superior norm. As it is
argued, such an approach would not have tallied with the present trend of
judicial deference to the Community legislature.54) Indeed, rather than
declaring secondary legislation altogether inconsistent with the Treaty, the
Court currently tends to "neutralise" any undesirable effect that legislation
may produce by directly applying Articles of primary law.55) Besides, the
Court has consistently held that, when the wording of secondary Community
law necessitates interpretation, preference should be given to the
interpretation that renders the provision consistent with the Treaty.56)
1. "Facultative" interpretation of the Regulation
Apparently, the Court has not remained oblivious to these considerations
when asserting the validity of Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71. It did so by
interpreting the Regulation in a "facultative" way, emphasising its merits, its
added value vis-à-vis the Treaty-based procedure. Manifestly, the Court did
not think of Article 22 (1) (c) as an imperative provision, compelling the
competent institution to reimburse the health services exclusively in
accordance with the tariffs applicable in the Member State where the
treatment was obtained. If it had taken such an approach, the Court would
have inevitably had to judge the compatibility of the Article with the Treaty, in
that it not allowed for reimbursement of medical costs according to the tariffs
applicable in the Member State of affiliation.57) Rather, the Court's reasoning
is centred around the advantages the Regulation offers its beneficiaries, as
compared to the situation of those relying directly on the Treaty. The former
are entitled to treatment in the other Member States "on conditions as
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favourable as those enjoyed by insured persons covered by the legislation of
those other States".58) In particular, a patient equipped with an authorisation
within the meaning of Article 22 of the Regulation may obtain cross-border
health care without incurring any additional expenditure. This is so even
where the foreign medical bill exceeds the amount that would have been
covered if the patient were treated in the Member State of affiliation. More
than that, he may even, on account of the competent institution, undergo
treatments which are not refundable in the Member State of affiliation.59)
Admittedly, these are advantages which the Treaty-based procedure does
not offer, and it is contended, cannot offer, for lack of a restriction to the free
provision of services. Indeed, the mere fact that the national health institution
or sickness fund refuses to pay for health care expenses incurred abroad is
not sufficient to hold it liable for restricting the free movement of services.
Such a refusal would only amount to a restriction if there is some prior
"national" obligation to pay. As mentioned, what is otherwise to stop frivolous
suits insisting that the government pay for holiday villas for all?60)
Consequently, if a certain medical treatment is covered by the national health
scheme of the Member State of affiliation, be it under certain conditions, the
rules of this Member State should allow this same medical treatment,
provided in another Member State under the same conditions, to be covered
to the same extent in default of which the rules of the Member State of
affiliation will represent a barrier - in need of justification - to the free provision
of services. If, on the other hand, that Member State refuses to pay the
amount exceeding the level of coverage under its own scheme, or denies
reimbursement for cross-border treatment which is not included in its
benefits package, the patient is not deterred, let alone prevented, to have
recourse to a health care provider established in another Member State.
Thus, by granting rights which the patient would not have under the Treaty-
based method, the Regulation can be seen as complementing Articles 49 and
50 ECT, as interpreted by the Court in Kohll and subsequent cases. However,
"the right to be treated in the same manner as affiliates of the […] social
security scheme [of the Member State where the treatment is obtained]",61)
granted by Article 22 (1) (c) of the Regulation, does not always work out to the
benefit of the insured person. For one thing, the amount reimbursable under
the legislation of the Member State where the treatment is received may be
lower than that reimbursable under the legislation of the Member State of
affiliation of the patient. Such was the setting in Vanbraekel.62) In that case,
the patient had (eventually63)) been granted authorisation in the sense of
Article 22 of the Regulation and was thus entitled to receive reimbursement
on the basis of the tariffs applicable in the Member State of treatment.
However, these happened to be lower than the ones applicable in Belgium,
the Member State of affiliation. The Court, reiterating its "facultative"
interpretation of Article 22, stated that this provision "does not have the effect
of preventing extra reimbursement, additional to that resulting from the
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application of the system of the Member State [of] treatment […], when the
system [of the Member State of affiliation] is more beneficial" (emphasis
added). Yet, it neither has the effect of requiring such additional
reimbursement.64) The Court then examined whether Articles 49 and 50 ECT
could entail an obligation to provide for additional reimbursement covering
the difference between the - more advantageous - system of cover laid down
by the Member State of affiliation and the system applied by the Member
State of treatment, and concluded in the affirmative.65)
2. Partial incompatibility in respect of extramural care
In Vanbraekel, the Regulation was clearly at risk of being incompatible with
the fundamental freedom to provide services. However, the non-compelling
reading of Article 22 allowed the Court to call in the Treaty Articles on the free
provision of services to "come to the rescue" of the Regulation. In this regard,
the Treaty can be seen as complementing the Regulation.
Vanbraekel was concerned with intramural care for which, even under the
Treaty-based procedure, prior authorisation must be obtained. Let us
consider now a hypothetical case, which is identical in terms of facts with
Vanbraekel, except that the cross-border receipt of extramural care is at
stake.66) If the system of cover which is in place in the Member State of
treatment is more beneficial to the patient than that in force in the Member
State of affiliation, it can be argued that the added value of the Regulation-
based procedure makes up for the prior authorisation requirement associated
with that procedure. By contrast, if the amount of reimbursement provided by
the system of the Member State of treatment is less than the amount which
application of the legislation in force in the Member State of affiliation would
afford to the patient concerned, Article 22 (1) (c) of the Regulation falls foul of
the Treaty provisions in relation to services. Indeed, not only would the patient
have a lower level of cover when he received outpatient care abroad than
when he underwent the same treatment in the Member State of affiliation -
which may deter or even prevent him from applying to foreign health care
providers 67) 68) - but in addition, he would not have been required to request
prior authorisation. Therefore, in such a case, the Regulation would be
incompatible with the free provision of services, and this incompatibility could
not just be offset by the granting of an additional reimbursement within the
meaning of Vanbraekel.69)
3. Attuning the authorisation procedures
Under the current wording of Article 22 (2) of Regulation 1408/71, Member
States retain considerable discretion to authorize treatment abroad. As
mentioned above, authorisation cannot be refused only where "(i) the
treatment in question is among the benefits provided for by the legislation of
the Member State on whose territory the person concerned resides" and
where " (ii) he cannot be given such treatment within the time normally
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necessary for obtaining the treatment in question in the Member State of
residence taking account of his current state of health and the probable
course of his disease". Member States' discretionary power to authorise
treatment abroad can even be based on an "administrative" criterion, rather
than on criteria relating to medical necessity.70) However, in its ruling in Inizan,
the Court has re-interpreted the second condition in the light of its case law
in relation to the Treaty-based method of patient mobility, in which it had
linked the appraisal of the timeliness of an equally effective treatment to the
patient's state of health. Thus, "clarifying the scope" of that condition, the
ECJ held in particular that "such a condition is not satisfied whenever it is
apparent that treatment which is the same or equally effective for the patient
can be obtained without undue delay in the Member State of residence".71) In
order to determine this, regard is to be had to "all the circumstances of each
specific case" and account is to be taken "not only of the patient's medical
condition at the time when authorisation is sought and, where appropriate, of
the degree of pain or the nature of the patient's disability which might, for
example, make it impossible or extremely difficult for him to carry out a
professional activity, but also of his medical history".72) Consistent with this
case law, the medical criterion is also brought to the fore in Regulation (EC)
No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems, which will
replace Regulation 1408/71 on the entry into force of a new implementing
regulation.73) Its Article 20 (2) provides that "[the] authorisation shall be
accorded where the treatment in question is among the benefits provided by
the legislation in the Member State where the person concerned resides and
where he cannot be given such treatment within a time-limit which is
medically justifiable, taking into account his current state of health and the
probable course of his illness".
Finally, in Inizan the Court made clear that the procedural requirements which
national authorisation schemes outside the scope of Article 22 of the
Regulation must meet, are fully applicable to national prior authorisation
systems constituting the implementation of that Article. Accordingly, such
systems must be easy accessible and capable of ensuring that a request for
authorisation be dealt with objectively and impartially within a reasonable
time-limit. Refusals must also be capable of being challenged in (quasi-)
judicial proceedings.74) 75)
4. Outlook
With its judgments in Vanbraekel and Inizan, the Court has sketched the
framework of the relationship between the two methods of patient mobility.
As regards the cross-border receipt of intramural care, the two methods are
mutually complementary and their application should be merged as much as
possible,76) in order to ensure not only legal certainty and coherence, but also
to strengthen patient rights. If a patient wishes to obtain hospital treatment in
another Member State, he will in any case have to apply for authorisation. As
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shown above, the conditions77) and the procedural modalities under which
authorization must be granted pursuant to both methods have been attuned.
Where the patient has been granted an authorisation accordingly, he is
entitled to intramural care in accordance with the legislation of the Member
State of treatment, at the expense of the Member State of affiliation, on the
understanding that the latter has to provide for additional reimbursement
covering the difference between the level of cover under the legislation of the
Member State of treatment and the (higher) amount which application of its
legislation would afford to the patient had he received the intramural care
concerned in its territory.78) In practice, it implies that this additional
reimbursement will cover co-payments the patient may have incurred in the
Member State of treatment, in pursuance to the legislation of that State.
However, the same reasoning cannot be maintained in relation to the cross-
border receipt of extramural care. In the judgment rendered in Müller-Fauré
and Van Riet, the ECJ has unequivocally indicated that prior authorisation
requirements for outpatient care constitute an unjustified restriction to the
free provision of services. Therefore, the application of Article 22 (1) (c) of
Regulation 1408/71 in respect of extramural care should be limited to cases
where it offers its beneficiary some added value, in the form of rights which
cannot be obtained by virtue of Articles 49 and 50 ECT, as interpreted by
the Court in the aforementioned cases (e.g. a benefit not included in the
package of the Member State of affiliation or a more advantageous level of
cover79)).
C. The proposal for a directive on services in the internal market and patient
mobility
Article 23 of the Proposal for a Directive on services in the internal market
[COM(2004) 2] is intended to codify the case law of the Court of Justice
relating to the Treaty-based method of patient mobility. The Commission's
objective of dealing with this issue in the Proposal is threefold: strengthening
the rights of patients, increasing legal certainty and transparency, and giving
the opportunity to the Community legislature to deal with practical issues left
open by the Court's case law.80) The scope of Article 23, especially its
relationship with Regulation 1408/71, has been clarified by the Commission
services in an explanatory note.81) The gist of these clarifications has been
taken up in the Working Document No 1 of 15 November 2004, containing
elucidations on the basis of discussions in the Working Party on
Competitiveness and Growth. The Luxembourg presidency has circulated a
consolidated text including these elucidations as well as the Articles and
recitals of the Commission's proposal which were not included in the said
Working Document.82) This consolidated text, hereinafter referred to as the
Draft services directive, will serve as a basis for our discussion. Where
appropriate, reference will be made to the text of the initial Commission
Proposal.
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Article 23 § 1 subparagraph 1 stipulates that Member States may not make
the assumption of the costs of non-hospital care in another Member State
subject to the granting of an authorisation, where the cost of that care, if it
had been provided in their territory, would have been assumed by their social
security system. The second subparagraph adds that the conditions and
formalities to which the receipt of non-hospital care in their territory is made
subject by Member States may be imposed on a patient who has received
non-hospital care in another Member State. As examples are cited the gate
keeping role of a general practitioner and the terms and conditions relation to
the assumption of costs of dental care. The first paragraph of Article 23 of the
Proposal seems to be an accurate codification of the Court's ruling in Müller-
Fauré and Van Riet.
Paragraph 2 of Article 23 deals with hospital care and states that the
authorisation to receive such care in another Member State shall be granted
in accordance with Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71 and, for the future, with
Article 20 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. The Draft services directive thus
advocates the full application of the Regulation-based method as far as
hospital care is concerned.83) The Vanbraekel case law is taken into account
in the third paragraph, treating of the level of assumption.84) In recital 53 it is
elucidated that Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71 continues to fully apply to
hospital care where according to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice
Member States can maintain requirements of prior authorisation for the
assumption of costs received in other Member States. According to that
recital, it also continues to fully apply to non-hospital care if patients ask an
authorisation in order to benefit from the special scheme applicable under
Regulation 1408/71; by contrast, Article 22 does not seek to regulate, nor in
any way to prevent, reimbursement, at the rates applicable in the Member
State of affiliation, of the costs of non-hospital care provided in another
Member State, in the absence of a prior authorisation.
Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 23, Member States shall ensure that the
level of assumption by their social security system of the costs of health care
provided in another Member State is not lower than that provided for by their
social security system in respect of similar health care provided in their
territory. Here too, the Court's case law is implemented in that patients are
always entitled to reimbursement according to the tariffs in place in the
Member State of affiliation, provided, where intramural care is concerned,
they have been granted authorisation. In respect of intramural care,
paragraph 3 encompasses the ECJ's judgment in Vanbraekel. Where
extramural care is concerned, as indicated supra, there is no need for a
Vanbraekel-like judgment, as the Regulation, on pain of running counter to
the Treaty, cannot apply in case the assumption under the legislation of the
Member State of treatment is less beneficial to the patient than that under the
Member State of affiliation.85)
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Some authors contend that paragraph 3 of the Draft services directive goes
beyond the Court's case law, as it guarantees patients a level of assumption
equal to that provided by their national legislation. They assert that the ECJ
in Müller-Fauré and Van Riet86) left room for reimbursing foreign health care
providers at a lower level than national contracted ones, as long as it is based
on objective, non-discriminatory and transparent criteria.87) We do not think
that this conclusion can be inferred from the Court's assertion. Indeed, the
Court has unambiguously stated that "the fact that a person has a lower level
of cover when he receives hospital treatment in another Member State than
when he undergoes the same treatment in the Member State in which he is
insured may deter, or even prevent, that person from applying to providers of
medical services established in other Member States and constitutes, both
for insured persons and for service providers, a barrier to freedom to provide
services". Such a restriction would not qualify for justification as
reimbursement up to the level provided for by the national legislation does not
in theory impose any additional financial burden on the national sickness
insurance and thus is not liable to have a significant effect on the financing of
the social security system.88) Rather, it would seem that the Court intended to
enable Member States which do not operate a reimbursement system - and
which therefore do not have clear-cut national reimbursement tariffs - to fix
thresholds for reimbursement of cost for cross-border treatment, that is to
calculate the nominal cost of the treatment which they would normally
assume for a certain treatment provided in kind.89) We will come back to this
issue infra.
The Draft services directive further provides that "the assumption of costs is
limited to the actual costs of the health care received". This provision, which
does not appear in the initial Commission Proposal, is anything but
contentious; indeed, although it does not explicitly stem from the Court's
rulings, there seems to be a large consensus that a patient cannot make a
profit out of his treatment abroad.90)
The Draft services directive, unlike the initial Commission Proposal, expressly
states that Member States are not required to assume travel expenses (recital
57).
By virtue of paragraph 4 of Article 23, Member States must ensure that their
authorisation systems for the assumption of costs of health care provided in
another Member State are in conformity with the Draft services directive's
general provisions on authorisation schemes, in particular its Articles 9 to 11
and 13. These Articles are tailored to the active provision of services and are
not suitable for governing the authorisation requirement for the assumption of
health care costs incurred abroad. It would be better if the fourth paragraph
were deleted.91) The procedural requirements established by the Court
provide sufficient guarantees for patients seeking authorisation for cross-
border treatment.
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1. The distinction between intra- and extramural care
To end with, some brief remarks should be made concerning the distinction
between intramural and extramural care, which runs like a thread through the
case law of the Court in relation to patient mobility. The Court itself
recognised that the distinction may be difficult to draw. It did indicate,
however, that it is willing to give a broad interpretation of the concept
extramural care, where it stated that "certain services provided in a hospital
environment but also capable of being provided by a practitioner in his
surgery or in a health centre could for that reason be placed on the same
footing as non-hospital services" (emphasis added).92)
As the classification of care greatly impacts the scope of patient mobility,
there is clearly a need for a Community definition of intramural care, in order
to prevent Member States from denoting treatments as such at their own
discretion.93) This definition should have regard to the intrinsic characteristics
of hospital care, characteristics that make it impossible for such care to be
provided outside a hospital environment. In the Commission's view, the
clearest criterion to assess this is that the treatment concerned requires
overnight accommodation.94) Accordingly, Article 4, 10° of the initial Proposal
defined hospital care as "medical care which can be provided only within a
medical infrastructure and which normally requires the accommodation
therein of the person receiving the care, the name, organisation and financing
of that infrastructure being irrelevant for the purposes of classifying such care
as hospital care". Spurred by some Member States who felt that overnight
accommodation is not the only reason for which certain types of treatment
are reserved to hospitals,95) the definition in the revised version has been
extended to medical care which "can only be provided within a hospital
infrastructure because it is highly specialised or presents a manifest risk to
the patient".
The initial Proposal failed to address the important question of the
geographical area for consideration of what cannot be provided outside a
hospital environment. The "capability rule", inaugurated by the Court in
Müller-Fauré and Van Riet, can hardly assist in this regard, for its potential
range of consideration is virtually unlimited.96) Narrowing down the issue, the
essential question is whether it is the Member State of actual treatment, or
the normal location of that treatment in the Member State of affiliation, which
is decisive. The latter may seem more logical. Indeed, the basis of permitting
restrictions is the need to maintain domestic hospital infrastructure, which
suggests that treatment that would be in that infrastructure may be confined
there.97) Accordingly, authorisation would be required for the assumption of
costs of what is considered to be hospital care in the Member State of
affiliation, even though this treatment is considered non-hospital care in the
Member State of treatment. This is the approach advocated by the
Commission98) and which found its way to the Draft services directive. The
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definition of hospital care, which has moved to Article 23 § 1 a, now reads as
follows: "[...] medical care which, in the Member State of affiliation of the
patient, is provided in a hospital infrastructure either because the care
requires accommodation of the patient or it can only be provided within a
hospital infrastructure because it is highly specialised or presents a manifest
risk to the patient. The name, organisation and financing of that infrastructure
is irrelevant for the purposes of classifying such care as hospital care"
(emphasis added). Still, opinions are divided on the matter as to which
Member State should be taken as the point of reference. As it is argued, the
reference point should be the Member State of actual treatment. That takes
the view that the very fact that the care was provided elsewhere indicates that
it could have been. Therefore, the need for infrastructure is clearly not as
great, if existent at all.99) A similar conclusion was reached by the Dutch
Health Care Insurance Board (CVZ), which also considers that authorisation
may be required if the health care (to be) obtained abroad involves admission
there.100)
D. The new Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 versus the health care cases and
Article 23 of the proposal for a directive on services in the internal market
During the revision process of Regulation 1408/71, the issue was raised as to
whether the Court's health care rulings should be incorporated into the new
coordination regulation. In our view, integrating the case law into the
coordination regulation is not desirable. As mentioned before, the Articles of
the coordination instruments dealing with planned health care abroad confer
upon their beneficiaries provided they have been granted authorisation, rights
which the ECT provisions on services cannot grant. Curtailing this procedure,
for instance by confining it to in-patient treatment, would mean a step
backwards in terms of the acquis. On the other hand, getting rid of the
inconsistency indicated above in respect of extramural care requires the
application of the Regulation-based method to be limited to cases in which it
offers its beneficiaries some added value. Translating this into a legal text is
not an easy task. Moreover, in addition to matters of a "politico-institutional"
nature (legislative procedure requiring unanimity within the Council), further
problems arise because of the distinct features (e.g. personal scope),
economies and indeed legal bases of the two methods of patient mobility.
However, this does not mean that the Community legislature should
disregard one method while regulating the other, as Article 23 (2) of the Draft
services directive satisfactorily demonstrates. In this context, it is regrettable
that the Community legislature did not seize the opportunity, on adoption of
the new coordination regulation, to at least implicitly refer to the Treatybased
method of patient mobility, instead of making it appear as if Regulation (EC)
No 883/2004 is the one route for patients wishing to be treated in another
Member State at the expense of the national health insurance institution.101)
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The European Parliament adopted an amendment in first reading by including
in the first paragraph of the Article dealing with authorisation to receive
treatment outside the competent State - which later became Article 20 - a
reference to the case law of the Court: "[save] as otherwise provided under
this Regulation, an insured person travelling to another Member State with
the purpose of receiving benefits in kind during the stay shall seek
authorisation from the competent institution where such benefits involve in-
patient treatment" (emphasis added).102) This clause could be read as
implying that patients travelling to another Member State in order to receive
benefits in kind which involve extramural treatment do not - or not necessarily
- have to apply for authorisation, while the second paragraph of the said
Article, which treats of the rights of insured persons who are authorized by
the competent institution to go to the territory of another Member State,
apparently would still encompass both in- and out-patient care. Accordingly,
the amendment would demonstrate that there is an alternative, a procedure
enabling patients to obtain non-hospital treatment in another Member State
at the expense of the national health insurance institution without having to
seek authorisation, even if the Article concerned does not mention that
procedure. If, however, the amendment would have the effect of confining the
scope of the second paragraph to in-patient treatment, it would deprive
patients wishing to obtain out-patient treatment abroad from the definite
benefits of the Regulation-based method. Furthermore, insofar as it was the
intention of the European Parliament to take into account the Court's case
law, it can be questioned whether it is appropriate to qualify out-patient
treatments received abroad - which, in accordance with this case law, have
to be pre-paid by the patient - as "benefits in kind".
Be that as it may, the relevant part of the Parliament's amendment, which was
accepted by the Commission,103) has not been retained by the Council. The
Council has indeed preferred to maintain the principle of prior authorisation
for extramural care, to the Commission's regret,104) and has deleted the
italicised clause. In the draft Statement of the Council's reasons
accompanying the adoption of the common position, it is stated that the
Council was not in a position to limit the scope of the competent institution's
authorisation to receive appropriate treatment outside the State of residence
to in-patient treatment and that in its view, the effects of such a restriction, in
particular on the reimbursement arrangements between Member States,
would also have had to be subject to specific provisions.105)
2) The active provision of services by foreign medical service providers
In this chapter, we will try to outline some aspects of the European legal
framework in relation to the mobility of medical doctors, in particular where
they temporarily provide services in another Member State without being
established there.106) Doctors, like many other health care professionals, can
hardly be regarded as ordinary service providers. Indeed, service provision in
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the health care sector is complicated by aspects of social security. Doctors
can be seen as operating in a triangle, the third party being a national health
service or a sickness fund, which bears - directly or indirectly - the major part
of their bill.107) Different contracting systems, either inclusive or exclusive, are
in place in the Member States. How do these systems articulate with the
temporary and occasional provision of services by migrant doctors?
A. The minor contribution of the recognition instruments
The mobility of medical doctors has been the subject of Community
secondary legislation, in the form of Directive 93/16/EEC of 5 April 1993 to
facilitate the free movement of doctors and the mutual recognition of their
diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications.108) This
Directive, hereinafter referred to as the Doctor's Directive, is chiefly
concerned with the removal of obstacles arising from the imposition of
national qualification requirements on migrant doctors. These restrictions,
which are dealt with in the Directive through the concepts of harmonisation
and mutual recognition, are outside our purpose.
In addition, the Doctor's Directive, in its chapter VI, provides for a partial
coordination of national requirements to the takingup and the pursuit of
professional activities of doctors. Articles 17 and 18 are specifically
concerned with the free provision of services and lay down a less stringent
framework for doctors who only temporarily and occasionally provide
medical services in the territory of the host Member State, as opposed to their
colleagues who establish themselves in the host Member State, either in an
employed (Article 39 ECT) or self-employed (Article 43 ECT) capacity. The gist
of these provisions is reiterated in Title II of the common position adopted by
the Council on 21 December 2004 with a view to the adoption of a Directive
on the recognition of professional qualifications (hereinafter referred to as the
Common Position).109) According to Article 5 (3) of the Common Position, the
service provider "shall be subject to the disciplinary provisions of a
professional or administrative nature which are directly linked to professional
qualifications, such as the definition of the profession, the use of titles and
serious professional malpractice which is directly and specifically linked to
consumer protection and safety, which are applicable in the host Member
State to professionals who pursue the same profession in that Member
State". As is apparent from recital 8 of the Common Position, these
disciplinary provisions include "the scope of activities covered by a
profession or reserved to it", thus endorsing and codifying the principle set
out in the Court's ruling in Gräbner.110)
Pursuant to Article 6 (a) of the Common Position, the host Member State must
exempt service providers established in another Member State from the
requirements which it places on professionals established in its territory
relating to authorisation by, registration with or membership of a professional
organisation or body. However, in order to facilitate the application of the
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disciplinary provisions of the host Member State, the latter may provide for
either automatic temporary registration with or for pro forma membership of
such a professional organisation or body, provided that such registration or
membership does not delay or complicate in any way the provision of
services and does not entail any additional costs for the service provider.
Furthermore, Member States may require that, upon the first provision of
services in his territory, the service provider concerned shall inform the
competent authority in the host Member State in a written declaration to be
made in advance including the details of any insurance cover or other means
of personal or collective protection with regard to professional liability. Such
declaration shall be renewed once a year if the service provider intends to
provide temporary or occasional services in that Member State during that
year. The service Member State may require that the declaration be
accompanied by proof of the nationality of the service provider, by an
attestation certifying that the holder is legally established in a Member State
for the purpose of pursuing the activities concerned and by evidence of
professional qualifications (Article 7(2). A copy of the said declaration and,
where applicable, of its renewal, accompanied by a copy of the documents
referred to in Article 7(2), shall be sent by the competent authority to the
relevant professional organisation or body, and this shall constitute automatic
temporary registration or pro forma membership within the meaning of Article
6 [Article 6 (a)].
Finally, under Article 6 (b) of the the Common Position, the host Member State
must exempt the foreign service provider from registration with a public social
security body for the purpose of settling accounts with an insurer relating to
activities pursued 17 for the benefit of insured persons. However, the service
provider shall inform in advance or, in an urgent case, afterwards, this body
of the services which he has provided.
It would of course be erroneous to assume that the aforesaid provisions
regulate the cross-border provision of medical services exhaustively. A
significant part of the plethora of regulations to which Member States tend to
subject health care professionals in their territory, is left untouched by the
Doctor's Directive and indeed by the amended Proposal on the recognition of
professional qualifications. Common Position.
The scope of Article 5 (3) of the Common Position, like that of the second
subparagraph of Article 17 (1) of the Doctor's Directive, to which it bears a
resemblance,111) is less than crystal-clear. It is regrettable that the Council has
retained the reference to the notion of "disciplinary rules of a professional and
administrative nature", which is vague to the extreme and lends itself to
divergent national interpretations. A clearer definition of the host State rules
with which the service provider has to comply at any rate would certainly be
acclaimed, not least in the light of the Draft services directive. Indeed, if both
instruments were adopted as they stand at present, the said notion, which
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dates back to 1975, would delimit the range of the country of origin principle
in respect of the temporary cross-border pursuit of numerous professional
activities, including that of doctors. The additional requirement that the
disciplinary provisions have a direct and specific link to professional
qualifications, even if it is coherent with the scope of the Common Position,
does little to clarify matters. If "serious professional malpractice" meets this
requirement, then why not rules regarding advertising and multi-disciplinary
activities? Be that as it may, the condition that there be a direct and specific
link with professional qualifications shows a desire on the part of the Council
to reduce the body of disciplinary regulation of the host Member State which
has to be complied with by the service provider. In its Statement of reasons
accompanying the Common Position, the Council has indicated that, "for
reasons of proportionality", [Article 5 (3) and recital 8] limit the disciplinary
provisions applicable to those which are strictly relevant".112) It would seem
that the host Member State's non-disciplinary regulations as well as its
disciplinary provisions which lack a direct and specific link with professional
qualifications are covered by the rule contained in the third recital,113) and thus
have to be observed by the service provider only in as far as they are
objectively justified and proportionate. In the context of the free provision of
services, this means theoretically, as we shall see below, that these host
State regulations will apply only exceptionally.
As concerns the consequences of the incidence of aspects of social security,
the recognition instruments do not contribute much either. Stating on the
obligation to exempt foreign service providers from registration with a public
social security body [Article 6 (b) of the Common Position], which is currently
laid down in Article 18 of the Doctor's Directive, the Court held that "neither
[that Article] nor any other provision of [the Doctor's Directive] seeks to
eliminate all obstacles that might exist in the Member States relating to the
reimbursement of the cost of medical services by an insurance body to which
the doctor established in another Member State does not belong".114)
Accordingly, Member States remain, in principle, competent to regulate the
taking-up and the pursuit of professional activities of doctors. However, when
doing so, they must respect the fundamental freedom of service provision.
This means that the imposition of national rules on foreign service providers
will have to comply with Articles 49 and 50 of the Treaty, as interpreted by the
Court of Justice.115)
B. The general case law on Articles 49 and 50 ECT
Article 50, last paragraph of the ECT grants the service provider the right to
temporarily pursue his activity in the State where the service is provided,
"under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own
nationals". However, the Court of Justice soon indicated that a mere right to
national treatment might not suffice to enable the beneficiary to effectively
exercise the freedom laid down in Article 49 ECT. Indeed, the service provider
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moves, if at all, to the host Member State only temporarily. He is already
established in another Member State, to whose legislation he remains
subject. In those circumstances, the imposition of the rules of the host
Member State means that the service provider might be subject to a double
regulatory burden, having to satisfy both the rules imposed by the Member
State of establishment and those of the Member State of destination.116) 117)
The specificity of the provision of services was explicitly recognised by the
Court in Webb, where it stated that the non-discrimination principle "does not
mean that all national legislation applicable to nationals of the [host Member
State] and usually applied to the permanent activities of undertakings
established therein may be similarly applied in its entirety to the temporary
activities of undertakings which are established in other Member States".118)
Only in Säger119) was the non-discrimination principle completely
"abandoned" in the field of services, for the benefit of a wide application of
the country of origin principle.120) In that case, the Court of Justice confirmed
that a Member State may not make the provision of services in its territory
subject to compliance with all the conditions required for establishment on
pain of depriving "of all practical effectiveness the provisions of the Treaty
whose object is, precisely, to guarantee the freedom to provide services".121)
It then turned to the question whether Articles 49 et seq of the ECT could also
be infringed by indistinctly applicable measures. Replying in the affirmative,
the Court stated that "[Article 49 of the Treaty] requires not only the
elimination of all discrimination against a person providing services on the
ground of his nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it
applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of
other Member States [...]". The national measures which come under the
Articles 49 et seq of the ECT are positively defined as those which are "[...]
liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services
established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar
services".122) The latter clause offers the key to the Court's reasoning. The
service provider in question was established in a Member State and fulfilled
all the conditions laid down by the legislation of that State for the access to
and the exercise of his professional activities.123) Because of his legally
carrying on similar activities in the Member State of establishment, he
automatically acquires the right to provide his services in the territories of the
other Member States. This implies an acknowledgement on the part of the
host Member States that the Member State in which the service provider is
established regulates the activity concerned appropriately and to an
adequate extent. The lawful pursuit of similar activities in the Member State
of establishment constitutes minimum, yet sufficient proof of the provider's
aptitude as well as of the quality of his services.124) Only exceptionally and
subject to certain conditions should Member States, in which the services are
occasionally and temporarily provided, be allowed to impose their own rules
on non-established providers.125) This will be the case if those rules are non-
discriminatory, objectively necessary and suitable for attaining a legitimate
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aim - either an express derogation listed in Article 46 ECT or an imperative
reason relating to the public interest - which is not sufficiently protected by
the legislation to which the service provider is subject in the Member State of
establishment. Accordingly, the legitimacy of the host Member State's action
must be proven on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the interests at
issue and taking into account the legislation of the other Member
States.126) 127) 
C. The "Activation" of the health care cases
It is submitted that the health care cases discussed in the previous chapter
can provide useful guidance to our present purpose, which is to describe the
relation between national health insurance schemes and the temporary
provision of services by medical doctors established in another Member
State. The health care cases were concerned with the "passive" provision of
services, in that the claimants, as recipients of medical services, asserted
rights conferred upon them by Article 49 ECT. Nonetheless, the Court has not
failed to refer to the situation of the providers of the services at issue, i.e. the
foreign health care providers. It has consistently held that the requirement of
prior authorisation for the assumption of health care costs incurred abroad
constitutes a barrier to the freedom to provide services, not only for insured
persons, but also for service providers.
Taking the health care cases as a point of departure, we will first highlight
some crucial aspects of this case law and then attempt to sketch the
European legal framework in which foreign health care professionals
providing services in the host Member State operate.
1. The case-law of the Court
The first matter, whose significance should not be underestimated, relates to
the ease with which the Court classified the medical treatment received
abroad as a service within the meaning of Article 50 ECT. Admittedly, ever
since the judgments in Luisi and Carbone128) and Grogan,129) (private) medical
services are deemed to fall within the ambit of the free provision of services.
In the health care cases however, the Court applied the ECT Articles
regarding services to State-organised provision of health care, that is health
care funded (and often provided) by the welfare state. To do so, the Court had
to establish the existence of an exchange of services for consideration. The
ECJ found that the relationship between the patient and the national social
security institution (the "payer") was not relevant to its assessment.130) In
Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, in response to arguments raised by
intervening governments and the Advocate General, the Court looked into the
relationship between the payer and the (hypothetical) national provider, only
to conclude that "the payments made by the sickness insurance funds under
the contractual arrangements provided for by the ZFW, albeit set at a flat rate,
are indeed the consideration for the hospital services and unquestionably
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represent remuneration for the hospital which receives them and which is
engaged in an activity of an economic character".131) However, in both
Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms and Müller-Fauré and Van Riet the Court
made clear that the intrastate, in casu Dutch setting was not relevant.
Irrespective of whether or not health care provided by Dutch providers and
paid by Dutch sickness funds constitutes a service within the meaning of the
Treaty, medical treatments obtained outside the national territory can be
regarded as such because the patient has paid the foreign provider
directly132)It is thus the interstate relationship between the insured person and
the foreign health care provider, the latter being paid by the former for the
services provided, which is decisive. The significance of this pragmatic
approach should not be underestimated. It clearly demonstrates that, at least
at this stage, the Court does not treat the public provision of health care, with
its triangular structure and its involvement of a third-party payer, any
differently than other service sectors. What is more, the approach adopted by
the Court renders irrelevant, for the purpose of the qualification as a service
within the meaning of the ECT, the nature of the domestic health care system.
The third party, the national payer, only comes to the fore upon the
examination of the restrictive effect of the national measures at issue. By
making the assumption of health care costs incurred abroad subject to
restrictive conditions, such as a prior authorisation requirement, or by
providing for a lower reimbursement of these costs than the insured person
would have obtained if he had undergone the same treatment under the same
conditions in the Member State of affiliation, Member States erect an
obstacle to the freedom to provide services, both for the patient and the
foreign provider. In general, Member States will be held liable of restricting
the free provision of services whenever they deter patients from seeking
medical treatment from a health care provider established in another Member
State. This will be the case where patients are put at a disadvantage for the
sole reason of having applied to a health care provider established in another
Member State. Consequently, an insured person who has received (and paid
for) a certain medical treatment obtained abroad which, if it had been
obtained within the national borders, under the conditions under which it is
delivered, would have given rise to a financial intervention of the payer
amounting to a given sum, should be granted a reimbursement totalling that
sum without having to apply for an authorisation, in default of which the
national measures will constitute a restriction to the free provision of services.
In respect of the interstate provision of extramural care, these restrictions
cannot in principle be justified.133)
This said, the actual implications of the Court's repeated assertion that
Community law does not detract from the powers of the Member States to
organise their social security systems and, particularly, of its even more
recurrent statement that Member States must still comply with Community
law when exercising their powers, become clear. Whereas application of
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Article 49 ECT, consistent with the former assertion and with Article 152 (5)
ECT, appear to leave intact national power to determine who can become
affiliated to a social security scheme (personal scope), the conditions to be
fulfilled in order to receive benefits and what these benefits will be (material
scope),134) compliance with Community law seems to entail for the Member
States a loss of spatial control over the medical consumption of their
citizens135) and a Europeanisation of the range of providers whom the patient
is entitled to visit.
2. Europeanisation of the range of providers: about contracted and non-
contracted providers and its reimbursement
In our opinion, this Europeanisation should not be construed by reference to
the nature of the national health care system, as some authors, following the
judgments in Kohll and Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, have contended. In
their view, Member States operating a reimbursement system, such as
Luxembourg and Belgium, reimbursing treatment from any doctor
established in the territory, should henceforth cover the medical services
provided by any doctor established in the European Union. For Member
States with a benefits-in-kind system, such as the Netherlands, where
sickness funds enter into agreements with health care providers which
provide treatment free of charge to those affiliated with it, the translation into
"Eurospeak" would have smaller repercussions. It would merely mean that
the sickness funds cannot discriminate between domestic providers and
providers established in another Member State. In particular, it should be just
as easy for foreign providers to become contracted as it is for domestic ones.
Furthermore, if the sickness fund were to avail itself of the services of non-
contracted institutions, it would be just as easy to obtain treatment from a
non-contracted provider established in another Member State as it is to
obtain care from its non-contracted colleague in the Member State of
affiliation. Member States with a national health service, such as the
Scandinavian Member States, would only be affected to the extent that they
recognise the patient's right to be treated by a private provider at their
expense; in that case, they cannot discriminate against foreign health care
providers.136)
We do not think that the Eurospeak argument is well-founded. As regards
Member States operating health care schemes which do not provide benefits
in cash - the major part of the European Union's twenty-five Member States
- the impact of Articles 49 and 50 ECT, as interpreted by the Court, goes well
beyond a mere application of a national treatment rule to the contracting of
health care providers. Obviously, Member States cannot disregard
applications from health care providers established in other Member States.
It is self-evident that the evaluation criteria should be objective, transparent
and non-discriminatory. On the other hand, it is materially impossible for
national health insurance institutions to enter into agreements with all
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European health care providers. Besides, it would seem unreasonable to
oblige health care institutions to contract foreign health care providers where
their services would not meet a demand on the part of the insured persons.
The ruling in Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, even if it left unclear whether the
justification of the prior authorisation requirement was founded on the
aspect of planning of hospital services or rather on the specific nature of the
Dutch benefits in kind system,137) demonstrated that Member States,
regardless of the nature of their national contracting system and irrespective
of the type of care received (intra- or extramural), should reimburse the health
care costs incurred abroad, on pain of restricting the free provision of
services.
Member States operating exclusive contracting systems cannot veil the
restrictive effect of the prior authorisation requirement by putting forward that
it applies to (domestic and foreign) non-contracted health care providers and
therefore has no nationalistic or territorial undercurrent.138) As the Court held
in Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, in response to the argument made by the
Dutch government and the Commission that it was open to the sickness
funds to enter into agreements with providers outside the Netherlands, "it will
be mainly hospital establishments in the Netherlands that will strike
contractual arrangements with the sickness insurance funds" and "it seems
unlikely that a significant number of hospitals in other Member States would
ever enter into agreements with the Netherlands sickness insurance funds,
their prospects of admitting patients insured by those funds remaining
uncertain and limited".139) In order to decide that the Dutch rule constituted a
restriction to the free provision of services, the Court accepted that "in the
majority of cases the assumption of costs, under the [Dutch legislation], of
hospital treatment provided by establishments in Member States other than
the Member State in which a person is insured will have to be subject to prior
authorisation.140) In other words, even if foreign health care providers have
an equal opportunity to conclude agreements with the national health
insurance institution, the prior authorisation requirement for
noncontracted care will still work to the detriment of foreign health care
providers and impact them disparately141) A disparate impact is of course
particularly evident in the case of the Luxembourg inclusive contracting
system, under which authorization to practice medicine cannot be detached
from accession to the collective agreement with the Union des Caisses de
Maladie (UCM). Hence, the authorisation requirement will in principle only
affect foreign health care professionals.
We submit that the same line of reasoning should apply with respect to the
level of assumption of the medical services supplied by foreign health care
providers. Member States cannot evade the prohibition contained in Article
49 ECT by reimbursing the costs incurred abroad to the (lower) level of cover
they happen to employ in respect of care provided by domestic non-
contracted providers (see also supra). It simply cannot be expected from
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foreign health care providers, in their capacity of beneficiaries of the freedom
to provide services, to have entered into contracts with any health insurance
institution with which their potential patients may be insured, to be placed on
the same footing as competing health care providers established in the
Member State of affiliation of the patient, the majority of whom are contracted
and for whom it is far easier to meet this condition.142)
Consequently, we believe that it can be inferred from the ruling in Geraets-
Smits and Peerbooms, as confirmed and elucidated by Müller-Fauré and Van
Riet, that Member States, even if they operate a selective contracting system
domestically by virtue of which appealing to the services of domestic non-
contracted providers is contingent upon prior authorisation or results for the
patient in a lower level of cover, are liable of restricting the free provision of
services if they fail to equate the rights of insured persons who applied to a
foreign health care provider with the rights of those who visited a domestic
contracted provider.
The rulings in Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms and Müller-Fauré and Van Riet,
especially when interpreted in the manner we advocate, do not sit well with
national contracting systems for extramural services. Where Member States
are to grant patients who visited a foreign provider the same treatment as
those who obtained treatment from a domestic contracted provider, it is not
surprising that domestic providers, both contracted and non-contracted, will
feel wronged, the former because their foreign competitors allegedly do not
have their hands tied by all sorts of regulations and the latter because the
services they provide do not give rise to the same benefits as those of the
foreign providers, who are no more bound by agreements with the national
health insurance institution than they are. As far as the discontent of domestic
contracted providers is concerned, this holds true as well for Member States
operating an inclusive contracting system in which providers are
automatically included, such as Luxembourg.143) It is well-known that the
Luxembourg medical profession, following the Kohll judgment, has called into
question this compulsory contracting system. Discussions were held, at the
end of which it was decided to maintain the compulsory contracting system
but to comply with certain subsidiary demands of the Luxembourg medical
and dentist profession.144)
For the time being, the Court does not seem amenable to objections raised
by Member States that fear the declining interest of the medical profession in
cooperating in a contracting system.145) 146) As mentioned above, the Court
rejected the reasons put forward to justify the requirement for prior
authorisation in respect of the assumption of the costs of cross-border
extramural care.147)
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D. The temporary provision of extramural care by medical doctors in the host
member state
In our opinion, there is no valid cause for fundamentally overthrowing the
scheme depicted above for the sole reason that, instead of the patient
travelling towards the foreign health care provider, it is the latter that moves
temporarily to the patient's Member State of affiliation in order to provide
medical services there.
Accordingly, a health care provider established in a Member State where he
lawfully provides medical services, is entitled to provide those services on a
temporary and occasional basis in the host Member State. If these services,
had they been provided by a contracted provider established in the host
Member State, would have been assumed by the national health insurance
institution, the patient, recipient of the medical services provided by the
foreign doctor, is entitled to reimbursement, the amount of which may not be
lower than the level of assumption of that care as provided by a domestic
contracted provider. The patient who visits a foreign doctor providing
services in the territory of the Member State of affiliation does not need to
apply for prior authorisation, save where this would constitute a condition on
which the benefits concerned are granted in that Member State, and
consequently, would also be required had the patient obtained the care from
a domestic contracted provider.
The foreign doctor should be given an equal opportunity to participate in the
contracting system applicable in the host Member State. His application
should be assessed on the basis of objective, transparent and non-
discriminatory criteria. However, it seems unlikely that many foreign doctors,
who are engaged in the temporary and occasional provision of medical
services in the host Member State, will want to take part in the contracting
scheme of that State. In our view, it cannot be imposed upon the foreign
doctor to participate in the contracting system of the host Member State in
order for the costs of his medical services to be reimbursed, even if joining
this system is not a matter of choice for domestic doctors, such as is the case
in Luxembourg. Whilst condemning a foreign doctor to private practice
would directly affect his access to the market in the host Member
State,148)149) requiring him to enter into agreements with a national health
insurance institution would appear a too cumbersome procedure in
proportion to the temporary nature of the service provision, depriving it
of all practical effectiveness. This conclusion not only stems from the Säger
case law, but can as well be inferred from the "activated" health care
cases.150)
Patients visiting a foreign medical doctor who is not bound by a contract with
the health insurance institution in the host Member State must pay the
medical bill up front, and then file a claim for reimbursement.
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As an intrinsic corollary of the qualification of health care professionals as
service providers, the Articles 49 and 50 ECT, as construed in the health care
cases, have detracted from the powers of the Member States to define, in
the presence of an intra- Community situation,151) the range of providers who
are entitled to supply medical services at the expense of the national health
insurance schemes. The services of foreign health care professionals who
lawfully provide health care in their Member State of establishment are
eligible for coverage under the national health insurance scheme of the
Member State of affiliation of the patient, irrespective of whether the insured
person travels to the Member State of establishment of the health care
professional to receive these services or whether the latter provides these
services temporarily in the territory of the host Member State, in which the
patient is insured. On the other hand, they appear to leave intact Member
States' power to define the personal scope of these schemes, their power to
determine the treatments which are covered and the extent to which they are
covered, and lastly, their power to lay down the conditions on which benefits
are granted.152) Member States retain full competence to regulate these
matters as they see fit, provided they do not discriminate against nationals or
goods of the other Member States.153) The effect of these regulations might
well be to impede or render less attractive the provision of services by foreign
doctors. As such, these rules are at risk of being covered by the broad Säger
formula. Even so, and leaving aside the case of discrimination, we submit that
the foreign medical service provider should not be able to challenge the
legislation of the host Member State establishing these parameters of
statutory health insurance. This legislation cannot be qualified as a restriction
to the free provision of services within in the meaning of Article 49 ECT. To
take a different view would amount to allowing the Community to exceed its
competence and would render completely nugatory the Court's sustained
assertions on Member States' powers in these fields. As far as the said
parameters are concerned, the foreign medical service provider should
basically take the statutory health insurance system of the host Member State
as he finds it. Accordingly, although it is liable to hinder the cross-border
provision of his services, a Luxembourg-based specialist doctor practicing
temporarily in the Netherlands cannot call into question the Dutch referral
system. By the same token, a dentist holding a lucrative practice in the
Member State of establishment, whose statutory health insurance system
generously reimburses the costs of dental care, cannot challenge the
decision of the host Member State to cut back on expenses for dental care
and, in view of that, not to assume the costs of certain types of treatments or
to assume them only for minors.
By contrast, the imposition on the foreign medical service provider of host
State regulations which are not such as to define the boundaries of health
care cover, is to be assessed under the Säger case law. To require the foreign
medical service provider to comply with regulations which are not closely
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connected to patients' entitlement to health care benefits, even if they are
indistinctly applicable, is tantamount to restricting the free provision of
services. The regulations concerned, which would include, in the
Luxembourg setting, the rules which affiliation of the mandatory contracting
system brings about for domestic doctors, deal with a vast array of issues
and include, in addition to rules of a purely professional nature154) such as
those governing multidisciplinary activities and commercial communications,
rules relating to the organisation of the profession,155) good medical practice,
tariffs,156) cost containment, etc.
Undoubtedly, the bulk of these restrictions is eligible for justification under
Article 46 ECT (the protection of public health) or under the judicially-created
exceptions to the free provision of services. The Court has construed the
scope of the express public health exception broadly so that it encompasses
the objective of maintaining a high-quality and balanced medical service
open to all as well as the objective of maintaining treatment capacity or
medical competence on the national territory.157) The risk of seriously
undermining the financial balance of the social security system constitutes,
despite its economic connotation, an overriding reason of general interest.158)
The same appears to hold true for the essential characteristics of the national
health insurance scheme.159)
National restrictive measures must be proportionate to the aim pursued; in
particular, they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the imperative
general interest requirement they pursue and must not go beyond what is
necessary in order to attain it. In that context, and even in the absence of a
common standard created by the Community legislature, regard must be had
to the legislation to which the foreign medical service provider is subject in
the Member State of establishment, in which he lawfully provides similar
services.160) In order to be able to impose its own indistinctly applicable rules,
in compliance with the principle of proportionality, the host Member State
must demonstrate the failure of the legislation of the Member State of
establishment to safeguard the general interest, e.g. the protection of public
health. This supposes, theoretically, an assessment of both the objective and
abstract proportionality of the envisaged measure to the aim pursued and the
subjective and concrete proportionality in relation to the protection of this aim
by the relevant legislation of the Member State of establishment.161)
However, faced with national measures pursuing objectives of public health
or social policy, the Court tends to employ a lighter-touch proportionality test
and to grant the Member State a wider margin of appreciation.162) In
Gräbner,163) the Court acknowledged that Article 49 ECT does not preclude
national regulation reserving the exercise of certain activities to medical
doctors, thus confirming previous case law in relation to Article 43 ECT.164) It
was held in particular that the decision of a Member State to restrict to a
group of professionals with specific qualifications, such as qualified doctors,
the right to carry out medical diagnoses and prescribe treatments for illness
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or to alleviate physical or mental disorders may be considered to be a
suitable means of achieving the objective of safeguarding public health.165)
Having recalled its consistent case law according to which the mere fact that
a Member State has chosen a system of protection different from that
adopted by another Member State cannot affect the appraisal of the need for
and proportionality of the provisions adopted, the Court found the measure
not to go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective, stating that
each Member State may decide, in accordance with its understanding of the
protection of public health, whether or not to authorise practitioners without
such qualifications to exercise activities of a medical nature, laying down,
where appropriate, requirements relating to experience or qualifications
which such practitioners must fulfil.166)
Even so, whereas the home Member State's regulations on health care tariffs
and, perhaps, on the organisation of the medical profession cannot be seen
outside the social and legal context of that Member State and may hardly be
relevant in the territory of the host Member State, this is not the case for
requirements aimed at quality assurance and cost control. Accordingly, the
host Member State must not disregard quality guidelines or requirements
relating to continuous professional development to which the foreign medical
service provider is subject in the home Member State. Likewise, against the
backdrop, common to all Member States, of scarce financial resources
having to satisfy increasing health care needs, the home Member State will
most probably have issued legislation to ensure efficient spending of public
money. Even if such rules are destined to safeguard another public purse,
they will produce a favourable effect on that of the Member State to which the
foreign medical service provider moves and will have to be taken into account
by that Member State.167)
E. The proposal for a directive on services in the internal market168)
We already mentioned that, if the Draft services directive were to be adopted,
it would become the frame of reference within which the free provision of
medical services is to take place. The showpiece of the Draft's chapter on the
free movement of services is the country of origin principle, pursuant to which
Member States shall ensure that providers are subject only to the national
provisions of their Member State of origin which fall within the coordinated
field.169) This coordinated field is all-encompassing, covering "any
requirement applicable to access to service activities or to the exercise
thereof", whether or not it falls within an area harmonised at Community level
and regardless of the legal field to which it belongs under national law.170) The
Member State of origin shall be responsible for supervising the provider and
the services provided by him.171) According to paragraph 3 of Article 16,
Member States may not, for reasons falling within the coordinated field,
restrict the freedom to provide services in the case of a provider established
in another Member State. Several requirements, the imposition of which is
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prohibited, are mentioned in particular, such as (e) an obligation on the
provider to comply with the requirements, relating to the exercise of an
activity, applicable in their territory and (i) restrictions on the freedom to
provide the services referred to in Article 23 (1) first subparagraph (prior
authorisation for the assumption of the cost of non-hospital services).172)
Several general derogations from the country of origin principle relate to
services with health- or health care-related repercussions. To ensure
coherence with the future Directive on the recognition of professional
qualifications, a general derogation is laid down in Article 17, 8°, as regards
Title II of the future recognition Directive (cf. supra). Pursuant to Article 17, 16°
of the Draft services directive, the country of origin principle shall not apply to
services which, in the Member State to which the provider moves in order to
provide his services, are prohibited, when this prohibition is justified by
reasons relating to public policy, public security and public health. Recital 42
adds to that reasons relating to the protection of human dignity and clarifies
that this derogation also covers cases where services are prohibited but are
allowed under certain specific circumstances.173) With this derogation,
national bans on euthanasia, abortion or medically-assisted procreation
techniques can be maintained. Article 17, 17° provides for a derogation with
respect to "specific requirements of the Member State to which the service
provider moves, that are directly linked to the particular characteristics of the
place where the service is provided, or to the particular risk created by the
service at the place where the service is provided, and with which compliance
is indispensable for reasons of public policy or public security or for the
protection of public health or the environment". Several examples of such
"specific requirements" are cited in recital 43, such as "requirements relating
to the organisation of public events or requirements relating to the safety of
building sites". The significance of this exception for our purpose remains
wholly unclear. In particular, the question arises whether it would cover the
parameters defining the boundaries of health care cover, as mentioned
above. Would it perhaps extend to rules fixing health care tariffs? The fact is
that the derogation contained in Article 17, 17° is referred to in recital 47a as
an important general derogation from the country of origin principle for cross-
border health services and as including "standards of hygene (sic)."174) Lastly,
Article 17, 18° exempts from the application of the country of origin principle
the authorisation system for the reimbursement of hospital care.
Apart from these general derogations from the country of origin principle,
Article 19 of the Draft services directive allows Member States to intervene on
a case-by-case basis to take measures relating to (a) the safety of services,
including aspects of public health, (b) the exercise of a health profession and
(c) the protection of public policy. This summary list, which completely
passes over all the overriding general-interest reasons recognised by the
ECJ,175) contains two grounds on which the host Member can rely to impose
its rules on the foreign medical service provider. However, before doing so,
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the host Member State has to follow a laborious and time-consuming
procedure of mutual assistance, laid down in Article 37 of the Draft. This
involves a notification to both the Member State of origin (which can take
corrective measures) and the Commission (which can adopt a decision
asking the Member State concerned to refrain from taking the proposed
measures or to put an end to the measures in question). In addition to that,
the conditions set out in Article 19 (2) have to be complied with.176)
To a large extent, the Draft services directive draws the consequences of the
case law of the Court of Justice. Indeed, the country of origin principle in the
field of services, the key principle of the Draft services directive, does not
appear out of thin air. On the contrary, it is firmly established in the case law
on Article 49 ECT.177) In view of that, the mere exclusion from the Draft's
scope of the provision of health-care-related services, as a steadily
lengthening list of interest groups and advisory bodies recommends, would
not place the provision of health care outside the ambit of the internal market,
save modification of the Treaty. However, the operation of the principle in the
Draft services directive goes significantly beyond that under the Treaty
provisions. It applies to the entire field of service regulation, which is only
declared coordinated, without prior harmonisation of the general interest.178)
Whereas under the Treaty provisions, the host Member State may impose its
legislation if and to the extent that the general good is not sufficiently
protected by the rules to which the foreign provider is subject in the home
Member State, and room is left for a wider margin of appreciation in the
presence of sensitive matters and/or diverse standards, the Draft services
directive, without instituting it, almost irrefutably presumes a European-wide
equivalence in the protection of the general interest.
Combining market access with enduring regulatory control179) in a field as
delicate and highly regulated as that of health care provision, which is
moreover interrelated with solidarity-based social security and lacks common
standards, is a difficult assignment. Whereas the current situation - a
"qualified" home State model combined with legislative instruments
prescribing application of aspects of the legislation of the host State - is
unremarkable for legal certainty, the virtually absolute and unconditional
implementation of the home State model in the Draft services directive
disowns the legitimate interest of Member States to impose their own
legislation on foreign medical service providers. Derogations are unclear or
their use is strictly framed. Alternative models of market integration, however,
are not abundant. With the creation, at Community level, of a single set of
harmonised regulatory requirements come thorny issues of democratic
legitimation, attribution of powers and subsidiarity.180) While detailed
harmonisation does not seem conceivable, minimum harmonisation of
certain requirements to the access to and the exercise of a medical
profession, as provided for in Articles 47 paragraphs 2-3 jo. 55 ECT, could
provide the basis for a systematic application of the country of origin
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principle. On the other hand, a pure model of host State control, as the
wording of Article 49 ECT suggests, would undoubtedly increase legal
certainty, but would shut the door on the development of the temporary
provision of cross-border health services.181)
One way or another, priorities will have to established.
3) The Free Provision of Ambulatory Non-Medical Care Services within
the Framework of the Luxembourg Care Insurance
A. Conformity with EU law
For the provision of services of domiciliary aid (non-medical care) to
dependent persons, such as elderly people or handicapped persons, the
Luxembourg care insurance scheme resorts to health professionals
employed by aid and care networks (réseaux d'aides et de soins, hereinafter
referred to as "network"). A network is defined as "un ensemble organisé
d'une ou de plusieurs personnes physiques ou morales, dispersé dans
une zone territorialement donnée, de compétences différentes et
complémentaires pour assurer et coordonner la prise en charge de la
personne dépendante".182) In order to be able to exercise the activities in
question,183 )the network has to obtain a double authorisation (agréments
aide à domicile et soins à domicile).184) The conditions for the granting of
these authorisations are laid down in grand-ducal regulations185) and include
staff requirements (in casu three full-timers) and requirements aimed at
ensuring continuity of aid and care (in casu provision of services on every day
of the year during at least 14 hours a day). In addition to these authorisations,
the network has to enter into agreements with the UCM (contrat d'aides et
de soins).186) This contract contains commitments on behalf of the providers
concerning quality, invoicing, book keeping, the definition of the circle of
persons covered,187) the extent of the services to be provided, continuity, etc.
Can an undertaking, legally established in another Member State where it
provides similar services, rely on Article 49 jo. Articles 48 and 55 ECT to gain
access to the activity of domiciliary non-medical care and exercise it in the
Luxembourg territory? If so, what are the requirements it has to comply with?
There can be no doubt that home aid services constitute services within the
meaning of the Treaty. In Sodemare, the Court considered a private company
running old people's homes to be engaged in an economic activity within the
meaning of Articles 2 ECT.188)
Trickier is the question whether the provision of home aid services by a
foreign-based company in the Luxembourg territory comes within the scope
of the Treaty Articles on services, or whether Article 43 ECT applies. The
decisive criterion for the application of the Treaty chapter on services is the
absence of a stable and continuous participation by the person concerned in
the economic life of the host Member State.189) A Community national who
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pursues an activity on a stable and continuous basis in another Member State
where he holds himself out from an established professional base to,
amongst others, nationals of that Member State, must be regarded as
exercising the right of establishment. On the other hand, the provision of
services within the meaning of the Treaty is characterised by its temporary
nature, which, according to a well-established case law, must be determined,
not only in the light of duration of the service provision, but also of its
regularity, periodical nature or continuity.190) The Court has interpreted these
criteria broadly and has qualified as a service provider a business,
established in a Member State, which supplies with a greater or lesser degree
of frequency or regularity, even over an extended period, services to persons
established in one or more Member States. It has observed that no provision
of the Treaty affords a means of determining, in an abstract manner, the
duration or frequency beyond which the supply of a service in another
Member State can no longer be regarded as the provision of services within
the meaning of the ECT.191)
Although the provision of services of domiciliary aid does not necessitate an
infrastructure in Luxembourg, as opposed to the running of an establishment
accommodating dependent persons, the services in question, by their very
nature, imply a certain degree of continuity and regularity, which seems to go
beyond mere considerations of desirability.192) In view of that, we believe that
there is a case for Luxembourg authorities to assess the application of a
foreign provider of home aid services to supply similar services on a regular
basis to a large population of unspecified dependent persons (e.g. a
municipality), under Article 43 ECT, even if the provider in question is not
established in Luxembourg. Anyhow, such a provider should not benefit from
the low standards of transgression of Article 49 ECT. Such will also be the
case where the foreign provider directs his activities entirely or principally
towards the Luxembourg territory, intentionally attempting to evade the
obligations laid down by Luxembourg legislation.193) On the other hand,
where he seeks to provide those services temporarily to specified dependent
persons attracted from the place of establishment,194) or where he supplies to
cover temporary shortages,195) the Treaty provisions on services will apply.
The question arises whether the Luxembourg authorities can impose upon a
foreign provider of home aid services seeking to provide those services
temporarily and occasionally in the Luxembourg territory, compliance with
the rules to which Luxembourg-based providers are subject. In other words,
can access to the Luxembourg market for non-medical domiciliary care196) be
made contingent upon the foreign service provider setting up as a network,
obtaining the authorisations required and entering into agreements with the
UCM? Indubitably, imposing compliance with these regulations is liable to
hinder or render less attractive the free provision of services, and thus
constitutes a restriction within the meaning of Article 49 ECT. Still, in
Sodemare, a case which - because of its parallels with the issue under
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consideration - cannot be left aside in this context, the Court took a
particularly reserved approach. In this case, the Court was asked to assess
the compatibility with inter alia Articles 43 and 48 ECT of an Italian rule
allowing only non-profit-making private operators to participate in the running
of the social welfare system by concluding contracts which entitle them to be
reimbursed by the public authorities for the cost of providing social welfare
services of a health care nature. The Court, having observed that the non-
profit-condition forms part of the social welfare system, which is based on the
principle of solidarity, stated that "as Community law stands at present, a
Member State may, in the exercise of the powers it retains to organise its
social security system, consider that a social welfare system of the kind at
issue […] necessarily implies, with a view to attaining its objectives, that the
admission of private operators to that system as providers of social welfare
services is to be made subject to the condition that they are non-profit
making".197) In view of that, and having pointed out that the condition was not
discriminatory, the ECJ judged that the non-profit condition cannot be
regarded as contrary to Articles 43 and 48 ECT.198) The judgment in
Sodemare is a remarkable one. Whereas the Court, in the vast majority of
internal market cases, immediately identifies restrictions and only then looks
for any justifications, in this case, it discontinued its reasoning at an earlier
stage and refrained from examining whether the contested measure was
restrictive, which it clearly was.199) However, it is questionable whether the
Court would reiterate this lenient approach if it were to assess the imposition
of national measures such as the Luxembourg rules in question, on foreign
companies providing temporarily and occasionally home aid services in the
Luxembourg territory. Sodemare was concerned with free establishment, to
the (explicit) exclusion of Article 49 ECT, and the ECJ might have been of the
opinion that an economic actor should abide the nondiscriminatory rules
issued by its only regulator.200) Besides, in the subsequent health care cases,
the Court has interpreted Article 49 ECT as entailing a Europeanisation of the
scope of health care providers in situations bearing an intra-Community
specificity. There seems to be no good reason why this should not hold true
in respect of social care. National measures hindering the Europeanisation of
the scope of social care providers constitute barriers to the free provision of
services and are in need of justification.201)
For the reasons stated above, the foreign service provider should not be able
to challenge the Luxembourg rules determining the definition of dependence,
the circle of beneficiaries, the range of benefits and the conditions on which
these are granted.
The regulatory framework imposed by the Luxembourg authorities is aimed
at achieving public health and social policy objectives. For one thing, the
network structure allows the dependent person to address herself to a single
interlocutor and ensures continuity of care.202) Both the conditions for the
granting of the authorisations as the obligations laid down in the accession
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contract with the UCM pursue aims of quality of aid and care, as regards
structural or process requirements respectively,203) accessibility of these
social services and more generally, the proper functioning of the care
insurance scheme. Still, the application of these national rules to service
providers established in other Member States must be appropriate for
securing attainment of these objectives and must not go beyond what is
objectively necessary in order to achieve the intended goals. In that regard,
due consideration must be had to the legislation to which the provider is
subject in the Member State of establishment, in that the intended goals must
not already be safeguarded by that legislation.204) To put it another way, is the
national mould into which Luxembourg wants to force the foreign provider,
wishing to supply home aid services on a temporary and sporadic basis,
suitable for attaining the legitimate general interest objectives it is said to
pursue? Can these objectives not be reached by lesser restrictive means?
Does the legislation of the home Member State not exhibit equivalence as to
the protection of the general interest, even if its precise content - inevitably -
differs?205) Yet given the context of the restrictions at issue and the nature of
the justifications put forward, it is plausible that the Court will adopt a more
reserved attitude. Still, even if the Court may not enforce such a wide-ranging
application of the mutual recognition principle as it does in less "sensitive"
fields, it is clear that the Luxembourg authorities cannot expect the foreign
provider to comply with all the detailed rules to which it subjects domestic
providers. As for the latter, Luxembourg legislation may well require that they
have at their disposal three full-time employees. However, if - for the sake of
argument - the authorities of the French speaking Community of Belgium
deem the continuity of care safeguarded where Walloon home aid service
providers employ 2.5 full-time equivalents, and this rule actually enables them
to ensure continuity of care to dependent Luxembourgers, the Luxembourg
authorities are to tolerate it. In the same way, where the French bookkeeping
rules allow for sound clerking and can be easily understood by the UCM,
Luxembourg will have no case to impose its own.
The requirement to obtain authorisation would probably pass the
proportionality test. In Commission v. France, the Court stated that the
defendant was entitled require that, in order to provide services to persons
residing in France, should they wish to do so, bio-medical analysis
laboratories which have their place of business in another Member State
comply, in accordance with French rules, with the requirement to obtain
authorisation.206) However, the competent authorities will have to make sure
that the conditions to be satisfied in order to obtain such authorisation do not
duplicate the equivalent statutory conditions which have already been
satisfied in the home Member State.207) Likewise, it cannot be excluded that
the Court would not find it disproportionate to oblige the foreign service
provider to make certain arrangements with the UCM regarding the nature of
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the services provided, the recipients of these services and their administrative
completion.
An obligation to have a place of business in Luxembourg,208) which could be
dictated by the need to ensure continuity of care, would most probably be
condemned as going beyond what is necessary to achieve that goal. The
Court has indeed consistently held that "[...] the requirement of a permanent
establishment is the very negation of [the freedom to provide services]" and
that "[i]t makes a dead letter of Article [49] of the Treaty, a provision whose
very purpose is to abolish restrictions on the freedom to provide services of
persons who are not established in the State in which the service is to be
provided".209) While undoubtedly the nature of the services concerned
demand a degree of proximity between the service provider and the
dependent person, this legitimate aim, given also the limited size of the
Luxembourg territory, could be attained by less restrictive means, such as an
obligation to be able to attend the dependent person at all times within a fixed
period of time.210) 211)
Upon assessment of the proportionality of the Luxembourg restrictive
measures, account ought to be taken of the fact that the care insurance
scheme embraces a level of choice. It provides for a partial replacement of
the aid and care services by benefits in cash, which allows the dependent
person to remunerate an informal helper (aidant informel).212) It goes without
saying that these informal helpers do not need to obtain the authorisations
nor are they obliged to conclude an agreement with the UCM.213)
Furthermore, pursuant to Article 393 last paragraph of the Code des
Assurances Sociales, the network secures the cooperation of other providers
if it is not capable of delivering the aid and care by its own resources. The
subcontractor exercises his activity under the responsibility of the network,
which remains the single interlocutor of the UCM.
B. The proposal for a directive on services in the internal market
The draft Directive, in its recital 14, exemplifying the concept of service, refers
explicitly to "household support services, such as help for the elderly".
Accordingly, where these services are supplied by a provider established in
another Member State, the country of origin principle will apply. The
obligation to obtain an authorisation is expressly prohibited. As to the
derogations from this principle in relation to the provision of home aid and
care services, only the exceptions contained in Articles 17, 8° and 17° and 19
(1) (a) and (b) seem available.
4) Concluding remarks
The Draft services directive states in its recital 7a that "[t]he Directive does not
affect the freedom of the Member States to define, in conformity with
Community law, what they consider to be services of general economic
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interest, how those services should be organised and financed and what
specific obligations they should be subject to".
In addition, recital 7c stipulates that "[this] Directive does not deal with the
funding of services of general economic interest and does not apply to
systems of aids granted by Member States, in particular in the health and
social fields [...]".
These recitals, which do not occur in the initial Commission Proposal, could
be read as invalidating to a large extent the deregulatory effects of the
Directive in the health and social fields. However, the tardy appearance - in
the preamble - of these recitals addressing such a cardinal issue as well as
the overall design of the Proposal - which is preserved in the Draft - lead one
to suspect that this reading might not correspond to the Commission's
intention. The relationship of the Draft services directive to services of general
economic interest should be further clarified, preferably in an article. This
matter will be further explored in the third section of the present report.
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III. Health insurance and the internal market
1) Competition in health care systems
Health care systems are increasingly nearing their financial limits and reforms
are therefore foreseen in all of the Member States. While it is true that the
social protection systems in all EU Member States are the result of a historical
process and are imbedded in a nationally determined economic, social or
legal context, there are nevertheless some general tendencies and problems.
This is the consequence of general problems encountered all over Europe:
the demographic evolution of society with an increasing number of older
people which means rising health care costs, the financial problems
encountered in social security systems and increasing health care costs as a
result of medical innovation. The need for social protection is increasing,
while the financial environment is deteriorating.214)
When studying the changing European welfare states, one sometimes
distinguishes, depending on the approach, between first, second and third
order changes.215)
First order changes refer to incremental and quantitative changes, such as
the slight reduction in the increase of benefit levels, benefit periods, etc.
Second order changes refer to institutional changes, qualitative changes, e.g.
changes in financing a scheme from the public purse to social partner
contributions or vice versa. Changes of a third order indicate changes in
policy goals or policy objectives. In the framework of health, second order
changes are predominant. We note a greater individualization and influence
of the free market. The rapid development of new kinds of therapies and
treatments, implying increasing costs, and the growing number of older
people and persons in need of health care, poses great challenges to the
systems. Consequently, in many countries there is ongoing debate about the
individualisation of health care. Individual responsibilities and competition
between private insurance companies and public institutions are being
established, allowing individual choices in health care about coverage or the
extent of coverage. This could lead to severe pitfalls. The segregation
between "good" and "poor" or "bad" risks could even lead to "two-speed
health care protection".
Despite the diversity in structures and financing of health care systems, most
structural reforms sought to introduce market mechanisms into their health
care system. Such reform seeks mainly to encourage health actors to pursue
the objectives defined and pursued by health care policy.216)
The essential issue is establishing the actor best equipped to assume
governance of the health care system, given the major challenge of keeping
spending under control. Reform projects have been introduced to increase
rationality and efficiency in health care systems by means of introducing
competition among its actors. Market mechanisms have been incorporated
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in all of the systems. This assumes changing the state's role. While the state
retains governance of the system by inserting objectives to be achieved and
defining rules and imitations on competition among actors, it is nonetheless
expected to withdraw from practical management of the system.217)
The introduction of market regulation into national health services leads to a
dissociation of the function of production of services from that of financing of
care ("the purchaser-provider split"). Reforms of the National Health Service
in the United Kingdom and in Italy and Greece have given service providers
and care establishers on the one hand and the authority managing the budget
on the other, more autonomy of management. The creation of an internal
market where service providers must negotiate the contract with a health
authority on the basis of the quality, effectiveness and price of care on offer,
is intended to create competition among care providers. In Spain it is either
the autonomous communities or public organization called INSALUD that
purchase services from health care institutions. A contract system has been
adopted by some of the autonomous communities containing agreements
about target levels of production and the setting of budgets. A similar division
can be seen in the UK, where district health authorities are responsible for
ensuring that adequate levels of health care are available in their regions.
They signed contract with any NHS trusts (independent public hospitals),
private commercial hospitals and non-profit making hospitals in order to
cover their regional health care requirements. This creates a kind of internal
market where institutions compete for health authority contracts. A general
practitioner fund holder was introduced. General practitioner fund holders are
groups of primary health care doctors, who are allowed to manage a budget
in order to supply their patients with specialised services. Where normal
general practitioners will have to refer their patients to specialists and
institutions, with which the health authority has signed an agreement, general
practitioner fund holders are allowed to sign their own agreements with
hospitals and specialists. In Slovenia the health insurance institute has issued
calls for tenders, aimed at private and public providers, for public service
contracts for care programmes and services.
Regulatory measures based on market forces in compulsory social insurance
systems have focussed above on all health insurance bodies. By making
health funds financially accountable for the health care costs of those they
insure, the intention is to encourage these funds to negotiate contracts with
providers for a rational delivery of quality care. Policy makers increasingly
became convinced of the need of powerful incentives to improve efficiency
and achieve more effective cost control. Increasing self-responsibility of both
consumers and funds were tools in this respect. In Belgium, for example, in
order to stimulate the funds' financial self-responsibility, the traditional
system of full retrospective reimbursement was gradually replaced by a new
system based on a combination of retrospective and prospective
reimbursement. By making some room for prospective reimbursement, funds
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could make a profit but also incur a loss that had to be covered by a flat-rate
premium charged to the insured.218)
Also in Germany one of the prime goals of health insurance reform in the 90s
was to stimulate market competition among the funds in order to achieve
more effective cost control and to give the population greater freedom of
choice. The segmented structure of social health insurance worked as an
effective barrier to market competition and through the reforms the substitute
sickness funds were opened to all applicants. Insured people were given the
right to shift easily between funds. Market competition and free choice or
open enrolment had enormous effects on market share. Where the AOKs lost
12.8% of their share over the period 1996-2001, the BKKs gained 65.4% over
the same period.219)
A risk-pooling arrangement with transfer payments between the funds was
implemented to facilitate their market competition. Risk-pooling was
considered a prerequisite for fair market competition because of the pre-
existing differences in risk profile between the funds. As of 2007, risk
solidarity will be based purely on mobility and pathology criteria and no longer
on risk factors. These reform programmes also affected the scope of
solidarity in social health insurance. Some medical services in the fields of
dental care, homeopathic drugs or Kurorte were removed from the package.
The Dutch health care systems, strongly influenced by private insurance, will
introduce a new health insurance system from 1 January 2006, which will be
operated by private health insurance companies that can make profits and
pay dividends to shareholders. Insured people make a choice on the basis of
the nominal insurance premium, the performance of the company and the
level of personal access. Health insurance companies are obliged to accept
everyone resident in the area of activity and the system of risk equalisation
has been introduced to make the acceptance obligation possible and to
prevent direct or indirect risk selection. Health insurers have a duty to provide
health care, but the insured can choose their care in kind from care providers
with which the health insurers have concluded contracts or opt for a
reimbursement of costs incurred with care providers that they have chosen
themselves. Policies can also provide for a mixture of these two approaches.
Linked to this introduction of market competition, there is also a growing
tendency to involve the private commercial sector in the execution of health
care, even in public systems. Open competition based on public financing is
increasing. In the United Kingdom the NHS has concluded a concordat with
the private sector to treat patients at NHS expenses in private hospitals. Also
in France the private hospital sector is acquiring an increasingly important
role in the health system.220)
The question remains however to what extent public and private hospitals
can compete with equal arms and whether competition is unfair as public
hospitals receive more generous funding.
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Notwithstanding a more market-driven health care system, it is still felt that
solidarity elements should play a very important role in the reform processes.
Health is not an ordinary economic good, but access to necessary care is a
fundamental right that must be provided to everyone, regardless of their state
of health or financial situation.221)
This is definitively why all health systems have some form of state
intervention.
Many Member States therefore base their health care systems on the
principle of compulsory membership within public schemes. Compulsory
membership is the core element of a welfare state and the central tenet of
domestic social sovereignty.222)
However, this coercive state monopoly is being threatened by the rules of EC
competition law.
The main question to be answered is how do competition law on the one hand
and social law on the other hand relate to each other? "The whole problem of
the application of competition law to social security regimes deals with one
fundamental issue: is the state or are other organisations authorised to set up
any form of solidarity between the members of a certain collective group
confronted with certain risks? If it is allowed, solidarity is inevitable and
excludes any form of competition. If it is not allowed, all legal and
conventioned systems should be abolished".223)
EU law of course does not force the Member States to introduce competition
rules in their health care systems. However, the more Member States
introduce forms of market regulation in their health care systems, the greater
the possibility that the EU competition rules will apply. As various Member
States introduce elements of competition, in an attempt to increase efficiency
and cost-reduction, this makes them vulnerable for application of
competition rules.
2) Competition Law
A. Are social security institutions undertakings?
Antitrust law in the EU provides for a complete set of legal instruments to
prevent distortions of competition regardless of whether they are caused by
private undertakings, by public undertakings224) or by Member States
themselves. The addressees of the competition rules are therefore
undertakings.
Also public undertakings are covered by the competition rules. Irrelevant is
whether the undertaking has its own legal personality, is an integral part of a
Member State’s administration or how it is financed.225)
The first question to be answered, therefore, is if social security institutions
and in particular health institutions, can be considered as undertakings?
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The term "undertaking" as such is not defined. The Court of Justice therefore
adopts a rather broad definition by stating that Article 81 is aimed at
economic units which consist of a unitary organisation of personnel, tangible
and intangible elements which pursue a specific economic aim on a long-
term basis.226) It covers any entity engaged in an economic activity,
regardless of the legal status of the entity or the way in which it is financed.227)
The Court follows a substance-oriented approach, where "substance"
prevails over form. The key feature of an undertaking shifts thus from the
criteria associated with the entities' autonomy or legal status to
considerations of economic activity. Consequently, the court looks at
functional criteria in that it focuses on the type of activity performed rather
than on the characteristics of the actors which perform it or the social
objectives associated with it. So whether the institutions concerned are
classified as bodies subject to public law or as part of the administration of
the State, is of no concern.
What is important is that economic activities are performed. Economic
activities are commercial activities. The basic test appears is whether the
activity, at least in principle, could be carried on by a private undertaking in
order to make profits and it faces actual or potential competition by a private
company.228) If there were no possibility of a private undertaking carrying on
a given activity, there would be no purpose in applying the competition rules
to it.229)
Any activity consisting in offering goods and services on a given market is an
economic activity and as health care providers perform economic activities,
i.e. as they offer medical services and goods, it cannot be ignored that they
have to be qualified as undertakings. Natural persons may therefore also be
undertakings if they engage in business activities. Self-employed medical
specialists who act as self-employed economic operators are therefore
undertakings. Also their national association is an association of
undertakings.230) Pharmacists, physiotherapists, medical doctors, suppliers
of medical devices... all can be considered as undertakings. It is not
necessary that the activities are performed with the objective of making a
profit.231)
Since nowadays all activities can be performed by private undertakings, the
Court of Justice has developed various exclusions in order to limit to a certain
extent the spectrum of competition law. This is in particular the case for
activities resulting from the exercise of sovereign powers and social activities.
B. Exemptions
1. Imperium
Activities resulting from the exercise of sovereign powers are not economic
activities, as there is no actual or potential competition by private companies.
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This exercise of imperium can by definition never be an economic activity.232)
Imperium implies the power of enjoying the prerogatives outside the general
law, privileges of official power and powers of coercion over citizens.233)
Health care institutions that perform a sovereign activity, could therefore
escape from application of the competition rules. Could it e.g. be said of the
German Health Care Institutions that they are not subject to the anti-
competition rules as they have a statutory duty to provide benefits in kind?
A simple declaration of the state, however, is not sufficient in this respect as
it is the nature of the activity that is determinant.234) It is a necessary
consequence of the functional approach that an activity neither loses its
economic nature by the mere fact that it is exercised by the state or by a state
body, nor becomes economic by virtue of the fact that it is performed by a
private company.235) The state can therefore have a twofold capacity, as it
might act either by exercising public powers or by carrying on economic
activities. In order to make such a distinction it is therefore necessary to
consider the activities by the state and to determine the category to which
those activities belong.236) So entities to which a Member State has conferred
the task of public interest, which forms part of the essential functions of that
state, are not subject to the competition rules of Article 81-82, whereas those
parts of the activities of such an entity that can be separated from those are
subject to Articles 81 and 82.237) But a sovereign exemption does not apply
even when a body is exercising official authority, if it trades products or
services alongside private undertakings that seek to make a profit.238) So it is
not because certain health institutions- as in Germany- act under public law
and form part of the administration that they would not fall under the anti-
competition rules.
As in health care, so much can be provided in the private sector, it might be
difficult to argue that health care institutions or providers perform tasks
typically for public authority.
In many health care systems, associations of medical health care providers
play an important role and are granted specific powers. Quite often in
different Member States professional associations will be the main and only
responsible organization to license and register practitioners and they will
determine who may and may not practice. Or the remuneration/fees of the
health care providers are negotiated between their professional associations
and the state. Sometimes these associations will just give a recommendation,
while in other cases there is real collective bargaining. Its decision may
sometimes be adopted by law or made binding upon the whole profession.
It cannot be excluded that such decisions fall under the anti-competition
rules.
In this respect the questions arises whether a high degree of state
intervention leads to the conclusion that such associations lack the necessary
autonomy to be engaged in economic activities or rather carry out their tasks
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as executor of the state? National regulations often stipulate who must be
accepted as a benefit provider, thereby establishing the admission criteria in
a binding and conclusive manner. Do these institutions act on their own
initiative or not? In many cases it may be difficult to establish who is
responsible for the anti-competitive conduct: the state by requiring the
conduct or influencing it in a decisive way or rather the undertaking by
engaging in anti-competitive activities based on its own initiative
notwithstanding the backing it may receive from the state, or perhaps even
both?239) According to the Court of Justice, the legal framework within which
such agreements are made is irrelevant and the adoption of a measure by a
public authority making an agreement binding on all the traders concerned ,
even if they were not parties to the agreement , cannot remove the agreement
from the scope of Article 81.240)
So it is only when the institution's conduct is so fundamentally restricted that
the anti-competition rules cannot be considered to apply to these institutions.
This is the case when they act like an arm of the state working in the public
interest. This would be the case where the members of the professional
organisation can be characterised as experts who are independent of the
economic operators concerned and they are required, under the law, to set
tariffs taking into account not only the interests of the undertakings or
associations of undertakings in the sector which has appointed them but also
the public interest and the interests of undertakings in other sectors or users
of the services in question.241) Or if a Member State were to require or favour
the adoption of agreements, decisions or concerted practices contrary to
Article 81 or to reinforce their effects, or to deprive its own legislation of its
official character by delegating to private institutions responsibility for taking
decisions affecting the economic sphere. An example could be a concerted
action on the fixing of tariffs, which afterwards have to be formal and
compulsory approved by the government.242)
It is clear that concerted action infringes on competition while the
government's formal approval procedure creates a link between the
government and the practice of the undertakings.
The issue therefore is not that these activities would not be economic
activities, but who is responsible for the distortion of competition: the state
under Article 86 or undertakings under Articles 81 and 82?
Indeed also the State could infringe on the competition rules. Article 86 (1)
provides that Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any
measure contrary to the rules of the EC Treaty, in particular to Article 12 and
the competition rules of the EC Treaty with regard to public undertakings or
undertakings to which the Member States grant special or exclusive rights.
This article was included in the Treaty mainly because of the influence
governments may exert over commercial decisions of public enterprises or
undertakings with close links to the state, causing them to distort competitive
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conditions within the Community. While private firms determine their
industrial and commercial strategy mainly by taking into account in particular
requirements of profitability, decisions of public undertakings, on the other
hand, may be affected by factors of a different kind within the framework of
the pursuit of objectives of public interest by public authorities which may
exercise an influence over those decisions.243)
Distortion may in particular be expected if the government decides to give
only to some organisations - if they are considered as undertakings - the
exclusive right to supply health care insurance. The mere existence of an
exclusive right is not in principle incompatible with the Treaty, but abuse is.
While Article 86 (1) clearly contemplates the creation of exclusive rights,244)
developments in the case law of the Court of Justice reveal that the grant or
broadening of exclusive rights is valid only if it is objectively necessary for the
performance of a task of general economic interest within the meaning of
Article 86 (2). In the Ambulanz Glöckner case245) the Court observes that the
authorisation needed to provide ambulance transport services may be
refused by the competent authority where its use is likely to have adverse
effects on the operation and profitability of the public ambulance service, the
running of which has been entrusted to the medical aid organisations. The
question to be determined is whether the restriction of competition is
necessary to enable the holder of an exclusive right to perform its task of
general interest in economically acceptable conditions. The Court has held
that the starting point in making that determination must be the premise that
the obligation, on the part of the undertaking entrusted with such a task, to
perform its services in conditions of economic equilibrium presupposes that
it will be possible to offset less profitable sectors against the profitable
sectors and hence justifies a restriction of competition from individual
undertakings in economically profitable sectors.246)
2. Social activities
A second group of activities exempted from the application of the
competition rules are purely social activities. This concept is an invention
from the Court of Justice. When judging if an economic activity takes place,
one should examine how much space the legislator has left for a free market
system when designing the system and to what extent the solidarity principle
has been developed.247)
The more clearly visible the solidarity principle, the greater the possible
conclusion that we are dealing with a social and not an economic activity.
However, balancing on the very thin line between the economic and the social
character of an institution is not an easy task. The social aim of an insurance
scheme however is not in itself sufficient to preclude the activity in question
from being classified as an economic activity.248) Also the principle of
solidarity should apply.249)
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In several cases the Court of Justice had the opportunity to work out these
concepts. The leading case is the Poucet and Pistre case.250) In this case both
persons refused to pay their contributions to a sickness and maternity
insurance scheme to which they were compulsory affiliated, claiming that
they should be free to take out equivalent private insurance.
The Court clarified that an institution charged by law with the task of
implementing a social security regime is not an undertaking as these
institutions pursue a social objective and embody the principle of solidarity.
According to the Court these follow out of elements such as: -the systems are
intended to provide cover for all the persons to whom they apply, regardless
of their financial status and their state of health at the time of affiliation; - the
scheme is financed by contributions proportional to the income from the
occupation and to the retirement pensions of the persons making them; only
recipients of an invalidity pension and retired insured members with very
modest resources are exempted from the payment of contributions, whereas
the benefits are identical for all those who receive them; -persons no longer
covered by the scheme retain their entitlement to benefits for a year, free of
charge; - solidarity entails the redistribution of income between those who are
better off and those who, in view of their resources and state of health, would
be deprived of the necessary social cover. In the old-age insurance scheme,
solidarity is embodied in the fact that the contributions paid by active workers
serve to finance the pensions of retired workers. It is also reflected by the
grant of pension rights where no contributions have been made and of
pension rights that are not proportional to the contributions paid; - Finally,
there is solidarity between the various social security schemes, in that those
in surplus contribute to the financing of those with structural financial
difficulties.251)
Such public social security schemes entail such an element of redistribution
in the interests of social solidarity that little or no scope remains for the
various actuarial, investment and intermediary services which private
pensions and insurance providers can and do supply on the market.252)
Solidarity therefore exists when contribution payments geared to income and
benefits are the same for all recipients, thus leading to redistribution of
income and protection for those who would otherwise be disadvantaged by
virtue of their financial circumstances or health.253) The Court has shown in
Poucet and Pistre that three elements are essential for establishing the
principle of solidarity or not: benefits are not proportional to contributions, or
benefits are paid even if no contributions are paid and the existence of
compensation mechanisms between the social security regimes.
Similarly, the Court decided that the organisations which run the Spanish
National Health system operate according to the principle of solidarity in that
it is funded from social security contributions and other State funding and in
that it provides services free of charge to its members on the basis of
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universal cover.254) An Italian scheme providing insurance cover against
accidents at work does not constitute an economic activity where affiliation
was compulsory, where there was only a limited correlation between the level
of contributions made and benefits received, and where both contributions
and benefits were subject to ministerial control. Redistribution elements are
available such as the fact that there is a maximum level of contributions to be
paid, as well as a minimum and maximum level of benefits to be paid.255)
This last case raises another important point. The Court referred in this case
to the fact that the Italian institution is expressly designated as competent
institution under Regulation 1408/71 on social security for migrant workers.
Does this mean that the Court would perhaps regard this inscription as a
presumption of the solidarity character of a system?256)
When a free market system is introduced, one should accept the application
of the competition rules.
Again the distinguishing point is if social insurance institutions compete with
private insurance companies. In such a case, a social function cannot be
accepted.257) That these activities have certain social objectives is no
objection, however.258)
Elements such as optional affiliation, application of the principle of
capitalisation and the fact that benefits depend solely on the amount of
contributions paid by the beneficiaries and on the financial results of the
investments made by the managing organisation, all suggest an economic
activity.259)
In other words, there is no solidarity as there is no compulsory affiliation and
as private insurance companies provide for an equal solidarity.
In such schemes, the redistributive element is not such as to entail a
suppression of the types of activity habitually provided by private insurance
and pension companies, such as actuarial assessment and the management
of investments.260)
The cases have however shown how difficult it is to draw the line between
social and economic activities. This should not come as a surprise as the
leading cases of the Court of Justice, Poucet and Pistre and FFSA, deal with
two completely different social security systems that can be found at two
extreme ends of one line. Many social security systems however can be
situated between these two extremes.261) In addition there is the growing
difficulty in defining the concept of social security. What are the typical social
security components?
Elements such as contributions related to income, no relation between
contributions and benefits, compulsory affiliation and no real possibility to
influence the level of contributions, therefore seem to point in the direction
that one could not speak about undertakings. This last element however has
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become questionable following the ECJ's AOK case on German sickness
funds.
A mix between solidarity and the free market principle could be an indication
that social security institutions will have to be considered as undertakings. It
seems logical that when sickness insurance funds can differentiate (part of)
their level of contributions, irrespective of income, they will be considered as
undertakings. However, this was not the opinion of the Court of Justice. In the
AOK case the Court decided that the German sickness funds in the German
statutory health insurance scheme were not undertakings.262) The German
sickness funds had no control on the level of obligatory benefits; however,
they had control on benefits relating to complementary optional treatment
and on the level of contributions paid. Sickness funds are engaged in a
degree of price competition with one another where employees have a choice
as to which fund they join. The funds determine for themselves the level of
contribution which they require from insured persons and they differed a lot,
ranging from 10.8 to 14.9% of the individual incomes.263) The legislature
introduced this element of competition with regard to contributions in order
to encourage the sickness funds to operate in accordance with principles of
sound management, that is to say in the most effective and least costly
manner possible, in the interests of the proper functioning of the German
social security system. Pursuit of that objective does therefore not in any way
change the nature of the sickness funds' activity.
This is rather surprising as it is generally understood that one of the objectives
of competition law is exactly to enhance efficiency. 264) In addition one could
say that the German sickness funds therefore supply goods or services in
return for a price, because are contributions not to a certain extent the
financial compensation for delivering services? This is surely an indication of
being an undertaking. For the Court, therefore, this one element of
competition is not sufficient.
In this respect the AOK case deviates from the famous Poucet and Pistre
case. Indeed, in this last case the Court referred to the fact that the
institutions could not influence the level of contributions, as feature of
solidarity.
According to the Court, the activities of the sickness funds are therefore not
of an economic nature. The Court however pointed out that the funds might
engage in operations that were not social, but economic in nature. Indeed
"the possibility remains that, besides their functions of an exclusively social
nature within the framework of management of the German social security
system, the sickness funds and the entities that represent them, namely the
fund associations, engage in operations which have a purpose that is not
social and is economic in nature. In that case the decisions which they would
be led to adopt could perhaps be regarded as decisions of undertakings or
of associations of undertakings".265) Organisations therefore can partly be an
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undertaking and partly not. This was not the case in casu as the determination
of fixed maximum amounts for medical products was considered by the
Court as being an integral part of the activities of the sickness funds within
the framework of the German statutory health insurance scheme.
Notwithstanding the clear elements of competition between the German
sickness insurance funds, the Court did not want to consider them as
undertakings. Perhaps the Court herewith wanted to make clear that one
should not only look at the internal organisation, but rather at the ultimate aim
(solidarity and redistribution) of the system.266) It is the basic principles that
prevail.
The problem remains however that the line between entities being
undertakings and entities that are not undertakings is very unclear and
impossible to draw in general. One should always look at the concrete
circumstance. The Court of Justice's ruling in the AOK-case therefore should
not be regarded as applying mutatis mutandis to at first sight similar
institutions in other Member States. Whereas in certain Member States health
care institutions will have to observe competition law, other bodies with
similar tasks will not be required to do so in other Member States.267)
Therefore no general statement can be made with respect to the application
of competition rules in the health care sector. And even when the Court
believes that we are dealing with an undertaking as there are not enough
solidarity characteristics, this does not mean that the competition rules will
fully apply.
Indeed, an exemption from the application of the competition and the abuse
of a dominant position rules, could follow from Article 86 (2).268)
C. Health care institutions as purchaser of products
Health organisers act not only as suppliers of benefits, but as purchasers of
health care products by contracting out or demanding certain health care
services or purchasing medical equipment or pharmaceuticals. These are
without any doubt commercial activities, but does the non-application of the
competition rules also applies to these activities? Do the same rules that
apply to the supply of benefits also apply to the demand for health care
benefits? Is an activity on an upstream market (purchasing goods or services)
not subject to competition law if there is no downstream activity (reselling to
the citizens). Are they therefore immune to the application of the competition
rules?
As these institutions have powerful positions on the market as a result of their
huge demand for health care benefits, one would expect this situation to
endanger the market. Indeed, as each activity must be examined on its merits
an organisation is not exempt from competition law simply because some of
its activities have a social character.269)
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The question whether an institution qualifies as an undertaking relates not to
the institution as a whole but only to each of its individual activities.270) One
could consider that in these cases the activities of the health care institutions
follow economic rather than social objectives, notwithstanding the fact that
the purpose of these activities is to achieve socio-political objectives.271)
There seems to be hardly any difference between health care institutions
when acting as purchaser and private companies.
In the Fenin case, however, the Court judged differently. The Court held that
it would be incorrect, when determining the nature of that subsequent
activity, to dissociate the activity of purchasing goods from the subsequent
use to which they are put.272) The nature of the purchasing activity must
therefore be determined according to whether or not the subsequent use of
the purchased goods amounts to an economic activity. Consequently, an
organisation which only purchases goods - even in great quantity - not for the
purpose of offering goods and services as part of an economic activity, but in
order to use them in the context of a different activity, such as one of a purely
social nature, does not act as an undertaking simply because it is a purchaser
in a given market. The activities on the supply side determine the character of
these activities on the purchaser's side. This is the upstream-downstream
theory according to which only entities that form activities both as buyers and
as sellers can be considered as undertakings in the context of Article 81 and
Article 82.
Some people wonder why these institutions should be given carte blanche for
their commercial behaviour on markets other than the one providing their
core social security services.273) An explanation could probably be found in
the fact that as the insurance activities of these entities are strongly
influenced by the solidarity principle, the entities concerned have no
commercial interest when buying care on the market. The conclusion could
however be different when the care they buy is not used for their patients/
insured persons, but is sold to health care providers in other Member
States.274)
The fact that these activities do not fall under the anti-competition rules,
however, does not exclude the applicability of EU law. As we will discuss later
on, the EU directives on public procurement can influence the behaviour of
these entities and provide certain guaranties for companies dealing with
them. And even if the directives are not applicable, certain principles of EU
law such as the non-discrimination principle and the condition of
transparency, will apply.
D. Prohibited conduct
After considering the question whether health care institutions could be
considered as undertakings, we want to find out which conduct is prohibited
by the EU rules. Not all prohibited forms could be treated here. Basically
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however, the most encountered forms in the health care sector are cartel
prohibition and abuse of dominant position.
1. Cartel prohibition
Article 81 forbids all formal and informal agreements, decisions and
concerted practices among all other forms of business enterprise.275)
Although Article 81 of the Treaty prohibits any form of collusion which distorts
competition, it does not deprive economic operators of the right to adapt
themselves intelligently to the existing and anticipated conduct of their
competitors.276) The principal rule is to ensure that each enterprise
determines individually and autonomously its business policies and market
conduct in the Community. It prohibits the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition i.e. the restriction of the freedom of the parties individually and
autonomously to decide their own market policy, contrary to the requirement
of economic independence.277) Article 81 gives a list of examples which is not
exhaustive such as fixing purchase or selling prices, limiting or controlling
production, markets, technical development or investment, sharing markets
or sources of supply, discriminatory practices, etc.
Health care providers agree amongst each other - as in the Netherlands - not
to contract under certain tariffs when negotiating collaboration agreements
with the health insurance institutions. Another example was agreements with
respect to the policy dealing with the licence to set up in practice and
establishment and the spreading of medical providers. Professional
associations of health care providers decide on the basis of a policy based
on quantitative standards such as number of inhabitants or patients if a new
health care provider can set up a business. This policy was declared
applicable in the individual agreements on collaboration concluded between
the health care providers and the health insurance institutions. New practices
were only allowed if approved by these organisations. Health care providers
with established practices decided therefore on the entrance of new
competitors and if a practice was not established in accordance with this
policy, no contract could be signed with the health care provider. This policy
can be described as policy-sharing the markets which raises barriers to entry
by other health care providers and therefore contrary to Article 81.
Arrangements relating to organisation, qualifications, professional ethics,
supervision and liability, in order to ensure that the ultimate consumers/
patients are provided with the necessary guarantees in relation to integrity
and experience,278) like e.g. deontological codes are not contrary to the anti-
competition rules. If this regulation despite the restrictive effects on
competetion that are inherent in it, is considered necessary for the proper
practice of the profession, as organised in the Member State concerned,
there is no infringement of Article 81 (1)279).
58 Bulletin luxembourgeois des questions sociales
Health insurance institutions that purchase together health care from health
care providers could form a forbidden cartel as this could in certain
circumstances lead to forbidden joint purchasing agreements. Joint
purchasing agreements aim at combining demand in order to obtain better
prices and could distort competition on the demand side.280) Another
forbidden example was found in the Netherlands, where health insurance
institutions agreed that the premiums for insurance policies for the oldest
age-category would not be higher then 150% of the premium for a 20-year
old person for the same product.281) This method aimed to install risk-
solidarity by self-regulating. The Dutch Competition authority has rejected
this policy as a breach with anti-competition rules as health insurance
institutions would be less inclined to offer products to young people at keen
premiums if they result in having to decrease prices for older people.
2. Abuse of dominant position
The second prohibited conduct is the abuse of a dominant position on the
Market. In contrast to Article 81, Article 82 only applies to firms that have
market power and seek to prevent the abuse of such power for anti-
competitive ends.
Article 82 enumerates types of abuse without being exhaustive. We note
three main categories of abuse:282)
- exploitative abuses: exploiting market power in trading relationships with
customers or suppliers by practices such as unfair purchase or selling
prices, tying arrangements, price discrimination, etc.
- exclusionary abuses: abusing market power to harm a competitor by
anticompetitive means such as refusal to deal, predatory pricing, or other
predatory actions.
- structural abuses: eliminating a competitor by merger or acquisition.
In order to prove the abuse of a dominant position, one must prove the
following elements: one or more undertakings, that hold a dominant position
conferring market power, with a relevant product and geographic market,
within the common market or in a substantial part thereof, commit an abuse
of the dominant position and that may affect trade between Member States.
The dominant position relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by
an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being
maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and
ultimately of the consumers.283)
The existence of a dominant position is the result of many factors, which
taken separately, are not absolutely decisive, however, extremely large
market shares are in themselves, most of the time, evidence of the existence
of a dominant position.284)
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Abuse of a dominant position could e.g. occur where suppliers or their
associations contribute to quality standards in a way that places foreign
suppliers at a disadvantage.285) Could we also speak about abuse of
dominant position in cases where a health insurance institution with a
dominant position refuses to conclude a contract with a health care provider
and the admission of doctors is restricted to a panel of providers who have
contracts with a health authority? Imagine the situation where a health
insurance fund that occupies a certain region has a dominant position and
refuses to offer contracts to certain medical providers. This is as such not
really forbidden. Anti-competition law does not forbid a dominant position,
but abusing this position. Excluding medical providers from the health market
is forbidden unless the action can be justified.286) As demand monopolists,
health care institutions are obliged to conclude contracts with physicians, as
in benefits-in-kind systems, physicians are largely dependent in economic
terms on health care institutions due to a lack of other potential markets. The
policy used to offer contracts or not should of course be based on objective
and transparent criteria and there should be justification. This could e.g. be
the case when a health insurance institution concludes that demand for a
certain service has not increased with respect to last year and as a result will
not allow it to sign a contract with new health providers.
In this respect we also want to refer to the French CMU (Couverture Maladie
Universelle) system. This system guarantees affiliation to statutory health
insurance by all residents and in addition provides free access to
complementary health insurance for people who have an income under a
certain level. CMU beneficiaries are granted free benefits in kind, including
exemption from payment in advance in coverage of co-payments for hospital
stay and supplementary charges for dental care and spectacles. In the
complementary CMU, beneficiaries are free to choose between either the
statutory sickness fund and traditional complementary insurance, such as
mutual benefit societies, provident institutions and commercial insurance
companies. Does this participation of the French public sickness funds in
administering free complementary health insurance not lead to a dominant
position and unfair competition? Not at least because the public sickness
funds are guaranteed full recovery of claims paid for under the CMU, whereas
the other complementary actors only receive a capitation payment from the
CMU fund. It cannot be neglected that the public sickness funds benefit from
a certain dominant position, where it may be expected that beneficiaries will
insure themselves with institutions where they are already insured, i.e. their
statutory health insurance. According to the French constitutional Court there
was no abuse of dominant position,287) building on the differences in relation
between these funds and the objective of the law. While public sickness
funds have the obligation as part of their mission as public authority and on
behalf of the state to take care of the complementary insurance of all who ask
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to be insured, other sickness funds just have the possibility of participating
and are free to withdraw. This reasoning, however, is very difficult to follow.
The same doubts could also be expressed with respect to the Flemish long-
term insurance care, where commercial insurers compete with mutual health
funds, responsible for the public health systems. One could also ask here if
this participation of the public sickness funds does not lead to an abuse of
the dominant position. Or what to be said about the fact that under Belgian
law, insured people are obliged to accept the complementary services
offered by the mutual health funds –responsible for the public health system-
they are insured with?
According to the Court of Appeal in Brussels there is no conflict with
competition law as a service of increased complementary compensation for
orthodontic treatment is no economic activity. Mutual health funds are after
all obliged to install these complementary services to fill the gaps in the
statutory social security system.288)
E. State aid
State aid could also be contrary to EU law. Article 87 (1) contains a general
prohibition against granting state aid that distorts or threatens to distort
competition by favouring undertakings provided it affects trade between
Member States.
For a measure to involve state aid, aid must fulfil the following criteria.289) First,
there must be an intervention by the State or through State resources.
Second, the intervention must be liable to affect trade between Member
States. Third, it must confer an advantage on the recipient. Fourth, it must
distort or threaten to distort competition. The Court clarified that to be
considered as aid, measures must, whatever their form, be likely directly or
indirectly to favour certain undertakings or are to be regarded as an economic
advantage which the recipient undertaking would not have obtained under
normal market conditions.290)
State aid could take different forms, such as positive contributions like
subsidies but also measures which mitigate the charges which are normally
included in the budget of an undertaking and which, without therefore being
subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in character and have
the same effects, as e.g. tax relief,291) interest relief, tax deductions,292) credit
facilities and preferential interest rates on loans,293) provision of logistical and
commercial assistance,294) etc. Or what if e.g. the state were to cover the
deficit of certain hospitals?295) Or what about the compensation paid out of a
risk-equalisation fund?296)
However, as the Court pointed out in its Altmark case, 'where a State
measure must be regarded as compensation for the services provided by the
recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, so that
those undertakings do not enjoy a real financial advantage and the measure
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thus does not have the effect of putting them in a more favourable
competitive position than the undertakings competing with them, such a
measure is not caught by Article 87(1) of the Treaty'.297)
For assessing whether such advantages constitute state aid, the so-called
"prudent investor principle" applies:298) it is necessary to assess whether, in
similar circumstances, a private investor of a dimension comparable to that
of the bodies managing the public sector could have been prevailed upon to
make capital contributions of the same size, having regard in particular to the
information available and foreseeable developments at the date of those
contributions.
This is certainly an important element in the health care sector where the state
gives certain financial advantages to health insurance funds. Could they be
considered as just compensation for the services in order to discharge their
public service obligations? The answer to this question remained unclear not
least as a result of the fact that the case law of the Court of Justice and the
Court of First Instance differed.
Some judgments tended to a legal approach, which aimed at considering any
financial compensation as state aid, which had to be notified but was likely to
be cleared according to the specific circumstances of the case in particular
where the conditions of Article 86 (2) were fulfilled.299) Other judgments
tended to a more economic approach, which aimed at considering only the
amount of compensation that exceeds what is necessary for discharging the
public service obligation.300) Not being considered as state aid leads to
important procedural consequences: i.e. no preliminary notification and
preventive control by the Commission, and the fact that the state is not
obliged to wait for the Commission's answer before payment.
In the Altmark GmbH case which concerned the grant of licences for
scheduled bus transport services within a certain region in Germany and
public subsidies for operating those services, the Court of Justice requested
the national court to ascertain, whether the following four conditions are
satisfied:
1. The recipient undertaking has actually required the discharge public
service obligations and those obligations have been clearly defined;301)
2. The parameters on the basis of which compensation is calculated have
been established beforehand in an objective and transparent manner;
3. The compensation does not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part
of the costs incurred in discharging the public service obligations, taking
into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging
those obligations;
4. Whether the undertaking which is to discharge the public service
obligations has not chosen a public procurement procedure, the level of
compensation needed has been determined on the basis of an analysis
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of the costs which a typical undertaking, well-run and adequately
provided with means of transport so as to be able to meet the necessary
public interest requirements, would have incurred in discharging those
obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable
profit for discharging those obligations.
If one or more of these conditions are not fulfilled, the subsidies are
incompatible with the prohibition of Article 88 (3) last sentence and subject to
nullity resulting from a non-notified state aid. The Altmark judgement clarifies
the preceding case-law of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance,
which established somewhat divergent criteria for classifying compensation
for the operation of services of general economic interest as state aid. It may
be said that the Court of Justice's approach in the Altmark case is more
balanced, thereby examining more closely the operation of public service
obligations and the services supplied in connection with a discharge of the
public service obligation, which will not be recognised whenever the
undertaking's activities have no connection with the provision of public
service obligations. It remains to be seen whether the approach is
satisfactory or still too theoretical for relying on a typical undertaking well-run
and adequately provided, except in cases of public procurement, where it is
presumed that market conditions prevail.302)
3) The internal market and voluntary health insurance
A. The possible application of the non-life insurance directives
Notwithstanding the dominance of solidarity-based statutory health care
systems in the European Union, it cannot be neglected that voluntary health
insurance plays a more and more important role in health protection. The
increasing cost and expenditure in health care and the problems for the
government to keep pace with this development, have today led to an
increasing role of voluntary health insurance.303)
In general it could be said that voluntary health insurance operates precisely
in areas that the state does not cover. Voluntary health insurance can
therefore be classified according to whether it:
- substitutes for cover that would otherwise be available from the state, the
so-called substitutive voluntary health insurance;
- provides complementary cover for services excluded or not fully covered
by the state, including cover for co-payments imposed by the statutory
health care system, the so-called complementary voluntary health
insurance;
- provides supplementary cover for faster access and increased consumer
choice, the so-called supplementary voluntary health insurance.304)
The introduction of private insurance companies as executors for medical
treatment results in the possible applicability of European Directive 92/49 of
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18 June 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative
provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance.305)
According to this directive, a Member State which decides to open up
coverage of a risk belonging to the statutory social security regime to private
insurers, has to accept that any Community Insurance undertaking
authorised in its home Member State, may cover that risk on the basis of the
freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services.
Private insurance companies are now basically allowed freely to establish a
branch or agency in another Member State, without the need to receive
authorisation by the competent national authorities of that state, and provide
insurance services in another Member State without the need to establish a
branch office or agency. This was realised through the introduction of
elements such as a single licensing and financial control system for insurance
activities throughout the European Union led by the Member State where the
head office is situated, the so-called home country control; the mutual
recognition of authorization and prudential control systems on the financial
soundness and solvency of insurers; and the abolition of contract and price
controls by risk-based Member States and of any prior notification of policy
conditions and tariffs. This implies that governments are no longer allowed to
regulate prices and conditions of insurance products, as this could endanger
fair competition among European insurers and could jeopardise the financial
health of insurance undertakings.306)
However, any Member State will, even when introducing private insurance
companies for the execution of their health care system, prescribe certain
statutory guaranties, such as the obligation to accept insurers or the
prohibition of risks selection, exactly in order to protect the consumer/insured
person. To what extent is the introduction of such guarantees contrary to the
principles of the non-life insurance directives? Can social objectives therefore
only be guaranteed through a statutory system of social security?
1. Field of application
The non-life insurance directive does not apply to insurances forming part of
a statutory system of social security.307) This is a first exemption. Social
security schemes, which are based on the principle of solidarity and require
compulsory contributions, are excluded from the scope of the third non-life
insurance directive.308) The same applies to insurance where benefits and
contributions are set by the national legislator at a uniform rate,
independently of the risk.309)
The question if voluntary statutory health insurance falls under the field of
application of the third non-life insurance directives is far from clear.
Substitutive health insurance, providing private cover for persons excluded or
exempted from statutory protection, seems to be included in the scope of
application of EU insurance law.310)
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However we have one certainty. In its important case of 18 May 2000311) the
Court clarified that the Belgian scheme of compulsory insurance against
accidents at work falls under the field of application of the third non-life
insurance directive. In Belgium this insurance is executed by private
insurance companies. It is of no relevance for the Court that this scheme
forms part of the basic compulsory social security scheme and even
Regulation 1408/71 on the social security for migrant persons. According to
the Court these insurance undertakings pursue an economic activity and in
the line of Article 55, this directive is applicable to insurance forming part of a
statutory scheme of social security offered by insurance undertakings "at
their own risk." In this case the Court explicitly referred to Article 54 dealing
with health insurance, and the conclusion may be therefore drawn that in
case private health insurance companies would execute the statutory health
insurance system and would work at their own risk and perform an economic
activity, this third non-life insurance can also be considered to be applicable
to health care insurers.312) For the applicability of the Directives, it is important
that insurances are offered at their own risk. But how should this concept be
interpreted? Is the concept of "own risk" limited to the "insurance risk", i.e.
the financial risk as a consequence of an uncertainty element characteristic
for every insurance relation or does it refer to any company-business risk? Is
there convergence between the concept of economic activity under the
competition rules and the activities which fall under the field of application of
the third non-life insurance directive?313) Can we therefore say that as soon
as there is economic activity, these insurances will fall under the third non-life
insurance directive and that the third non-life insurance directive does not
apply when the insurers are performing a purely social activity?
2. The content of the third non-life insurance directive
The basic rules under the insurance directive follow the principle of the single
license (an insurance company only needs one authorisation) and linked to
that the country home control principle (implying that an insurance company
is only submitted to the control and supervision of the home Member State
or the country of establishment). Also the principle of specialization applies.
In this respect the Court for example condemned France, because the
insurance activities of the French mutual societies were not legally separate
from their philanthropic activities.314) And what about the rule in the new
Dutch health care system: if the insured is entitled to reimbursement of costs,
there is still a duty for health insurers to provide for health care.315)
Application of the non-life insurance directives could lead to possible
conflicts arising from Article 29 of the third non-life insurance directive.
According to this article Member States shall not adopt provisions requiring
the prior approval or systematic notification of general and special policy
conditions, scales of premiums, of forms and other printed documents which
an insurance undertaking intends to use in its dealings with policy holders.
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For the Court of Justice the Community legislator clearly meant to secure the
principle of freedom for undertakings to set the rates in a non-life insurance
sector and national regulations concerning tariffs for insurance companies
are therefore contrary to the directive. This principle implies the prohibition of
any system of prior or systematic notification or approval or the rates, which
an undertaking intends to use in its dealings with policy holders.316) However
this article does not apply to a bonus-malus system, as this system does not
result in the direct setting of premium rates by the state, since insurance
undertakings remain free to set the amount of the basic premium. A full
harmonisation in the field of non-life insurance rates was clearly not the
intention of the Community legislator.317)
This is a narrow interpretation of Article 29. Prohibition of price- difference on
the basis of the personal risk characteristics of the insured, or the no-claim
refund therefore does not seem to be contrary to article 29.318)
The question remains however whether other national regulations, not
dealing with the business of insurance, are also forbidden by this article? This
would imply that regulations other than those concerning financial
supervision (such as e.g. obligation of acceptance, a minimum package of
benefits to be provided), would not be possible either.
3. Limits of Article 54: general good exception
But even when certain measures are not in conformity with Article 29, an
exception and justification may be sought under Article 54 of the third non-
life insurance directive.
According to this article, a Member State in which contracts may serve as a
partial or complete alternative to health cover provided by the statutory social
security system, may require that those contracts comply with the specific
legal provisions adopted by that Member State to protect the general good in
that class of insurance and that the general and special conditions of that
insurance be communicated to the competent authorities of that Member
State before use. The nature and social consequences of health insurance
contracts therefore justify the competent authorities of the Member State in
which a risk is situated and require systematic notification of the general and
special policy conditions, exactly in order to verify that such contracts are a
partial or complete alternative to the health care provided by the social
security system.319)
The particular nature of health insurance distinguishes itself from other
classes of indemnity insurance and life insurance,
insofar as it is necessary to ensure that policy holders have effective access
to private health cover or health cover taken out on a voluntary basis
regardless of their age or risk profile. These provisions may provide for open
enrolment, rating on the uniform basis according to the type of policy and life
time cover. That objective may perhaps be achieved by the requirement to
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offer standard policies in line with the cover provided by statutory social
security schemes at a premium rate at or below a prescribed maximum and
to participate in loss compensation schemes.320) Additionally, Article 54 (2)
establishes that Member States may require that the health insurance system
be operated on a technical basis similar to that of life insurance and further
determines a set of criteria that Member States could require from such
health insurances.
It remains unclear however how broadly Article 54 can be interpreted and in
particular, whether this article also applies when private insurance companies
substitute entirely for the statutory system of social protection. Under a
narrow interpretation the directive would only apply to private insurances that
exist apart from the public statutory system and fulfill for a part of the
population the function that the statutory public system fulfils for the rest of
the population. Some authors as well as the European Commission however
are in favour of a broad interpretation.321)
Sustainability also becomes more questionable or hazardous when moving
from substitutive health insurance to complementary or supplementary health
insurance, which covers services of providers excluded fully or partly from the
ambit of social protection.
Justification under Article 54 however implies that these rules have to be
analysed against the principles of proportionality and necessity for a good
health care system. Elements under the new Dutch health care system,
dealing with a minimum package defined by government and to be provided
by every health insurer, are an obligation of acceptance, the prohibition of
differentiation between premiums on personal characteristics (like age, sex,
health and social circumstances) and the establishment of a risk-equalisation
fund between insurers. These are acceptable to the Commission as they
appear necessary to ensure legitimate objectives.
According to the European Commission the proportionality condition is not
guaranteed if these conditions are also be declared applicable to
complementary insurances offered by private insurers going beyond the
social security package.
The concept of general good remains unclear, however. In its interpretative
communication on the general good in the insurance sector,322) the
Commission makes clear that this concept is based on the case law of the
Court of Justice and that is also the basic reason why it is not defined by the
third non-life insurance directive. In order to be justified on the grounds of the
general good, national measures must - according to this interpretative
communication - fulfill the following 6 criteria:
- must not have been the subject of prior Community harmonisation;
- must not be discriminatory;
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- must be justified for imperative reasons relating to the general good (such
as consumer protection, prevention of fraud, cohesion of the tax system
and worker protection);
- must be objectively necessary;
- must not duplicate home country rules;
- must be proportionate to the objective pursued.
It is therefore up to the Court to decide on the interpretation of this Article 54.
4) Procurement directives
Even when social security institutions do not fall under competition law
because they are not undertakings, they are not exempt from EU law. In
particular, discriminatory public procurement is considered to create
significant barriers to trade. Discriminatory procurement and other restrictive
behaviour is prohibited by the EC Treaty and the Treaty also imposes a
positive obligation to advertise contracts, to support a prohibition on
discrimination.323)
Different directives have been enacted to regulate procedures for public
major contracts.324)
These directives require entities to follow transparent procedures aimed at
preventing and monitoring discriminatory behaviour and ensuring
community-wide competition.
Do social security institutions, and in particular health care institutions, fall
under the field of application of the procurement directives?
In this respect the definition of "contracting authority" is extremely important.
The structure of the directives is such as to embrace the purchasing
behaviour of all entities that have a close connection to the state.325)
For the public procurement directives to apply, the contracting authority must
be the state or a body governed by public law.326) In order to be a body
governed by public law, different cumulative criteria have to be fulfilled:
- established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general
interest, not having an industrial or commercial character, and
- having legal personality, and
- financed, for the most part, by the State, or regional or local authorities, or
other bodies governed by public law, or subject to management
supervision by those bodies, or having an administrative, managerial or
supervisory board, more than half of whose members are appointed by
the State, regional or local authorities or by other bodies governed by
public law.
Notwithstanding this definition, public interest functions are dispersed
through a range of organisations which strictu sensu could not fall under the
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ambit of the term "contracting authority", since they are not formally part of
the state, nor are all criteria for the definition of bodies governed by public law
present.327)
The term "the state" must be interpreted in functional terms. The aim of the
directive which is to ensure the effective attainment of freedom of
establishment and freedom to provide services in respect of public works
contracts, would be jeopardized if the provisions of the directive were to be
held to be inapplicable solely, because the public works contract is awarded
by a body which, although it was set up to carry out tasks entrusted to it by
legislation, is not formally a part of the state administration.328)
In order to fall under the directives, institutions therefore do not have to be a
formal part of the state, but could be said to be active in name of the
state.329)In addition to the elements of management or financial control,
functionality, as an ingredient of assessing the relationship between an entity
and the state, demonstrates the importance of constituent factors, such as
the intention and purpose of establishment of the entity in question.330)
Public procurement deals with the public market where the state and its
bodies are engaged in pursuit of the public interest.331) In the public market it
is not the commercial characteristics of private entrepreneurship that prevail
in as much as the aim of the public sector is not the maximisation of profits,
but the serving of public interest.332)
Fundamental in this respect is that the entities do not have an industrial or
commercial character, but are established to meet needs in the general
interest. Activities in the general interest imply that someone is not acting
solely in the individual interests of a particular group of people, but is
envisaging a whole community.333)
The Court approached this concept by direct analogy with the concept of
general economic interest as defined in
Article 86 (2).334) The absence of an industrial or commercial character is a
criterion intended to clarify the meaning of the term "needs" in the general
interest. The question whether private undertakings might meet the same
needs, is irrelevant. The public procurement directives may apply to a
particular body, even if private undertakings meet or may meet the same
needs, and the absence of competition is not a condition necessary to be
taken into account in defining a body governed by public law. However, the
existence of significant competition, and in particular the fact that the entity
concerned is faced with competition in the market place, may be indicative of
the absence of a need in the general interest, not having an industrial or
commercial character.335)
By analysing the list of bodies governed by public law contained in annex 1
to the directive, the Court concludes that in general the needs in questions
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are ones which, for reasons associated with the general interest, the state
itself chooses to provide or over which it wishes to retain a decisive influence.
A body which is non-profit making, but is managed according to the criteria
of performance, efficiency and cost-effectiveness, and which operates in a
competitive environment therefore does not constitute a body governed by
public law.336)
Consequently, whenever bodies or entities, like health care institutions,
perform activities not with a commercial intention and to maximize profits, but
to provide goods and services for the public and thus in the general interest,
these institutions are active on the public market and therefore the public
procurement laws will be applicable. This idea is very close to what has been
described under the competition rules. The fact that these institutions have a
double capacity in the way that they perform both social activities as
economic activities, is of no relevance. What is important is that the institution
is established for the specific purpose of meeting those needs in the general
interest. In that respect it is immaterial that such an entity is free to carry out
other activities in addition to that task, and even the fact that meeting needs
in the general interest constitutes only a relatively small proportion of the
activities actually pursued by the body is irrelevant, provided that it continues
to attend to the needs which are specifically required to meet. The fact that a
body must have been established for the specific purpose of meeting needs
in the general interest, not having an industrial or commercial character,
therefore does not mean that it is necessarily entrusted only with meeting
such needs.337)
Therefore if an entity is a contracting authority, it will have to apply the public
procurement rules, irrespective of whether it pursues a general interest need
or just commercial interests. Health care institutions purchasing for their own
purposes equipment and buildings, will therefore have to apply the public
procurement directives.338)
In the case of health care institutions that provide benefits in kind, the public
procurement directives apply to relations between the health care institutions
and the performers of services. In such systems, the contracts between the
institutions and the providers of services are framework contracts, in which
the latter obligate themselves to provide certain services for patients on
account of the institution. In the Tögel case, the European Court of Justice
applied the public procurement directives on the contracts between social
security institutions and transport undertakings which must afford insured
persons and members of their families adequate access to the benefits
provided for by the law and under agreements.339)
However, this also implies that procurement law and competition law will
apply.340)
70 Bulletin luxembourgeois des questions sociales
Entities that fall under the public procurement directives must normally use
either open procedures (in which anyone may tender) or restricted
procedures (in which only selected firms may tender).
During recent years within many Member States different forms of public/
private partnerships have been set up in the form of joint ventures or the
private financing of public projects. The private sector is also becoming
increasingly involved in delivering public services. This applies also in the
case of health. The projects in the UK under the private finance initiative (PFI)
are an example of this. In these projects provision and management of assets
and the provision of finance is entrusted to the private sector, which is
remunerated by charging for the assets used. In this public private
cooperation the state no longer delivers the services. If contracting
authorities award their public contracts via private undertakings under their
control, they will not come within the framework of the public procurement
directives, as the entities which award the relevant contracts cannot be
classified as contracting authorities within the meaning of the directives.
In a certain way the Court of Justice found a response to this by stating that
where a contracting authority intends to conclude a contract for pecuniary
interest relating to services within the material scope of the public
procurement directives, with a company legally distinct from it, the public
award procedures laid down by that directive must always be applied,
whether or not that entity is in itself a contracting authority.341) In cases where
a contracting authority has established an undertaking in order to enter into
contracts for the sole purpose of avoiding the requirements specified in
public procurement law, then the relevant directives should apply. If the
realisation of a project does not contribute to the aims and objectives of an
undertaking, then it is assumed that the project in question is awarded "on
behalf of another undertaking", and if the latter beneficiary is a contracting
authority under the framework of public procurement law, these directives
should apply.342)
As open and restricted procedures are unsuitable for many such projects, the
new public procurement directives 2004/18 EC and 2004/17 EC have
foreseen a new more flexible instrument and allow contracting authorities to
use the method of competitive dialogue.343)
5) Concluding remarks
There is no doubt whatsoever that the health care sector is not immune from
the application of the EU competition rules. This applies both to the social
security institutions and to the Member States. This should not come as a
surprise as health care is in principle an economic activity, despite the fact
that health care is not a normal market and that certain protection measures
have to be guaranteed.
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Competition law therefore occasionally conflicts with elements of national
solidarity. The case law of the Court has shown that it is not always easy to
draw the line between social and economic activities. Competition does
influence the health care sector to a considerable extent. The outcome of the
cases is however highly unpredictable and also the criteria used are far from
clear. On the other hand however, the Court does seem to understand the
Member States' fears and concerns when solidarity elements are at stake and
approaches social security systems with a certain degree of caution.
And even when the Court believes that we are dealing with an undertaking as
there are not enough solidarity characteristics, this does not mean that the
competition rules will fully apply.
It may be that an exemption from the application of the competition and the
abuse of a dominant position rules, could follow out of Article 86 (2). Article
86 (2) provides that undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of
general and economic interest or having the character of a revenue producing
monopoly, are subject to the rules of the Treaty, and in particular to the rules
of competition, insofar as the application of such rules does not obstruct the
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them, and
provided that the development of trade is not affected to such an extent as
would be contrary to the interest of the Community.344)
In Joined Cases Albany, Brentjens and Drijvende Bokken,345) the Court after
having decided that the exclusive right of the sectoral pension fund to
manage supplementary pensions restricted competition and constituted a
breach of Article 86 (1) ECT,346) considered whether that breach was justified
under paragraph 2 of Article 86.347) It held that the pension scheme at issue
did fulfil a "service of general economic interest" and that its exclusive right
was necessary for the performance of that service. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court explicitly considered matters of social solidarity.348) The
fund at issue displayed a high level of solidarity, resulting, in particular, from
the fact that contributions do not reflect the risk, from the obligation to accept
all workers without a prior medical examination, the continuing accrual of
pension rights despite exemption from the payment of contributions in the
event of incapacity for work, the discharge by the Fund of arrears of
contributions due from an employer in the event of insolvency and the
indexing of the amount of pensions in order to maintain their value. Moreover,
the Court observed that "if the exclusive right of the fund to manage the
supplementary pension scheme for all workers in a given sector were
removed, undertakings with young employees in good health engaged in
non-dangerous activities would seek more advantageous insurance terms
from private insurers. The progressive departure of `good' risks would leave
the sectoral pension fund with responsibility for an increasing share of `bad'
risks, thereby increasing the cost of pensions for workers, particularly those
in small and medium-sized undertakings with older employees engaged in
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dangerous activities, to which the fund could no longer offer pensions at an
acceptable cost".
Citizens can therefore be obliged to participate in a social security system
executed by private companies.
But perhaps even more remarkable was the following consideration of the
Court in this case:
"it is important to bear in mind that, under Article 3(g) and (i) of the EC Treaty
(now, after amendment, Article 3(1)(g) and (j) EC), the activities of the
Community are to include not only a `system ensuring that competition in the
internal market is not distorted' but also `a policy in the social sphere'. Article
2 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 2 EC) provides that a
particular task of the Community is `to promote throughout the Community a
harmonious and balanced development of economic activities' and `a high
level of employment and of social protection."
Social objectives overrule in this case the internal market.
Article 86 (2) could thus be successfully invoked in order to set aside the
application of the competition rules, in particular when the activity does not
fulfil the conditions in order to qualify as a "core" solidarity activity but, still,
displays enough solidarity aspects, including compulsory affiliation.349) A
balance could be found between competition law and social law.
But it is not only within the public sector that social objectives are taken into
account. The broad interpretation of the general good exception of article 54
in the non-life insurance directive points in the same direction.
This tendency is important in a time where social security is more and more
shifting from a public to a mixed private-public system. Even when private
elements are introduced in social security systems, it doesn't seem that the
free market will apply without mercy. The Court accepts that systems with
certain social objectives can be safeguarded against full application of the
competition rules.
The following chapter examines whether, and how this concept of general
(economic) interest can be used to avoid full application of the internal market
rules in health care.
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IV. The notion of “social services of general interest” as
counterweight to the internal market rules
1)  Services of general interest
A. Situation
The notion of "service of general interest" was, ironically, first used in the
American "Communications Act" of 1934 as an argument to install a
telephony monopoly in the United States, when chaos ruled the US telephony
market after the intellectual property rights of G. Bell had expired. Very ironic
indeed, as the term "service of general interest" in Europe is strongly linked
with the dismantling and privatisation of state monopolies and thus often
seen as a sort of counterbalance. Where the public intervention was
commonplace in all economies after World War II, in the late seventies and
throughout the eighties different states shifted away from the Keynesian
approach to a policy tendency of privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation.
The national corporatist systems started to collapse under the pressure of
exogenous economic shocks and "the changes were enforced by
economic necessity and more subtle changes in the prevalent
ideological and economic paradigm".350) In 1993, privatisation started in
the majority of the EU countries. The reforms in the European public sector
were a central issue in the shift from a welfare state model to a post-welfare
or regulatory state model.351) In this context it was the great fear of certain
interest groups that public and social services would be damaged. Through
mutual consultation processes, but also as a consequence of local and
regional protests and conflicts in various Member States, the issue of "public
services" was picked up in the EU agenda as "services of general interest in
the EU" and has gained importance ever since. However, the Commission
has all this time preferred a pragmatic approach instead of the dogmatic
position of certain stakeholders representing opposite interests.352) Since
1993, after the Maastricht Treaty cleared the path for a more comprehensive
consideration of services of general economic interest,353) the term appears
more and more systematically in Community documents354) and the concept
has grown from the notion of "services of general economic interest" as a
derogation from the higher principle of undistorted competition to be "one of
the pillars of the European model of society",355) opening the way for a
beneficial interaction between general interest and the liberalised market.
The term "service of general interest" is very hard to define, as can be derived
from the compilation of discussions and texts relating to the topic, produced
by the different European institutions, the Member States and commentators,
which isn't exactly a paragon of coherence and clarity.356) Indeed, "it is
difficult to define services of general interest in legal terms, but in
general terms a service of general interest is one that has the following
characteristics [...]".357) It is a complex and dynamic notion that is constantly
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in evolution and under evaluation, which is not surprising as it is strongly
related to the constantly changing view of the role of the state. The annex to
the White Paper on services states that terminological differences, semantic
confusion and different traditions in the Member States are a reflection of
different historical, economic, cultural and political developments and the
source of many misunderstandings in the discussion at European level.
Therefore the White Paper repeats the EC definition of services of general
interest, dating from the first Communication from the Commission on
services of general interest of 1996: "The term 'services of general interest'
cannot be found in the Treaty itself. It is derived in Community practice
from the term 'service of general economic interest', which is used in the
Treaty. It is broader than the term "services of general economic
interest" and covers both market and non-market services which the
public authorities class as being of general interest and subject to
specific service obligations."358) Although this cannot be considered a
conventional legal definition, it provides some key elements for discussing
services of general interest in the European Union. First, it is not a Treaty-
based concept, but derived from the sub-concept "services of general
economic interest" which does appear in the Treaty in Article 86(2) EC (Treaty
establishing the European Community)359) and Article 16 EC. Secondly, the
term covers not only economic activities as is the case for "services of
general economic interest" and thus also relates to noneconomic services,
for which compulsory education, social security and certain state
prerogatives (such as security, justice, diplomacy or the registry of births,
deaths and marriages) are traditionally used as examples. The most
important consequence of the qualification as a non-economic service is the
inapplicability of internal market and competition rules on the services
concerned. According to the Commission, there are three categories of
services of general interest: (1) services of general economic interest
provided by large network industries (telecommunications, postal services,
electricity, gas, transport) (2) other services of general economic interest
(waste management, water supply, public service broadcasting) and (3)non-
economic services (social security, compulsory education and state
prerogatives) and services without effect on trade.360) Non-economic services
will be further elaborated in the section on social services of general interest.
However, economic or not, the service must, as a third main characteristic,
be categorised as of "general interest" and therefore subject to certain
service obligations. Being of "general" interest, the output of the service is not
only in the interest of the provider and the consumer, but also in the interest
of a larger group, being "the Community as a whole".361) Indeed, these
services are considered so essential in a given society that every citizen
should have access to them under reasonable conditions, especially
concerning quality and affordability.362) Consequently, specific requirements
are imposed on the service provider in order to ensure that certain public
interest objectives are met. Finally, this task of classification is incumbent on
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the public authority. It is still for the national, regional or local authority in the
Member States to define, organise,363) finance and monitor services of
general interest. However, also due to the insertion of Article 16 EC364)  at the
Amsterdam IGC, the enabling of services of general interest is increasingly
seen as a shared responsibility of the Community and the Member States.
Here, the subsidiarity principle of Article 5 EC365) plays an important role, as it
is also the Commission's opinion that services of general interest should be
organized and regulated as close as possible to the citizens and it intends,
whenever required, to make proposals for sector-specific regulation only in
areas that have an apparent European dimension and present a strong case
for defining a European concept of general interest. This Community
regulation defines, as a general rule, only a regulatory framework that can be
implemented and specified by the Member States, taking into account
country-specific situations. In the debate on the Green Paper there was a
broad consensus that it was not necessary to change this situation by giving
the Community additional powers in the area of services of general
interest.366) 
Whether the services concerned are called "services of general interest" (EU),
"services of public utility" (UK), "services publics" (FRA), "diensten van
algemeen belang" (NL, B) or "Daseinsvorsorge" (D), to name a few, one
simply cannot neglect that there unambiguously is a set of common values or
certain shared standards in the interest of consumers underlying all of these
national manifestations of the concept. These are universal access, high
quality, continuity, affordability and user/consumer protection. The "universal
service" aspect implies that the services concerned have to be available at a
certain quality level and at affordable conditions for all users and consumers
on the whole territory of a Member State, independent of their geographical
location. This is a dynamic and flexible concept, but at the same time a
complex and demanding task for the responsible authorities. The continuity
obligation holds that the service provider is obligated to ensure that the
service is provided without interruption. The continuity of electricity supply is
a well-known example. The quality and affordability requirements to services
of general interest entail in the first place an important role for the competent
authorities to establish quality requirements and to supervise and enforce
them. On the other hand, the service of general interest must also be provided
at affordable conditions, which means that the services concerned should be
provided to the public at a 'reasonable' price, taking into account the specific
income situation of certain consumers and having attention for certain
vulnerable groups in society, e.g. by means of price control or subsidising the
provision of the services concerned. As a last basic principle for the provision
of services of general interest, specific user and consumer protection rules
normally apply. These concern basic requirements with regard to high quality
of the services, a high level of safety of services, transparency (e.g. on tariffs,
contracts, choice and financing of providers), satisfactory choice of service
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and of supplier, existence of regulatory bodies, availability of redress
mechanisms, representation and active participation of consumers and users
in the definition and evaluation of services and choice of forms of payment,
etc. Other principles mentioned in the context of services of general interest
are equality, reliability, participation, simplification of procedures, profitability,
efficiency and evaluation of results.367) These common elements ensure there
is room for defining a Community concept of services of general interest.
To this very day, at the level of the European Union, the services of general
interest debate is still very closely linked to the "services of general economic
interest" concept in Article 86(2) as a derogation from the Treaty rules for
undertakings entrusted with a task of public interest, satisfying certain basic
needs such as transport, postal services, energy and telecommunications
and to other economic activity subject to public service obligations. Also the
White Paper focuses mainly, though not exclusively, on issues relating to
"services of general economic interest". This is not surprising, as the Treaty
itself concentrates mainly on economic activities. The term "services of
general interest" is only used where it is not necessary to specify the specific
nature of the services concerned or where the text also refers to non-
economic activities. This could lead to new Babylonian misunderstandings,
as the term "services of general interest", conceived to function as a general
term, thus becomes (maybe too) strongly related to non-economic services,
with the risk of ending up as a synonym of "non-economic services".
Nonetheless an evolution in the Commission's approach is clear after
comparing its first Communication on services of general interest in 1996 and
the 2004 White Paper. The former explicitly focused on the "relevant sectors"
of telecommunications, postal services, transport, energy and broadcasting,
as opposed to the recent White paper, which clearly opens up the issue of
using a general approach and inserting important paragraphs on non-
economic, social and health services, removing the debate from a purely
competition-based market context. Nonetheless, when discussing services
of general interest in the European Union, an overview of the role of Article
86(2) is indispensable.
B. The key role of Article 86 EC
Article 86 has been described as the "Article reconciling Community
objectives with the fulfilment of the mission of general economic interest
entrusted by public authorities". According to the Court, this provision also
"seeks to reconcile the Member States' interest in using certain
undertakings, in particular in the public sector, as an instrument of
economic or fiscal policy with the Community's interest in ensuring
compliance with the rules on competition and the preservation of the
unity of the common market".368) It is a derogation from the Treaty rules369)
for undertakings entrusted with a service of general economic interest and a
juridical conception, "the chief purpose of which is to delineate activities
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deserving of special treatment within the European Community legal
system from those which must submit to all the rules of the internal
market".370) The article states that
"1. In the case of public undertakings or undertakings to which Member
States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither
enact or maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules
contained in this Treaty, in particular to those rules provided in
Article 12 and Articles 81 to 89.
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general
economic interest or having the character of a revenue- producing
monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in
particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of
such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of
the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade
must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the
interests of the Community
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this
Article, and shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives
or decisions to Member States".
For Article 86(2) to apply, the undertakings concerned must have been
entrusted with the operation of a service of general economic interest and the
application of the Treaty rules must obstruct the performance in law or in fact
of the tasks assigned to it, but the development of trade must not be affected
to an extent contrary to the interests of the Community. The underlying
principles of Article 86 are threefold. First of all, the Article is neutral towards
the question of ownership, fully in line with Article 295 EC holding that the EC
Treaty in no way prejudices the Member States' rules governing the system
of property ownership. Community law does not require the privatisation of
public-sector entities. The Commission stresses firmly that it does not
question the public, private or mixed ownership of undertakings providing
services of general economic interest and strongly holds that it is primarily
driven by the European citizen's interest of having access to reliable, efficient
and affordable services. This would also be one of the reasons why the term
"public service" was replaced with the more neutral term "service of general
interest" in official political discourse. It is the service itself that is protected
in the EU, not its provider. Thus "a service, [...], does not lose its general
interest character merely because it is not the State that is providing it
and vice versa".371) As already mentioned, a second principle is the freedom
of the Member States to define what they consider as a task of general
interest on the basis of the specific features of the activity and consequently
entrust certain undertakings with their operation, granting exclusive or special
rights, regulating them, funding them, etc. The Member States enjoy a wide
margin of discretion and thus a freedom to shape policy is provided.
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Nonetheless, they are subject to the control of the Court of Justice as regards
manifest errors.372) of course ces that clearly serve individual interests cannot
be excluded from the application of the internal market freedoms and the
competition rules. However, to invoke the derogation of Article 86(2), the
tasks need to be clearly defined and must be explicitly entrusted through an
act of public authority, which is broadly interpreted as this can also concern
specific contracts between the authority and the entrusted undertaking. But
providers of services of general economic interest are undertakings and
therefore subject to the competition rules. Decisions to award special or
exclusive rights to service providers, or to favour them in other ways, can
amount to an infringement of the Treaty. Case law shows that this is true, in
particular, where the public service requirements to be fulfilled by the service
provider are not properly specified,373) where the service provider is
manifestly unable to meet the demand374) or where there is an alternative way
of fulfilling the requirements that would have a less detrimental effect on
competition.375) Finally, the principle of proportionality is laid down in the
article as the restrictions to the rules of the EC Treaty, in particular the internal
market and competition rules, cannot go beyond what is necessary to ensure
the effective fulfilment of the service of general interest.
The interpretation of this article has produced a long list of complex and from
time to time puzzling case law from the Court of Justice on what exactly is the
meaning of services of general economic interest,376) whether undertakings
were effectively entrusted with a service of general economic interest,377)
whether the entrusted tasks are obstructed by the application of the normal
Treaty rules378) and on the scope for applying the provision of Article 86(2) to
other specific Treaty rules.379) The term "general economic interest" implies a
universal service. Services of general economic interest are characterised by
the obligation imposed by a Member State or its authorities to perform a
service for the public within a determined geographic area and to make sure,
irrespective of profitability, that all persons enjoy equal access to the service
in question at affordable prices.380)
With regard to the present key question, probably the most important feature
of the case law on Article 86(2) is the obvious change in approach of the Court
of Justice to its interpretation. In its earliest case law,381)the Court used the
economic viability of the entrusted undertaking as the decisive test to assess
whether the specific tasks would be obstructed by the application of the
Treaty rules. The Court indeed shifted away from this "obstruction approach",
in which an economic analysis of the performance of a "fully-Treaty-
complying" entrusted undertaking was the essential instrument and in which
Article 86 was considered "one of the provisions relating to infringements
of the normal functioning of the competition system by actions on the
part of the states".382) The Court changed its jurisprudence in favour of a
looser assessment, taking other conditions under which the undertaking
operates into consideration and as a result leaning more towards a "value
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approach". This more benign attitude started with the 1993 Corbeau383)
judgment, where the Court already based its decision on the premise that the
obligation to perform the relevant services in conditions of economic
equilibrium presupposed that it would be possible to offset less profitable
sectors against profitable sectors. Hence, the paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article
86 EC were placed on an equal level for the first time. It was further elaborated
in the 1994 Almelo384) judgment, where the Court held that in order to balance
the task of general interest justification of Article 86(2) against the breach of
competition rules, it was "necessary to take into consideration the economic
conditions in which the undertaking operates, in particular the costs which it
has to bear, and the legislation, particularly concerning the environment, to
which it is subject". The "economic viability test" gave its last gasp in the
Energy cases385) in the late 90s, as the Court declared that "for the Treaty
rules not to be applicable to an undertaking entrusted with a service of
general economic interest under Article 90(2) [now Article 86(2)] of the
Treaty, it is sufficient that the application of those rules obstruct the
performance, in law or in fact, of the special obligations incumbent upon
that undertaking. It is not necessary that the survival of the undertaking
itself be threatened". The switch "from economic measurement to value
judgment"386) could be considered as the development of a concept similar
to rule of reason as it is known from the case law on the rules of the internal
market.387) Indeed the overall circumstances are comparable. Where the
Cassis jurisprudence in the free movement case law had a deep impact on
the national regulation, this urged the need for a broader view on the
justifications on the grounds of higher interests. Mutatis mutandis, one could
argue that the increasing influence of competition rules on entrusted
undertakings due to the introduction of market elements in sectors of general
economic interest, calls for a broader base on which derogations can be
justified in order to protect objectives recognised in Community law. Anyhow
the present status of Article 86(2) and the more generous use that is made of
it in the Court's case law supports the idea of the Article's potential to
establish a valuable and useful counterweight for the influence of the Treaty
rules on services of general economic interest.
This status is reinforced by Article 16 EC,388) positioned in the 1997
Amsterdam Treaty as a principle alongside more frequently mentioned
Community values such as non-discrimination and equal treatment, resulting
in a horizontal389) applicability of the common values underpinning services of
general interest. Although the potential of this article should not be
overestimated, the adoption of the new version of this article in the Draft
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe indicates that something is
moving regarding the status of services of general economic interest at the
Community level, as a legal base for Community legislative action in the field
of services of general economic interest is incorporated "in fine" in Article III-
6.390) Article II-36 of the Draft Constitution, former Article 36 of the Charter of
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Fundamental Rights of the Union, completes the picture as it declares "the
Union recognises and respects the access to services of general
economic interest as provided for in national laws and practices, in
accordance with the constitution, in order to promote the social and
territorial cohesion of the Union". This constitutional and fundamental
(social) rights aspect of services of general interest is reflected in the
Community's approach,  which tightly connects the subject of services of
general interest with EU citizenship (Article 17 EC).391) In this vision services
of general interest are seen as "something to which all citizens enjoy a right".
"Social citizenship", just like political citizenship, can be defined as an
equality of rights and obligations and "as so defined social citizenship
includes, without question, equal access to certain services (i.e. services
of general economic interest as referred to in Article 90(2) [now Article
86(2)] of the Treaty) of appropriate quality".392) Due to this bottom-up
approach the discussion has been opened up to all services to which
European citizens can have a right and the dividing lines between the different
possible types of services of general interest (services of general economic
interest, network industries, non-economic services, social services, ...) have
blurred.
As far as the financing of services of general interest is concerned, one has
to bear in mind that different services of general interest cannot be viably
provided on the basis of market mechanisms alone. A specific characteristic
of services of general interest is indeed that they need to be provided even
where the market may not have sufficient incentives to do so. Consequently,
specific arrangements are necessary in order to ensure the financial
equilibrium of the provider. Member States can apply different mechanisms
in order to guarantee the financial equilibrium of providers of services of
general interest. The financing mechanisms applied by the Member States
include direct financial support through the State budget (e.g. subsidies or
other financial advantages such as tax reductions), special or exclusive rights
(e.g. a legal monopoly), contributions by market participants (e.g. a universal
service fund), tariff averaging (e.g. a uniform country-wide tariff in spite of
considerable differences in the cost of provision of the service) or solidarity-
based financing (e.g. social security contributions). Member States are free to
choose which method they apply to finance their services of general interest.
They only have to make sure that the mechanism chosen does not distort
unduly the functioning of the internal market. In particular, Member States
can grant public service compensations, which are necessary for the
functioning of the service of general economic interest. But in case the
Member State over-compensates, State Aid rules are applied, as can be
derived from extensive case law and several Commission actions.393)
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2) Health care as a social service of general interest
A. Social services of general interest
As can be derived from Article 16 EC, services of general economic interest
all play an important role in the promotion of "social and territorial cohesion"
in the Community. Thus the "social function" is inherent to this type of
services. The term "of general interest" already suggests this relation as, just
like the term "social", it refers to a higher interest in society that is taken into
consideration. However, there is one category of services of general interest
that intrinsically is related to a social objective and consequently labelled
"social services of general interest". Like "services of general interest", it is
very difficult to give a satisfactory and comprehensive definition of "social
services (of general interest)". Social services of general interest cover a
broad range of activities such as statutory social protection schemes,
supplementary social protection schemes, health394) and social care
services,395) employment services, child care, services to promote social
integration, education and training, social housing.396) Far from being
exhaustive, this list already indicates that most social services are of a special
nature as they are strongly connected to the "person" (birth, education,
employment, sickness, age, etc.). This "personal nature of many social and
health services leads to requirements that are significantly different from
those in the network industry",397) as acknowledged and perhaps to some
extent understated in the 2004 White Paper. Regarding the above-mentioned
examples of social services, one could argue that they tightly correlate to the
several "social risks" as they are known in the traditional systems of social
security and social assistance and thus responding to difficulties that
individuals encounter during their lifetime.398) Being qualified as "social
services" and considered to be related to "social risks", as known in social
protection schemes, certainly does not mean this category of services
constitutes only non-economic services, as could be erroneously concluded
from the élan of the Court's jurisprudence to exclude solidarity-based
services from the EC competition framework. As already discussed earlier,
solidarity elements or underlying social objectives do not preclude qualifying
certain services as economic activities.399) However, it is also clear that some
social services are definitely of general interest, but cannot be considered of
general 'economic' interest, as they are not regarded as economic activities.
The classification as an economic or a non-economic service in Community
law is of course important for the key question of the role of services of
general interest as a counterweight against the influence of internal market
and competition rules. Noneconomic services are not totally excluded from
the scope of the EC Treaty, but the application of the latter is restricted to the
rules on the free movement of persons, the prohibition of discrimination and
the EC public procurement rules. The internal market rules on the right of
establishment, the free provision of services and the competition rules on
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cartels, abuse of a dominant position and state aid, only apply to "economic
activities". In Community law, "economic activity" is defined as "an activity
that consists in offering goods or services on a given market".400) We already
know that the same entity can provide both economic and non-economic
services. Yet it is not possible to draw up a list of activities that would not a
priori be economic, as this depends on constantly evolving political choices.
What should be kept in mind is that non-economic services are excluded
from the application of the internal market and competition rules of the EC
Treaty. So there is no need for a counterbalance in the "non-economic
services field". This will be further specified for the health care sector. We
have already seen in part II that there are two exemptions to the principle of
economic activities. The most clear-cut example of non-economic services is
the category of activities, "where the state, by definition, faces neither
actual nor potential competition by private companies: the exercise of
imperium".401) Further we have the exemption for solidarity-based services.
According to the European Economic and Social Committee, the distinction
between economic and non-economic services is blurry and uncertain.
However, the EESC stresses that this distinction cannot be the purpose,
which should be to ensure the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity,
as "the Union should recall the types of service to which common
competition law does not apply (services of sovereign or national, regional or
local interest, the compulsory education system, health care and social
protection, or cultural, charitable, social, solidarity/donation-based activities,
etc.)".402) It also reiterates403) the importance of a special treatment of
organisations providing social services on a non-profit basis. The question of
how to reconcile these views with the competition policy of the Commission
and (the functional approach in) the Court's relevant case law remains. An
important feature of the activities that can be categorised as "social services
of general interest" is that they are indeed provided by a variety of providers,
such as public entities, for-profit private "undertakings" or non-profit private
providers, varying from Member State to Member State and making this a
very heterogeneous sector, also within each Member State.404) However,
many of them are provided by non-profit welfare organisations, claiming a
specific status accord- ing to their social tasks and objectives and their
"specific role in maintaining solidarity and encouraging active
citizenship".405)They are defined by the EESC as "a category of private not-
for-profit organisations, having different status in different countries
(associations or foundations) that are active in the health and social
spheres, though where necessary conducting economic activities that
are subordinate to their primary social functions"406).
Although social services of general interest are, certainly in the opinion of
stakeholders in the field of social services, still dealt with only superficially in
the 2004 White Paper, the Commission has certainly made an effort to
unravel a part of the often mysterious and complex tangle around this issue
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at the European level. Their status as services of general interest is
unquestionably acknowledged as they are, in their turn, recognised as an
"integral part of the European model of society", to which is added that
"based on the principle of solidarity, social and health services of
general interest are person-centred and ensure that citizens can
effectively enjoy their fundamental rights and a high level of social
protection, and they strengthen social and territorial cohesion".407)
Recognition of the distinction between missions and instruments for their
delivery and financing on the one hand and the modernisation of these
services on the other, seem to be priorities for the Commission. But the
complete Commission's approach towards social and health services of
general interest is postponed and will be revealed in a Communication on
social services of general interest, including health services, to be adopted in
2005.
These social services are also the result of different historical, cultural and
political evolutions in the Member States and thus difficult to reduce to one
single identity. Nevertheless throughout this whole range of social services,
several common points can be discerned. Applying above-mentioned
characteristics, it is apparent that social services can easily be classified as
services of general interest because they share common values, such as
universality, high quality, affordability, continuity and user / consumer
protection, with the other services of general interest. Their close relation to
social rights408) also gives them the specific fundamental rights aspect already
mentioned in the context of services of general interest. But due to their
specific nature and personal character, social services are characterised by
additional common values and underlying principles. First of all, they pursue
the concrete implementation of social rights and the creation of equal
opportunities. They are based on particular principles like human dignity,
solidarity, social justice, social cohesion, social capital, empowerment and
users' participation. Also important is that they respond to societal
weaknesses and social needs which are not sufficiently addressed by market
mechanisms. Finally they are considered to be effective tools for the
implementation of public policies in the areas of social protection, non-
discrimination, solidarity and the fight against poverty and exclusion.409)
Taking these different elements into consideration, the place of the health
care sector in this context is the final issue to be considered.
B. The concept of services of general interest in the health care sector
1. Health-related services of general interest 
Having marked out the field of "services of general interest" and "social
services of general interest", we can now go down one more level to explore
the place occupied by the health care sector in this domain. This examination
will divide the "health care sector" into three large subdivisions, i.e. "health
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care provision" (the provision of preventive and curative care by health care
professionals and institutions: patient-provider relation) and "health care
insurance" (patient-purchaser relation), in particular statutory health
insurance (the basic compulsory social security scheme covering the risk of
sickness) and voluntary health insurance (substitutive, complementary and
supplementary410) social protection schemes). In fact, the application of the
concept of services of general interest to these sectors is to a large extent
experimental, considering that this concept is still very closely linked to the
big network industries as services of general "economic" interest. Comparing
"health care" with "electricity" seems an unfeasible task, but a closer look
reveals that they have more in common than one would expect. In fact,
notwithstanding many unresolved questions, health fits well in the present
"services of general interest"-debate. This is unquestionably acknowledged
in the 2004 White Paper under subsection "4.4 Recognising fully the general
interest in social and health services". This makes clear that there can be no
doubts on the classification of health services as "of general interest". We will
explore later to what extent "economic interest" is involved. The White Paper
furthermore clearly states that health services should be treated differently
from the network industries in the traditional general "economic" interest
sector. What is meant exactly by "health services" is not clear. It should be
further specified whether this only concerns "health care provision" or if it
covers also the "health care insurance" sector. In this paper, we have focused
on the "health care sector" or what could be identified as "health-related
services".
Recalling the above-mentioned "underlying principles" or "common values"
of services of general interest, these are in fact all values frequently used in
the health care context. The principle of universality or universal access for
the whole territory is an actual concern of health authorities in all Member
States, of which hospital or pharmacy planning are textbook examples. It is
almost needless to mention that continuity and quality requirements are core
topics in the health care sector. While continuity of care is certainly an
essential element, quality of care must be one of the all-important matters in
this area, considering the magnitude of regulation on quality in every Member
State. This concerns the quality of input (infrastructure, staff), e.g. admission
criteria or accreditation; quality of applied techniques and procedures, e.g.
quality control in clinical biology or blood transfusions, and quality of output,
e.g. programmes on hospital infections or bedsores, etc.411)The concept of
affordability is a primary health care topic too, concretised e.g. in the fixing of
maximum tariffs or the installation of a ceiling on health care expenses for
vulnerable groups. Finally, the continuously reiterated importance of user and
consumer rights is easy to "convert" to the health care sector as in the
protection of patient rights, the installation of complaint procedures or the
protection of personal health data. This very short overview of main principles
and examples already indicates that almost all state intervention in the health
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care sector can be linked to a particular "general interest" requirement as it is
known in the field of services of general interest.
But as the specific nature of health care - that "leads to requirements that
are significantly different from those in the network industry" - already
suggests, there is obviously more to health care. The "additional underlying
principles" or "extra values" make it presumable that health care can be
qualified as a "social service of general interest", independent of the question
whether the health care sector and its subdivisions are to be considered
economic or non-economic. The person-centred character of health care is
obvious, as it involves human life and well being. Also the above-mentioned
relation to "social security matters" is self-evident, as "sickness" is one of the
traditionally insured risks in social protection schemes. The status of social
services of general interest as a tool for the implementation of fundamental
social rights is fully applicable to health care. In the European Union
"everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right
to benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established by
national laws and practices. A high level of human health protection shall
be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and
activities" (Article II-35 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe)
and the Union "recognises and respects the entitlement to social security
benefits and social services providing protection in cases such as
maternity [and] illness, [...], in accordance with the rules laid down by
Union law and national laws and practices" (Article II-34 Draft Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe). These articles of the Draft
Constitution for Europe - ominously preceding the Article on the access to
services of general economic interest - are the emanation of the fundamental
rights aspect in the health care sector, as also acknowledged in international
treaties. To complete the picture, it suffices to repeat the "principles
indicating the social character of the service", such as solidarity, social
justice, social cohesion, social capital, non-discrimination, empowerment
and users' participation, etc. These notions and the social services' inherent
responsiveness to societal weaknesses and social needs which are not
sufficiently addressed by market mechanisms presses arguments to qualify
the health care sector in the category of social services of general interest.
2. Health-related services of general economic interest
There is no doubt therefore that the health care sector and its subdivisions
are (social) services of general interest. But being more of a "declaration" at
a "general principles-level" or "European common value-level", it leaves
unanswered the question concerning the potential usefulness of Article 86(2)
as a derogation in Community law from the applicability of fundamental EC
rules in the health care sector. This article is only applicable to "services of
general economic interest" and thus leads unavoidably to the question of the
economic character of the services concerned. Here the division between
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health care provision, statutory health insurance and voluntary protection
schemes is essential for an overview. Following the Commission's
subdivisions of services of general interest in the Green Paper, it is clear that
these health-related services cannot be placed in the same category as
"networking industries". The remaining categories of "other services of
general economic interest" and "noneconomic services" do not satisfy either.
It would be contrary to the special status of health care in the Member States
to characterize this sector as purely economic, as there is considerable
consensus in the European Union that health care has specific characteristics
to which the market is unable to respond accurately.412) On the other hand,
qualifying health care as a genuinely non-economic service does not match
reality either, as e.g. the Court confirmed several times "health care
provision" is an economic activity and in some countries (e.g. the United
States) basic health care insurance is to a large extent left to private
undertakings acting in a market environment.413)
First, as far as the provision of health care (relation patient-provider) is
concerned, the Court confirmed on several occasions that health care
provision is a service according to the EC Treaty. The Court of Justice dealt
with this topic in relatively early jurisprudence and came to the conclusion in
the Luisi and Carbone case that "persons receiving medical treatment are
to be regarded as recipients of services".414) Also in later decisions the
Court leaves no doubt that medical activities are services within the meaning
of the EC Treaty.415) Of course these activities have a special nature as they
are provided in the Member States under the national health care system in
the framework of a social security scheme. However, according to the settled
case law of the Court, the special nature of certain services does not remove
them from the ambit of the EC Treaty and the fundamental freedoms
therein.416) This means that activities in health care provision cannot be
excluded from the range of action of the internal market. Moreover, also the
providers of medical activities (general practitioners, medical specialists,
pharmacists, hospitals, etc.) have been considered by the Court to be
economic actors and thus undertakings according to the EC competition
rules.417) The fact that health provision can be qualified as a service of general
interest and is unmistakably of general economic interest too, means that
there is certainly a potential for Article 86(2) to be applied in this domain. This
was the case in Ambulanz Glöckner418) for providers of transport of sick
persons, where Article 86(2) justified the exclusive right to provide both
emergency and regular transport for sick and injured persons. This was
necessary to prevent "cream skimming" by private companies (by providing
transport in the more profitable non-emergency sector in urban areas), which
would make the task of general economic interest (of providing all transport
by ambulance) of the entrusted entities very difficult. Of course in the domain
of health care provision, the requirement that competition law only applies
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where the conduct in question is liable to affect trade between Member
States should be kept in mind, e.g. in the case of general practitioners.
However, the situation is totally different in the case of "basic" or "statutory"
health insurance as a part of the national social security schemes. Since the
Poucet-Pistre case419) the Court created a "new category" for social
insurance services based on compulsory affiliation, such as statutory health
insurance schemes. This category was exempted from the application of
competition law because the activities concerned were based on the
"principle of solidarity", providing for a transfer of wealth among members of
a given risk group or among different groups. The fact that the activities are
embedded in solidarity motives entails that the entities engaging in them are
not to be considered as engaging in an economic activity and thus are not
undertakings according to the EC Treaty. This line of thought was reiterated
in the cases Garcia,420) Cisa l421) and AOK Bundesverband.422) It entails that
there is no scope for applying Article 86(2), as the entire field of solidarity-
based activities in statutory health insurance are excluded from the range of
action of the competition rules and need not to be countered by the legal
derogation for services of general economic interest.
However we have already mentioned that health care is in principle an
economic activity. Therefore we agree with different authors423) that the Court
was wrong to prevent application of the competition rules on the entire field
of statutory (health) insurance and that a better result could have been
reached if the Court had acknowledged that these "insurance services" are in
fact an economic activity (health as an insurable risk), but as they are services
of general economic interest, Article 86(2) could be applied where their
provision is threatened by the application of the Treaty rules. In this reasoning
the solidarity element is used as an argument for demonstrating the "general
economic interest" character of these activities. Consequently, Article 86(2)
could affirm the necessity of special or exclusive rights such as compulsory
affiliation to maintain solidarity in the system.424) This argument was also
developed by Advocate General (AG) Jacobs in his Opinion on the AOK
Bundesverband judgment.425) The Court did not follow its AG and simply
applied the Poucet-Pistre interpretation of the "solidarity exemption", though
it noted that "the possibility remains that, besides their functions of an
exclusively social nature within the framework of management of the
German social security system, the sickness funds and the entities that
represent them, namely the fund associations, engage in operations
which have a purpose that is not social and is economic in nature. In that
case the decisions which they would be led to adopt could perhaps be
regarded as decisions of undertakings or of associations of
undertakings" and added an Article 86(2)-like reasoning. The Court seems
to suggest that it will not consider entities like mutual health funds to be of a
special nature and will not give them special protection when they clearly
engage in economic activity according to its definition of undertaking. This
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could be the case for entities managing the basic health insurance scheme,
engaging in voluntary health insurance activities. There is another issue
related to this. In his Opinion, AG Jacobs points to a potential future
usefulness of Article 86(2) in the field of statutory health insurance too.
Indeed, in the ongoing search for new cost-containing measures, several
Member States have already introduced and will introduce more market
incentives in their health care systems (cf. the Netherlands). The more market
elements in the system, the higher the chance that the lat-ter will be viewed
as less based on solidarity, which makes the actual application of the
competition rules presumable. The derogation of Article 86(2) could prove to
be essential for preserving social objectives and solidarity elements in the
national basic health insurance schemes, depending on the amount of market
elements in the statutory health insurance scheme. This of course depends
on political decisions in the Member States, responsible for the organisation
of their social security system,426) on how to set up the statutory health
insurance scheme. If a Member State decides to introduce more competition
elements in its system, it will have to take into consideration that EC
competition rules will apply and vice versa. In this way the powers of the
Member States can be respected.
This need for the "services of general economic interest derogation" will
presumably be even more the case for voluntary health insurance schemes.
If they are considered "economic activities" by analogy with the
supplementary pension schemes that have already passed the scrutiny of the
Court, it is obvious that Article 86(2) will play an important role in preserving
the social objectives and general interest tasks of these voluntary social
protection schemes. In the supplementary pension funds cases FFSA,427)
Albany,428) Brentjens429) and Drijvende Bokken,430) the exclusive rights of the
funds were challenged. In part II, we have already pointed out that the social
objectives and the solidarity elements in the supplementary scheme could
not prevent the qualification of their activities as economic, but were an
essential element when the application of Article 86(2) was judged. The Court
acknowledged that the pension funds were entrusted with a service of
general economic interest according to Article 86(2), of which the operation
could be threatened if the exclusive rights concerned were to banned. Again
"cream skimming" by competing private companies was acknowledged as a
major risk for the pursuit of the social objectives in these cases. Mutatis
mutandis, the concept of services of general economic interest could help in
finding a balance between the competition rules and the inherent general
interest requirements (open enrolment, lifetime cover, community rating,
minimum benefits, etc.) in the field of voluntary health insurance. As in the
supplementary pension cases, voluntary health insurance and the basic
regime could be seen as forming a whole with the purpose of covering the
same social risk.431) If the level of solidarity in the scheme is insufficient to
enjoy the "solidarity exception", Article 86(2) can bring the necessary
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counterweight. If certain voluntary health insurance services were to be
opened to competition, bad risks could be refused by private for-profit-
companies and entities with a social objective would have to cover these bad
risks, which would make it difficult for those organizations to offer these
services at an affordable price to the beneficiaries concerned. Of course the
relevance of the supplementary pension jurisprudence for the voluntary
health insurance sector is uncertain.
As health-related services are or have the potential to be considered as
services of general economic interest, Article 86(2) also requires that the
undertakings concerned are "entrusted" by the government with a task of
general economic interest432) and that the discharge of the latter would, in law
or in fact, be obstructed by the application of the Treaty rules.433)The
"entrusting" of health-related service providers can presumably be found in
"Sickness Insurance Acts" or national "Acts on the medical professions",
"Hospital Acts", "Pharmacy Acts" for health care providers and for statutory
health insurers in e.g. "Sickness Funds Acts" or also in general "Sickness
Insurance Acts". For voluntary health insurance the entrustment with general
interest tasks should be found in the regulation setting boundaries for the
providers of this service, like an "Act on complementary health insurance".
The entrustment could also be derived from a series of governmental actions
and policy documents.434) Of course the relevant government action will differ
from country to country so this will be a case-by-case evaluation. The search
for this "entrusting Act" will surely not always be unproblematic. However, in
the cases Albany, Brentjens and Drijvende Bokken, the Court did not really
"investigate" explicitly the entrustment with a task of general economic
interest by governmental action when it ruled on the application of Article
86(2). The stringency of this requirement should therefore be put in
perspective since both the Commission and the Court interpret it liberally.435)
The Court seems to draw this conclusion from the obvious and essential
social function of the pension scheme. Furthermore, it has to be
demonstrated that it would not be possible for the undertaking to perform the
particular tasks entrusted to it or to perform the tasks of general economic
interest which have been assigned to it under economically acceptable
conditions,436) but the entrusted entity must not prove that the financial
balance or economic viability of the undertaking entrusted with the operation
of a service of general economic interest is threatened. Nonetheless this
means that as long as health care institutions can perform their task without
infringing the Treaty, they are bound by it. The performance assessment of
art. 86(2) with relation to health care institutions should therefore not only
consider financial matters, but also quality and access to health care. Finally
this obstruction of the normal functioning of EC law should not go further than
is necessary for the preservation of the performance of the given tasks. This
proportionality requirement holds that a balance must be found between the
anticompetitive action and the entrusted task of general interest (i.e. health)
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and could be the main cause of disagreement, as it constitutes a more
subjective deliberation on whether the given public task is worth the breach
of competition rules. Be that as it may, a Member State "should not be
required to prove that no other conceivable measure, which by definition
would be hypothetical, could enable [those tasks] to be performed under
the same conditions".437) Of course the freedom that Member States enjoy
to organise their own social security system in the present state of
Community law, is also of undeniable importance when the health care sector
is concerned. More in particular, according to Article 152(5) EC, Community
action in the field of public health shall fully respect the responsibilities of the
Member States for the organisation and delivery of health services and
medical care. This clause should shed a specific light on the Article 86(2)
proportionality test in health care matters.438)
3) Concluding remarks
The topic of services of general interest has acquired an inerasable place on
the political agenda of the European Union, the Member States and the
stakeholders in the related activity sectors. This should not be
underestimated, as the European Commission already acknowledged in its
first and almost 10 year old Communication on services of general interest in
the European Union that these services are a key element in the European
model of society, a view recently confirmed in the 2004 White Paper.
Nonetheless the notion and the debate on services of general interest have
undergone an undeniable evolution, which has not yet ended and presumably
never will, as the topic is strongly related to the constantly evolving economic,
social, political and cultural changes in the Member States and the EU. The
1996 Communication already covered the issue of "services of general
interest", but was to a large extent devoted to the big network industries of
postal services, telecommunications, energy and broadcasting. Although this
link has not disappeared in 2004, it has certainly has made room for a broader
approach of the issue, opening it up as a shared responsibility of the Union
and the Member States, operating close to citizens, reiterating underlying
common values, the importance of monitoring and evaluating performance,
but maybe most important of all, respecting diversity of services and
situations, integrating social and health services in the document and thus
recognizing fully their general interest. The same evolution is noticeable in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, which has moved away from
a rather narrow-minded "competition obstruction approach" to what is called
a "value approach" of services of general economic interest in the EC Treaty
Article 86. This certainly points to future opportunities with regard to recourse
to Article 86(2) as a counterweight for the normal application of Treaty rules
before the Court of Justice.
And this was the issue at stake for the health care sector. To what extent can
the concept of "(social) services of general (economic) interest" function as a
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counterbalance for the "threat" of internal market and competition rules in the
field health care and its subdivisions? It was easy to conclude that all the
examined "health-related activities" are indeed services of general interest,
which is not surprising as social security matters, like health care, are a sort
of "archetype" or at least a "textbook example" of services of general interest.
But whilst acknowledging the well-known specific status and specific
characteristics of health care cannot be considered revolutionary or
innovating, the practical legal usefulness of the concept "services of general
economic interest", as it is found in Article 86(2) EC, in health care matters
seems more interesting and challenging. Anexamination led to the conclusion
that all activities in the health care sector (provision, statutory insurance and
voluntary insurance) can have an actual or potential (future) virtuous effect on
it. Activities in the health care sector already labelled as "economic services
according to EU law" could be joined by the other "sheltered" subdivisions in
health care, when, due to cost containment measures, more market elements
are introduced in the health care systems and the level of solidarity elements
is too low to stay out of the action range of European economic law. That is
why it is impossible to draw up a list of "a priori noneconomic services": what
is sheltered from internal market and competition rules today, can be an
economic activity tomorrow, depending on changing views on the role of the
state and political reorientations in the Member States. In this view the
importance of Article 86(2) for justifying national measures aiming at solidarity
or other social objectives could be major and this Article could become the
key element in finding a balance between the application of EU competition
rules and socially inspired activities, as a "third way" next to the "state
prerogative" and "solidarity"-exemptions. The more benign approach of the
Court towards the higher interests of balance within the EC Treaty rules, is of
course crucial for the health care sector. Once an entity engaging in health
care activities is considered an undertaking according to EC law, the
qualification of a health care activity as a task of general interest will be quite
trouble-free, but the requirements of "entrusted by an act of public authority",
"obstructing in law or in fact" and of proportionality could be more delicate
subjects.
Be that as it may, both the European Union and the Member States should
take this key role seriously and this should in the first place be done by
eliminating semantic problems and further exploring and elaborating the
status of health care as a "service of general interest". Even where it is self-
evident that this tag is justified, it will certainly be a more complicated task to
evaluate the tangible consequences of this qualification. One concrete
consequence could be an in-depth re-evaluation of the pending "Proposal for
a Directive on services on the internal market", taking into account the
importance of services of general interest and the specific status of health
care as a service of general interest "of which the personal nature leads to
requirements that are significantly different from those in the network
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industries" and at the same time "recognising fully the general interest in
social and health services". The latest version of the proposal for a services
Directive covers the issue of services of general interest in a rather
noncommittal way, as a new recital relating to the subject-matter of the
Directive states that it is only applicable to services of general interest that
correspond to an economic activity and proclaims a status quo as regards
these services of general "economic" interest: "The Directive does not
affect the freedom of the Member States to define, in conformity with
Community law, what they consider to be services of general economic
interest, how those services should be organized and financed and what
specific obligations they should be subject to". The recital concludes that
"this Directive does not deal with the follow-up to the Commission White
Paper on services of general interest". Unmistakably having a prima facie
reassuring effect, these considerations not only avoid a more thorough
analysis of the relationship between the services Directive and the White
paper on services of general interest, they also confirm - by means of a status
quo - that nothing changes as far as services of general (economic) interest
are concerned, which also means that no specific attention will be given to
their specific status in the services field. The services Directive thus fully
applies to services of general economic interest in the same way as it applies
to other services. A good example of this special attention can however be
found under Chapter II "Freedom of establishment for service providers", in a
recital concerning mutual evaluation process for the evaluation of
requirements, stating that this evaluation process "has to take fully into
account the specificity of services of general economic interest and of
the particular tasks assigned to them". It is acknowledged that "these may
justify certain restrictions to the freedom of establishment in particular
where these pursue the protection of public health and social policy
objectives". This being merely a recital only relating to the establishment
chapter of the Directive, it doesn't remedy the absence of a legally binding
Article dedicated to the specific status of services of general economic
interest. This lack of special consideration should at least be brought to
attention and be re-evaluated, leaving, in the context of this paper, the
precise tenor or content of an Amendment open for discussion.
The Commission Communication on social services of general interest,
including health services, is a very important step and should be a very
interesting document holding the Commission's views on the future of on
health and (other) social services. It should bring more clarity and hopefully
more legal certainty and transparency to the relation between health care
systems and European economic law, often referred to as "the threat of the
internal market and competition rules for the national health care systems".
Establishing a common vision on health care as a (social) service of general
(economic) interest amoung 25 countries will definitely be a very demanding
exercise (in which the open method of coordination in health care matters
Access to health care in an internal market: 
impact for statutory and complementary systems 93
could be very valuable). But finding a common line of thought is what Europe
is for and it's what Europe is good at, albeit from time to time the result of an
exhausting crusade.
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V. Overall conclusions
It is a fact that the competence of the European Union in the Health Care
sector remains rather limited, implying that Member States are free to
determine the characteristics and the structure of their national health
systems. This cannot however hide the further interference of European law
and in particular the rules on the internal market. This is not surprisingly in a
time where national social security systems evolve in the direction of hybrid
systems with a mix of public and private elements. The need is felt for a
greater responsibility of the citizen, for increasing elements of competition
leading to a bigger role of the private sector. This does not exclude that the
State is pulling the strings, but rather now from another perspective. More
and more the State sees its task to guarantee everybody a right to social
security as a kind of end-responsibility allowing other actors to participate in
the execution of the social security system.
This report wanted to see how far the internal market can affect access to
health care.
In a first part the element of free movement was investigated.
As a general rule, regulation and free movement fit uneasily. Combining
market access with enduring regulatory control is a difficult assignment, not
least in a field as delicate and highly regulated as that of the provision of
health care, a field which is moreover interrelated with territorially and
solidarity-based social security. The current European legal framework in
relation to the free movement of health care professionals is unremarkable for
legal certainty. Leaving aside the issue of professional qualifications, one is
confronted with a situation in which secondary legislation, in the form of the
Doctor’s Directive, prescribes the application of significant yet ill-defined
parts of the legislation of the host Member State, whereas at the same time,
the Court’s services case law has gradually developed to embrace of a
“qualified” country of origin principle, on the basis of which a conditional
mutual recognition applies. Conditional indeed, as the host Member State is
able to impose its non-discriminatory legislation in the event and to the extent
that the legislation of the Member State of establishment of the service
provider fails to safeguard a legitimate aim of public interest. In the matter
under consideration, i.e. health care provision, this proportionality
assessment, which is to be conducted on a case-by-case basis, might be
applied with less rigour by the Court, an approach which is prompted by the
delicate nature of the regulation at hand, pursuing health and social policy
objectives. Whilst this flexibility helps safeguarding Member States’
legitimate interests, it renders the legal position of health care professionals
providing services in the host Member State utterly difficult to predict.
Conversely, the proposed Directive on services in the internal market, though
largely drawing from the Court’s case law, envisages a virtually absolute and
unconditional implementation of the home State model. Being conceptually
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clear and, admittedly, predictable, the country of origin principle as laid down
in the Commission’s Proposal almost irrefutably presumes a European wide-
equivalence in the protection of the public interest, an equivalence which in
fact does not exist and which is neither instituted by the Proposal. In so doing,
the Proposal disowns the legitimate interest of Member States to impose their
own legislation on foreign health care professionals providing services within
their territory, forcing them to nearly unconditionally recognize the legislation
of the home Member State of the service provider. Health- and health-care
related derogations are altogether scarce, unclear or their use is strictly
framed.
The relationship of the Proposal with the future Directive on the recognition of
professional qualifications leaves much to be desired. The scope of the
former and the range of its coordinated field are such that it plainly
encompasses the matters regulated by the latter. Although derogations are
provided for to compensate for situations of manifest inconsistency, more
attention should be paid to the coordination of the two instruments, so as,
ideally, to come to an integrated legal framework within which the free
movement of health care providers is to take place. Clarification is definitely
needed as to the scope of the concept of “disciplinary rules of a professional
or administrative nature which are directly linked to professional
qualifications”, to which the service provider, pursuant to the future
Recognition Directive, is subject at any rate in the host Member State and in
respect of which a derogation to the country of origin principle has been
included in the Proposal. This vague notion, reintroduced by the Council in
the Common Position on the Recognition Directive, will delineate to a
significant extent the scope of the country of origin principle in respect of the
cross-border pursuit of numerous professional activities, notably health-
carerelated ones.
Furthermore, the Proposal for a Directive on services in the internal market
adds nothing to the thorny issue of the connection between the intra-
Community provision of health care services and the incidence of aspects of
social security; the question as to whether, and if so, under which conditions,
these services should give rise to a financial intervention by the national
health insurance institution in the host Member State remains unanswered,
although some provisions of the Proposal hint at an “activated” reading of the
Court of Justice’s cases on patient mobility under Article 49 ECT. Elaborating
on these “activated” health care rulings as well as on the general services
case law, we contend that a health care provider established in a Member
State where he lawfully provides medical services, is entitled to provide those
services on a temporary and occasional basis in the host Member State. If
these services, had they been provided by a contracted provider established
in the host Member State, would have been assumed by the national health
insurance institution, the patient, recipient of the medical services provided
by the foreign doctor, should in principle be entitled to reimbursement, the
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amount of which may not be lower than the level of assumption of that care
as provided by a domestic contracted provider. We further submit that it
should not be possible for the foreign medical service provider to challenge
the host Member State’s legislation defining the boundaries of health care
cover, that is the personal scope of their schemes of social protection in the
area of health care, the range of treatments which are covered and the extent
to which they are covered, and lastly, the conditions on which benefits are
granted.
The Court’s health care cases have paved the way for a second method of
patient mobility, which comes on top of the procedure enshrined in the
Community Regulations on the coordination of social security. Having
described the manner in which the Court deals with the compatibility of the
Regulation-based method of patient mobility – which subjects the
assumption of the costs of treatments provided in another Member State, in
accordance with its legislation, to prior authorisation by the competent
institution of the Member State of affiliation – with the Treaty, we take a
prescriptive approach and submit that, as regards the cross-border receipt of
intramural care, the two methods are mutually complementary and their
application should be merged as much as possible. The same reasoning,
however, cannot be maintained in relation to the cross-border receipt of
extramural care, in respect of which prior authorisations requirements
constitute unjustified restrictions to the free movement of services.
Proceeding from a prescriptive point of view, the application of the
Regulation-based method as regards extramural care should be limited to
those cases where it offers its beneficiary some added value, on pain of
running counter to the Treaty. In that regard, it is to be regretted that the
Council has not seized the opportunity, on adoption of the new coordination
regulation, to at least implicitly refer to the Treaty-based method of patient
mobility, instead making it appear as if Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 will be
the one route for patients wishing to be treated in another Member State at
the expense of the national health insurance institution. Without advocating
an incorporation of the Court’s case law into the Coordination Regulation,
which, for various reasons, seems not desirable, we believe that the
Community legislature ought to take account of the one method while
regulating the other, as the Commission has satisfactorily done in Article 23
of its Proposal for a Directive on services in the internal market, intended to
codify the Court’s health care cases. It does so not without merit, even if it
fails to remove uncertainty regarding some important concepts, most notably
the distinction between intra- and extramural care.
In a second part attention was paid to the difficult relation between
competition law and health care, leading to the fundamental issue whether
social security institutions are performing economic activities or not. The
Court has been clear on the qualification of health care provision as an
economic service within the meaning of the Treaty and the same probably
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holds true for voluntary health insurance, if the supplementary pensions case-
law can be transposed to the health sector. But an entangled situation has
been created by the Court of Justice as regards the question whether the
management of statutory health insurance under the national social security
schemes should be regarded as an economic activity or not. The Court has
exempted the institutions governing these schemes from the notion of
“undertaking exercising an economic activity” on the grounds that their
operation is founded on the principle of solidarity. This raised the crucial
question which criteria an insurance system has to meet to be considered as
“a social security system” allowing it to escape from full application of the
internal market rules. Here we are however confronted with the problem that
the case law of the Court is far from clear. It is understandable that the
European concept of social security differs from the national concept,
however it is very remarkable that exactly an important aspect of what is
social security , is answered differently by the Court, most of the time
depending on the European instrument in question.
Under the third –non-life insurance directive e.g. the fact that the system is
executed by private insurance companies acting at their own risk excludes
the possibility to be considered as social security system. The fact however
that a system is executed by companies not acting at their own risk, does not
immediately imply that we are dealing with a social security system. What is
the relevance of being considered as social security under Regulation 1408/
71? Sometimes considered completely irrelevant while at other occasions
used as an argument pointing in the direction of a social security system.
Moreover the Court has in a recent case, in which the examined basic
insurance scheme displayed a considerable amount of market elements,
made entirely clear that it is willing to go far with this solidarity-based
immunity for basic social protection schemes. A crucial policy question is
thus at what point of this “balance of solidarity” the degree of solidarity in a
given scheme will not suffice to be exempted from European economic law.
When will reforms towards a more market-oriented model in the different
European models of health care systems lead to the application of
competition law? Are certain types of solidarity (income solidarity, solidarity
by scope, risk solidarity, intergenerational solidarity and solidarity between
schemes) more decisive than others for the outcome of this weighing
exercise and which? Intergenerational solidarity does e.g. not concern health
insurance. All this is not in favour of much legal certainty.
How far can the Court go in this respect without compromising its own
authority?
The different cases have however shown that social objectives can be
introduced as a safeguard against full application of the competition rules and
this not only in the public sector.
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Where these first two chapters unambiguously demonstrate that national
health care policy cannot be established with disregard of European
economic law, the third Chapter examines a concept in Community law that
could constitute a safeguard or counterbalance to this increasing influence of
market-based rules, which are often deemed maladjusted in a sensitive and
person-centred sector like health care. The practicability of this concept is to
be viewed in the first place on a looser conceptual level under the
denominator of “services of general interest”, which are tackled in a recent
Commission White Paper. But on a strictly legal level it is only the sub-
concept of “services of general economic interest” as it appears in the Treaty
that can be used as a decisive derogation to the provisions of Community law
indirectly aiming at the “organisation and delivery of health services and
medical care in the Member States”. Putting the Babel-like confusion relating
to the term and the historical connection of the concept to the network
industries (electricity, telecommunication, postal services, …) aside, one
straightforwardly agrees that the concept of services of general interest, as
services of which the provision to the citizens is deemed very important in a
given society and therefore is submitted to a number of common values and
specific demands, fits perfectly for health care. As a strongly person-oriented
sector, health care is to be considered as a “social service of general interest”
and therefore subject to additional requirements. In a nutshell, health care
evidently is a part of this “pillar of the European model of society”.
But legally binding provisions on “services of general interest” are absent in
Community law. Indeed the EC Treaty only knows the sub-concept of
“services of general economic interest” of Art. 86(2) EC, which aims at
“economic” services. As we have seen, in health matters, this is exactly a
troublesome qualification, especially when it concerns basic health insurance
schemes, lacking the necessary legal certainty. But should this issue
continue to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis? If this would be the case,
the challenge will be to find the answer to the question of which role Art. 86(2)
EC could or should play after failure of the solidarity-argumentation and
qualification as an economic service, and if this provision could be the basis
for a new type of “rule of reason”, supported and reinforced by the special
status given to services of general economic interest in Art. 16 EC and in the
future Constitution. But is Art. 86(2) EC case-law considered to be the right
path to mitigate potential undesired impact of European economic law on
health care policy in the first place? Or should this once and for all be dealt
with in future primary or secondary EC legislation, with the risk of introducing
rigidity in a dynamic concept? Should the Treaty provide for a general
derogation clause for social security and if so, how to define “social
security”? Must the answer rather be found in secondary legislation? Could
e.g. a consensus be reached on a European legislative framework on
standards for health care as a service of general economic interest, in which
common values are laid down and thus legal safeguards as to solidarity,
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equality, accessibility, affordability, etc…, would become a part of
Community law? Would that be conducive to the recognition of basic health
insurance as a service of general economic interest and reduce the
vagueness surrounding the regulatory environment of the institutions
administering these schemes? Expressing this kind of considerations could
be building castles in the air, but touching on emanations of the legal
uncertainty regarding the relation between national health care policies and
the EU internal market and competition policies, there is a strong case for
these issues to be sorted out within the scope for policymaking of the
Community. If not, the legislative powers of the Community probably
condemn themselves to tail along after the case-to-case solutions of the
judiciary.
Either way, whether the essential protective layer is found in art. 86(2) EC or
in future legislative intervention, we argue that also basic health care
insurance can be qualified as an economic activity, without being robbed of
the elemental solidarity grounds it is based on. The final result probably will
not differ much from the current situation, but the institutions managing
health care schemes would then be put in a situation of more legal certainty,
as their activities would be considered as an economic activity, to which
competition law is applicable in principle, but for which clear safeguards (on
the basis of Art. 86(2) EC, future primary or secondary legislation) can be
provided in order to protect the fundamental principles most health
protection schemes are based on. This would of course do much to the
coherence of the Court’s case-law concerning the scope of EC competition
law too.
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144)Discussions were held, at the end of which it was decided to maintain the
compulsory contracting system but to comply with certain subsidiary
demands of the medical and dentist profession, cf. the Act of 22 July
2003, Mém.A. 2003, 2257.
145)See the argument submitted by the Dutch government and sickness fund
in ECJ, Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré / Van Riet [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, par.
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Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré / Van Riet [2003] E.C.R. I-4509, par. 74;
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General STIX-HACKL in Commission v. Spain, par. 98 e.s.
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par. 98, 100 and 106.
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restrictive rule, see V. HATZOPOULOS, "Le principe communautaire
d'équivalence et de reconnaissance mutuelle dans la libre prestation de
services", Brussels, Bruylant, 1999, 167, 197 and 315 e.s.
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proportionality of national restrictive measures has either been left to
national courts with little or no guidance, or left to the Member States
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BURCA lists a number of factors which can usefully be kept in mind when
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190)ECJ, Case C-55/94, Gebhard [1995] ECR 4165, par. 25-27.
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comparative analysis of the effect of social health insurance reform in
former European countries", Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law,
Vol. 28, 4, 2003, 59.
219)See MAARSE, H., and PAULUS, A., "Has solidarity survived ? A
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and 82.
231)As such pension funds may be undertakings, even if they are not profit
making (ECJ, September 21, 1999, Albany, [1999], ECR I-5751, par. 77-87.
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OPENING ADDRESS

Mars DI BARTOLOMEO
MINISTER OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY
LUXEMBOURG
Mesdames, Messieurs,
Tout d'abord, je vous souhaite la bienvenue à Luxembourg et je tiens à vous
remercier de votre participation à notre conférence. Bienvenue aux
représentants du Parlement européen, aux délégations gouvernementales
des différents États membres, aux représentants des institutions
européennes, aux personnes du milieu académique ainsi qu'aux acteurs du
secteur sanitaire et social. 
Je tiens aussi à féliciter les organisateurs de la conférence, à savoir l'AIM,
l'Association internationale de la mutualité, l'aloss, l'Association
luxembourgeoise des organismes de sécurité sociale et le Conseil supérieur
de la mutualité luxembourgeoise.
Merci de participer à cette conférence qui retient tout mon engagement et qui
traite du thème très important de l'accès aux soins de santé dans un marché
unique et de l'impact sur les systèmes légaux et complémentaires.
Les soins de santé dans une Europe unie doivent continuer à obéir aux
critères et aux objectifs mis en place par des générations entières, c'est-à-
dire correspondre à un système performant, assurant des soins de qualité et
garantissant un libre accès aux concernés, sans distinction de leur situation
sociale, et fondé sur le principe de la solidarité entre les différents acteurs.
L'avenir de ce système doit nous préoccuper. Quand le thème a été retenu,
la directive Bolkestein était en pleine discussion. Elle le reste d'ailleurs mais
nous avons constaté une certaine évolution en la matière. A l'heure actuelle il
est très fortement envisagé que le secteur de la santé ne sera pas inclus dans
le champ d'application de la directive, dont le texte devra être remodelé.
Cependant ne soyons pas dupes, le sujet reste d'actualité même si les
premiers dangers ont été écartés.
Avant la conférence, je viens de parler avec la rapportrice du Parlement
européen sur la directive Bolkestein. Nous nous devons de suivre la
discussion non pas seulement en matière de services de santé, mais aussi
dans le domaine des services d'intérêt général. L'évolution sur le plan
européen a une très forte influence sur nos systèmes nationaux qui ont été
construits à grands efforts et à grands frais et que nous devons sauvegarder
et développer dans le bon sens.
Nous sommes très contents d'avoir aujourd'hui la possibilité d'échanger nos
vues avec celles d'un expert reconnu qui est le professeur Yves Jorens de
l'Université de Gand. A notre demande, le professeur Jorens a rédigé un
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rapport d'une qualité exceptionnelle qui va constituer la base de nos
discussions dans les tables rondes respectives.
Fort d'une expérience ministérielle de seulement huit mois, j'ai appris
beaucoup de choses dans cette période. J'ai appris que si la politique ne
s'occupe pas de sujets prioritaires, ceux-ci continuent à évoluer et à se
développer. Pour ma part, j'ai tiré la conclusion qu'on a intérêt à se préparer
et à s'engager dans la discussion. Il ne suffit pas de laisser le terrain à des
fonctionnaires, aussi bien intentionnés et motivés qu'ils soient. Il faut engager
la politique dès les premiers pas. 
Conscient que la politique ne peut pas tout résoudre, j'estime quand même
qu'elle peut jouer le rôle d'arbitre en recherchant l'équilibre entre les
différents intérêts. Concernant le sujet qui nous préoccupe aujourd'hui, il y a
des intérêts qu'on doit garder en point de mire: à côté de la libre circulation
des services et du libre échange, il y a la qualité des services et le libre accès
aux soins de santé. 
Parfois on a tendance à dire que les soins de santé sont des services. Certes,
ce sont des services, mais ce ne sont pas des services comme tous les
autres. Ce ne sont pas des services marchands qui obéissent à la seule idée
de la concurrence. Nous ne sommes pas seulement en présence de deux
partenaires, l'un qui fait l'offre et l'autre qui fait la demande, mais il y a un
troisième partenaire, celui qui garantit le financement. C'est la collectivité qui,
par voie de conséquence, doit garder le droit d'intervenir et de déterminer le
cadre général.
Je ne veux certainement pas monopoliser la discussion, mais j'ai voulu
insister sur un certain nombre de points qui me sont chers et qui, j'espère,
seront présents dans nos débats d'aujourd'hui. Certainement nous n'allons
pas trancher toutes les questions mais je suis sûr que les conclusions de nos
discussions nous armeront pour les débats futurs.
Retenu par des obligations ministérielles pendant la matinée en participant
respectivement à la réunion du Conseil du Gouvernement luxembourgeois et
à une réunion informelle du Conseil des ministres du Travail et de l'Emploi de
l'Union européenne, j'aurai le plaisir de vous rejoindre pour les discussions de
cet après-midi.
Finalement, je vous souhaite une conférence intéressante et surtout
fructueuse. 
Je vous remercie.
Fernand SAUER
DIRECTOR
DG HEALTH AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
  EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Minister, Honourable Member of Parliament, 
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am very pleased to be able to participate in this International Conference on
access to health care in an internal market co-organised by the “Association
Internationale de la Mutualité”, under the auspices of the Luxembourg
Presidency of the European Union.
Let me thank on this occasion Ron Hendriks and Willy Palm, from AIM, for
their invaluable contribution to the Commission’s reflection work on patient
mobility as well as a strong partner in our EU Health Forum.
Recognition of the European dimension of healthcare
- Healthcare issues are primarily national in nature. The fundamental
responsibility for ensuring universal access to high-quality care, funded
through solidarity, lies with the Member States.
- But there are a variety of trends creating a European dimension to these
issues.
- Jurisprudence from the European Court of Justice on the rights of patients
to seek healthcare in other countries and be reimbursed is one major
aspect.
- Also common challenges for all health systems of coping with the need to
adapt to constant developments in medical technologies and techniques;
the ageing of the European population changing overall health needs; and
rising public expectations, as discussed by Health ministers under the
Dutch Presidency.  
First elements of a European strategy now in place
- An important report on Health and the Internal Market was finalised in
2001 for my directorate by a group of governmental experts chaired by
Hans Stein. This report and other contributions were the subject of a major
conference in Minorca under Spanish Presidency in June 2002.
- The Commission brought together health ministers together with
representatives of patients, professionals, providers and purchasers of
healthcare and the European Parliament in a high-level reflection process
on patient mobility which agreed a wide-ranging report in December 2003.
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- Three Commissioners, responsible respectively for health employment
and internal market, were involved in this process, leading to a close
cooperation between their services.
- The key result of this patient mobility reflection process was the
recognition of the importance of the European dimension for national
health systems, and the potential value that European cooperation can
bring in helping Member States to achieve their objectives. 
- The Commission set out proposals for developing a European response
to these challenges in April 2004:
- establishing a High Level Group on health services and medical care to
take forward the recommendations of the reflection process;
- and extending the open method of coordination to healthcare and
long-term care.
Practical collaboration through the High Level Group will help
improve health service across Europe
Work is being taken forward in seven main areas.
- on cross-border healthcare purchasing and provision, looking at
issues such as the financial impact and sustainability of cross-border
healthcare; developing a purchasing framework; and patients’ rights and
responsibilities;
- on health professionals, looking at issues beyond recognition of
qualifications to subjects to such as continuing professional development
and the impact of health professional migration within the Union;
- on centres of reference, developing principles for a European system of
centres of reference that could pool resources on tackling very rare
diseases, for example, and where we hope to see pilot projects in 2006;
- on health technology assessment, where the High Level Group has
developed orientations for a network which the public health programme
could help finance this year;
- on information and e-health, and looking at the key elements of
information strategies for health services;
- developing impact assessment methodologies to take account of the
impact of proposals on health services;
- and developing collaboration on patient safety, as described at the
conference also supported by the Presidency here in Luxembourg earlier
this week.
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The future Health & Consumer Protection programme will better
support to health system cooperation
- My directorate and the health research directorate have already been able
to support some activities on healthcare cooperation under the current
public health programme, but in a limited way.
- However, on Wednesday the Commission adopted a proposal for a new
Health and Consumer Protection Programme to run from 2007 to 2013
within the so-called “financial perspectives parckage”.  This programme
will be expanded both in scope and in size.
- In terms of size, the new programme would have a total budget of over 1.2
billion Euros – a major increase on our current resources.
- And we also propose adding a specific new strand of action to support
cooperation between Member States on health services.  
- Of course, health expenditure will still be undertaken within the Member
States, not through this programme. So this very much respects
subsidiarity. 
- Nevertheless, this new programme will allow us to turn the many ideas for
areas where European collaboration can add value into practical
initiatives.
- The start of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
(ECDC) next month in Stockholm adds another dimension to what the EU
will be able to do for the health of its citizens.
Nevertheless, questions about the impact of European rules on
health systems remain
- One of the main recommendations of the patient mobility reflection
process was that legal certainty about the application of European rules
needed to be improved.
- This need for greater clarity remains and my colleagues dealing with
internal market aspects will address this today. 
- There has been a great deal of discussion about these questions, in
particular with regard to the proposed directive on services in the internal
market (the “Bolkestein” directive proposal). That debate will be lively
today!
- I would simply like to underline that we must always bear in mind the
patients’ perspective in the middle of these discussions.  
- Whatever mechanism we choose, we must be sure that it provides
sufficient certainty and clarity for patients to be clear about what their
rights under European law.  Providers and policy-makers also need to
know what the situation is in order to plan and manage services.
162 Bulletin luxembourgeois des questions sociales
This conference is therefore very timely in providing an
opportunity to discuss these issues
- I therefore congratulate the Association Internationale de la Mutualité for
organising this event, and the Luxembourg minister for lending his support
to today’s  conference. 
- Speakers and participants will address the various issues relating to legal
certainty throughout this day.
- Other colleagues from the Commission are contributing in each of the
sessions that will take place today: 
- Geraldine Fages in the session on health services and the internal
market.
- Anne Houtman in the session on health insurance and internal market
- Jérôme Vignon in the session on social services of general interest.
- I think that the range of Commission participants indicates the
seriousness that our Institution attaches to these issues. 
- The preparatory work undertaken by Professor Jorens is also provides a
valuable overview of the complex nature of the issues to be addressed.
Conclusion
- Health and healthcare now become priority issues for citizens across the
European Union.
- Whilst respecting subsidiarity, enabling patients to have healthcare in
other Member States is of significant value to European citizens. 
- It has a great potential to demonstrate the benefits of European integration
in a very tangible way to citizens, and to help improve the effectiveness
and efficiency of European health systems overall.
- This needs a proper cooperation framework and accompanying measures
to be put in place, which we are working to develop.
- It also requires clarity and certainty about how European rules apply to the
health sector, in a way that enables professionals and policy-makers to
plan and manage systems and patients to get access to the high-quality
care they seek in a way that ensures that systems are financially
sustainable.
- This conference is a valuable opportunity to address these issues and
prepare solutions to these complex issues. 
I look forward to the results of our discussions today.
PRESENTATION OF THE BASIC REPORT

Yves JORENS
PROFESSOR OF SOCIAL SECURITY
LAW AND EUROPEAN SOCIAL LAW
GHENT UNIVERSITY
BELGIUM
General introduction 
Welfare states are national states. The organisation of health care systems
are therefore a matter for the Member States, notwithstanding the gradual,
but limited expansion of the competences of the European Union in the field
of social policy and public health. 
But far more important than the increase in competences attributed in the
European Treaty to the European Union, has been and is the influence of the
internal market rules. It cannot be denied that health care is an economic
market where goods and services are delivered and that in principle could be
supplied by private actors operating in a purely commercial market.  On the
other hand, health care is not a normal market as there is information
asymmetry: Suppliers still determine demand, rather than the well-informed
consumers. In addition, health care is a fundamental right. 
The health care market, therefore, cannot be left completely open to free
competition and all  Member States have therefore also a widely developed
system of collective responsibility and solidarity. 
The combination of these two elements of solidarity on the one hand and
more economic oriented elements from the free market on the other hand,
requires legal fine-tuning. This fine-tuning is an ongoing process, where the
European Court of Justice plays the most important role. 
Here we would like to discuss a few issues. 
I. Access to Health Care in an Internal Market: Impact for
Statutory and Complementary Systems
1) Free movement of patients: the relation between the Treaty-based
and the Regulation-based Method of Patient Mobility
A. Two methods of mobility
Up until 1998, Community nationals seeking medical treatment in another
Member State at the expense of their national health insurance institution had
no choice other than to rely on Article 22 § 1 (c) of Regulation (EC) No 1408/71. 
The 1998 Kohll judgment of the Court of Justice paved the way for a second
method of planned health care abroad, stemming directly from the Treaty.
Two different procedures, the one having no primacy over the other – govern
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therefore now the assumption of health care costs incurred in another
Member State.  The Court’s reasoning is centred around the advantages the
Regulation offers its beneficiaries being that they are entitled to treatment in
the other Member States “on conditions as favourable as those enjoyed by
insured persons covered by the legislation of those other States”. 
Admittedly, these are advantages which the Treaty-based procedure does
not offer,  cannot offer, for lack of a restriction to the free provision of services.
Indeed, the mere fact that the national health institution or sickness fund
refuses to pay for health care expenses incurred abroad is not sufficient to
hold it liable for restricting the free movement of services.  
The Court, reiterating its “facultative” interpretation of Article 22, stated in
Vanbraekel that this provision “does not have the effect of preventing extra
reimbursement, additional to that resulting from the application of the system
of the Member State [of] treatment [], when the system [of the Member State
of affiliation] is more beneficial”   
B. Partial incompatibility in respect of extramural care
Vanbraekel was concerned with intramural care for which, even under the
Treaty-based procedure, prior authorisation must be obtained.  Let us
consider now a hypothetical case, which is identical in terms of facts with
Vanbraekel, except that the cross-border receipt of extramural care is at
stake.  If the system of cover which is in place in the Member State of
treatment is more beneficial to the patient than that in force in the Member
State of affiliation, it can be argued that the added value of the Regulation-
based procedure makes up for the prior authorisation requirement associated
with that procedure.  By contrast, if the amount of reimbursement provided
by the system of the Member State of treatment is less than the amount which
application of the legislation in force in the Member State of affiliation would
afford to the patient concerned, Article 22 (1) (c) of the Regulation falls foul of
the Treaty provisions in relation to services. Indeed, not only would the patient
have a lower level of cover when he received outpatient care abroad than
when he underwent the same treatment in the Member State of affiliation –
which may deter or even prevent him from applying to foreign health care
providers– but in addition, he would not have been required to request prior
authorisation. Therefore, in such a case, the Regulation would be
incompatible with the free provision of services, and this incompatibility could
not just be offset by the granting of an additional reimbursement within the
meaning of Vanbraekel.
During the revision process of Regulation 1408/71, the issue was raised as to
whether the Court’s health care rulings should be incorporated into the new
coordination regulation. In that regard, it is however to be regretted that the
Council has not seized the opportunity, on adoption of the new coordination
regulation, to at least implicitly refer to the Treaty-based method of patient
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mobility, instead making it appear as if Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 will be
the one route for patients wishing to be treated in another Member State at
the expense of the national health insurance institution.  We believe that the
Community legislature ought to take account of the one method while
regulating the other, as the Commission has satisfactorily done in Article 23
of its Proposal for a Directive on services in the internal market, intended to
codify the Court’s health care cases.  
2) The active provision of services by foreign medical service providers
However, the case law of the Court raised also questions concerning the
active provision of services by foreign medical service providers. Service
provision in the health care sector is complicated by aspects of social
security.  
A. The minor contribution of the recognition instruments
The mobility of medical doctors has been the subject of Community
secondary legislation, in the form of a doctors Directive 93/16/EEC according
to which  the service provider “shall be subject to the disciplinary provisions
of a professional or administrative nature which are directly linked to
professional qualifications, such as the definition of the profession, the use of
titles and serious professional malpractice which is directly and specifically
linked to consumer protection and safety, which are applicable in the host
Member State to professionals who pursue the same profession in that
Member State”. 
The scope of this article is less than crystal-clear and far from legal certainty
lending itself to divergent national interpretations.  However at the same time,
the Court’s services case law has gradually developed to embrace of a
“qualified” country of origin principle, on the basis of which a conditional
mutual recognition applies. The lawful pursuit of similar activities in the
Member State of establishment constitutes minimum, yet sufficient proof of
the provider’s aptitude as well as of the quality of his services. Conditional, as
the host Member State is able to impose its non-discriminatory legislation in
the event and to the extent that the legislation of the Member State of
establishment of the service provider fails to safeguard a legitimate aim of
public interest.  If on the other hand the Draft services  “Bolkestein” directive
were to be adopted, it would become the frame of reference within which the
free provision of medical services is to take place. The showpiece of the
Draft’s chapter on the free movement of services is the country of origin
principle, pursuant to which Member States shall ensure that providers are
subject only to the national provisions of their Member State of origin which
fall within the coordinated field. To a large extent, the Draft services directive
draws the consequences of the case law of the Court of Justice. In view of
that, the mere exclusion from the Draft’s scope of the provision of health-
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care-related services, would not place the provision of health care outside the
ambit of the internal market.  However, the draft services directive goes
significantly beyond that under the Treaty provisions.  It applies to the entire
field of service regulation, which is only declared coordinated, without prior
harmonisation of the general interest.  Whereas under the Treaty provisions,
the host Member State may impose its legislation if and to the extent that the
general good is not sufficiently protected by the rules to which the foreign
provider is subject in the home Member State, and room is left for a wider
margin of appreciation in the presence of sensitive matters and/or diverse
standards, the Draft services directive, without instituting it, almost irrefutably
presumes a European-wide equivalence in the protection of the general
interest envisaging  a virtually absolute and unconditional implementation of
the home State model. Furthermore, the Proposal for a Directive on services
in the internal market adds nothing to the thorny issue of the connection
between the intra-Community provision of health care services and the
incidence of aspects of social security; the question as to whether, and if so,
under which conditions, these services should give rise to a financial
intervention by the national health insurance institution in the host Member
State remains unanswered. 
B. The “Activation” of the health care cases
The requirement of prior authorisation for the assumption of health care costs
incurred abroad constitutes a barrier to the freedom to provide services, not
only for insured persons, but also for service providers, the nature of the
domestic health care system being irrelevant.  
In general, Member States will be held liable of restricting the free provision
of services whenever they deter patients from seeking medical treatment
from a health care provider established in another Member State.  This leads
to an Europeanisation of the range of providers whom the patient is entitled
to visit.  
1. Europeanisation of the range of providers: about contracted and non-
contracted providers and its reimbursement
This Europeanisation should not be construed by reference to the nature of
the national health care system. Which would imply that where Member
States operating a reimbursement system, should henceforth cover the
medical services provided by any doctor established in the European Union,
Member States with a benefits-in-kind system, would have smaller
repercussions.  It would merely mean that the sickness funds cannot
discriminate between domestic providers and providers established in
another Member State. We do not think that this Eurospeak argument is well-
founded.  
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Member States operating exclusive contracting systems cannot veil the
restrictive effect of the prior authorisation requirement by putting forward that
it applies to (domestic and foreign) non-contracted health care providers.  In
other words, even if foreign health care providers have an equal opportunity
to conclude agreements with the national health insurance institution, the
prior authorisation requirement for non-contracted care will still work to the
detriment of foreign health care providers. The same line of reasoning should
apply with respect to the level of assumption of the medical services supplied
by foreign health care providers.  Member States cannot evade the
prohibition contained in Article 49 ECT by reimbursing the costs incurred
abroad to the (lower) level of cover they happen to use in respect of care
provided by domestic non-contracted providers   
C. The temporary provision of extramural care by medical doctors in the host
member state
Accordingly, a health care provider established in a Member State where he
lawfully provides medical services, is entitled to provide those services on a
temporary and occasional basis in the host Member State.  As an intrinsic
corollary of the qualification of health care professionals as service providers,
the Articles 49 and 50 ECT, as construed in the health care cases, have
detracted from the powers of the Member States to define, in the presence
of an intra-Community situation, the range of providers who are entitled to
supply medical services at the expense of the national health insurance
schemes.  The services of foreign health care professionals who lawfully
provide health care in their Member State of establishment are eligible for
coverage under the national health insurance scheme of the Member State of
affiliation of the patient, irrespective of whether the insured person travels to
the Member State of establishment of the health care professional to receive
these services or whether the latter provides these services temporarily in the
territory of the host Member State, in which the patient is insured.  On the
other hand, they appear to leave intact Member States’ power to define the
personal scope of these schemes, their power to determine the treatments
which are covered and the extent to which they are covered, and lastly, their
power to lay down the conditions on which benefits are granted.  
II. Health Insurance and the Internal Market
1) Competition in health care systems
EU law of course does not force the Member States to introduce competition
rules in their health care systems. Introducing elements of competition, in an
attempt to increase efficiency and cost-reduction, makes them however
vulnerable for application of competition rules.
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The whole problem of the application of competition law to social security
regimes deals with one fundamental issue: is the state or are other
organisations authorised to set up any form of solidarity between the
members of a certain collective group confronted with certain risks?  
2) Competition Law
A. Are social security institutions undertakings?
Are health institutions undertakings? The basic test is whether the activity, at
least in principle, could be carried on by a private undertaking in order to
make profits and it faces actual or potential competition by a private
company. As health care providers perform economic activities, it cannot be
ignored that they have to be qualified as undertakings. The Court of Justice
has however developed various exclusions in order to limit to a certain extent
the spectrum of competition law.    
B. Exemptions
1. Imperium 
Activities resulting from the exercise of sovereign powers are not economic
activities, as there is no actual or potential competition by private companies.
Could it e.g. be said of the German Health Care Institutions that they are not
subject to the anti-competition rules as they have a statutory duty to provide
benefits in kind? But a sovereign exemption does not apply even when a
body is exercising official authority, if it trades products or services alongside
private undertakings that seek to make a profit. So it is not because certain
health institutions- as in Germany- act under public law and form part of the
administration that they would not fall under the anti-competition rules.  This
exception will be difficult to use. 
In many health care systems, associations of medical health care providers
play an important role and are granted specific powers as being the main and
only responsible organisation to license and register practitioners or the
remuneration/fees of the health care providers are negotiated between their
professional associations and the state.  Its decision may sometimes be
adopted by law or made binding upon the whole profession. In this respect
the questions raises if a high degree of state intervention leads to the
conclusion that such associations lack the necessary autonomy to be
engaged in economic activities or rather carry out their tasks as executor of
the state?   The issue here at stake however is not that these activities would
not be economic activities, but who is responsible for the distortion of
competition: the state under Article 86 or undertakings under Articles 81 and
82? 
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2. Social activities 
A second group of activities exempted from the application of the
competition rules are purely social activities. This concept is an invention
from the Court of Justice. When judging if an economic activity takes place,
one should examine how much space the legislator has left for a free market
system when designing the system and to what extent the solidarity principle
has been developed. However, balancing on the very thin line between the
economic and the social character of an institution is not an easy task and the
cases of the Court of Justice show how difficult it is to draw the line between
social and economic activities. In addition there is the growing difficulty in
defining the concept of social security. What are the typical social security
components? 
Elements such as contributions related to income, no relation between
contributions and benefits, compulsory affiliation and no real possibility to
influence the level of contributions, seem to point in the direction that one
could not speak about undertakings. This last element however has becomes
questionable following the ECJ’s AOK case on German sickness funds. It
seems logical that when sickness insurance funds can differentiate (part of)
their level of contributions, irrespective of income, they will be considered as
undertakings. Are contributions not to a certain extent also the financial
compensation for delivering services? For the Court, however this one
element of competition is not sufficient, deviating in that respect from the
famous Poucet and Pistre case. The Court however pointed out that the
funds might engage in operations that were not social, but economic in
nature. Organisations therefore can partly be an undertaking and partly not. 
Notwithstanding the clear elements of competition between the German
sickness insurance funds, the Court did not want to consider them as
undertakings. Perhaps the Court herewith wanted to make clear that one
should not only look at the internal organisation, but rather at the ultimate aim
(solidarity and redistribution) of the system. 
The problem remains however that the line between entities being
undertakings and entities that are not undertakings is very unclear and
impossible to draw in general.Therefore no general statement can be made
with respect to the application of competition rules in the health care sector
C. Health care institutions as purchaser of products
Health organisers act not only as suppliers of benefits, but as purchasers of
health care products by contracting out or demanding certain health care
services or purchasing medical equipment or pharmaceuticals. Does the non-
application of the competition rules also applies to these activities? Is an
activity on an upstream market (purchasing goods or services) not subject to
competition law if there is no downstream activity (reselling to the citizens.
The Court held that it would be incorrect, when determining the nature of that
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subsequent activity, to dissociate the activity of purchasing goods from the
subsequent use to which they are put. The activities on the supply side
determine the character of these activities on the purchaser's side. An
explanation could probably be found in the fact that as the insurance
activities of these entities are strongly influenced by the solidarity principle,
the entities concerned have no commercial interest when buying care on the
market. The conclusion could however be different when the care they buy is
not used for their patients/insured persons, but is sold to health care
providers in other Member States. 
The fact that these activities do not fall under the anti-competition rules,
however, does not exclude the applicability of EU law, in particular the public
procurement directives. 
D. Prohibited conduct :cartel prohibition and abuse of dominant position
Competition rules forbid several conducts, as e.g. cartel prohibition. This
could be the case if 
health care providers agree amongst each other –not to contract under
certain tariffs when negotiating collaboration agreements with the health
insurance institutions. Or health insurance institutions that purchase together
health care from health care providers could form a forbidden cartel as this
could in certain circumstances lead to forbidden joint purchasing
agreements.   But could we e.g. also speak about abuse of dominant position
in cases where a health insurance institution with a dominant position refuses
to conclude a contract with a health care provider? Imagine the situation
where a health insurance fund that occupies a certain region has a dominant
position and refuses to offer contracts to certain medical providers. This is as
such not really forbidden. Anti-competition law does not forbid a dominant
position, but only if one abuses this position.  This could e.g. be the case
when a health insurance institution concludes that demand for a certain
service has not increased with respect to last year and as a result will not
allow it to sign a contract with new health providers. 
But what to be said about e.g. the French complementary CMU (Couverture
Maladies Universelles) system were beneficiaries are free to choose between
either the statutory sickness fund and traditional complementary insurance,
as mutual benefit societies, provident institutions and commercial insurance
companies. Does this participation of the French public sickness funds in
administering free complementary health insurance not lead to a dominant
position and unfair competition?  This could be believed.  The same doubts
could also be expressed with respect to the Flemish long-term insurance
care, where commercial insurers compete with mutual health funds,
responsible for the public health systems. Or what to be said about the fact
that under Belgian law, insured people are obliged to accept the
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complementary services offered by the mutual health funds -responsible for
the public health system-  they are insured with? 
E. State aid
In the health care sector, the state gives many times certain financial
advantages to health  insurance funds, like  subsidies, or forms of tax relief,
credit facilities. Is this state aid?  Or what if e.g. the state were to cover the
deficit of certain hospitals? Or what about the compensation paid out of a
risk-equalisation fund?   The answer to this question remained unclear not
least as a result of the fact that the case law of the Court of Justice and the
Court of First Instance differed.  In has to be said that the Court of Justice’s
approach in the Altmark case is more balanced, thereby examining more
closely the operation of public service obligations and the services supplied
in connection with a discharge of the public service obligation, which will not
be recognised whenever the undertaking’s activities have no connection with
the provision of public service obligations. It remains to be seen however
whether the approach is satisfactory or still too theoretical for relying on a
typical undertaking well-run and adequately provided, except in cases of
public procurement, where it is presumed that market conditions prevail.
3) The internal market and voluntary health insurance
A The possible application of the non-life assurances directives
Notwithstanding the dominance of solidarity-based statutory health care
systems in the European Union, it cannot be neglected that voluntary health
insurance plays a more and more important role in health protection.
However, any Member State will, even when introducing private insurance
companies for the execution of their health care system, prescribe certain
statutory guaranties, such as the obligation to accept insurers or the
prohibition of risks selection, exactly in order to protect the consumer/insured
person.  To what extent is the introduction of such guarantees contrary to the
principles of the non-life insurance directives? Can social objectives therefore
only be guaranteed through a statutory system of social security? 
1.  Field of application 
The question if voluntary statutory health insurance falls under the field of
application of the third non-life insurance directives is far from clear.
Substitutive health insurance, providing private cover for persons excluded or
exempted from statutory protection, seems to be included in the scope of
application of EU insurance law. There is one certainty. For the applicability
of the Directives, it is important according to the Court that insurances are
offered at their own risk. But how should this concept be interpreted? Is the
concept of  “own risk” limited to the “insurance risk”, i.e. the financial risk as
a consequence of an uncertainty element characteristic for every insurance
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relation or does it refer to any company-business risk? Is there convergence
between the concept of economic activity under the competition rules and
the activities which fall under the field of application of the third non-life
insurance directive? Can we therefore say that the third non-life insurance
directive does not apply when the insurers are performing a purely social
activity? 
2. The content of the third non-life insurance directive
Application of the non-life insurance directives, Member States shall not
adopt provisions requiring the prior approval or systematic notification of
general and special policy conditions or scales of premiums. A full
harmonisation in the field of non-life insurance rates was clearly not the
intention of the Community legislator. The question remains however whether
other national regulations, not dealing with the business of insurance, are also
forbidden by this article? This would imply that regulations other than those
concerning financial supervision (such as e.g. obligation of acceptance, a
minimum package of benefits to be provided), would not be possible either. 
3. Limits of Article 54: general good exception
But even when certain measures are not in conformity with Article 29, an
exception and justification may be sought under the general good exception.
It remains unclear however how broad this exception might be interpreted
and in particular, whether this article also applies when private insurance
companies substitute entirely the statutory system of social protection?
Under a narrow interpretation the directive would only apply to private
insurances that exist apart from the public statutory system and fulfils for a
part of the population the function that the statutory public system fulfils for
the rest of the population. There are however arguments in favour of a broad
interpretation. 
4) Procurement directives
Even when social security institutions do not fall under competition law
because they are not undertakings, they are not exempt from EU law. In
particular, discriminatory public procurement is considered to create
significant barriers to trade. But do health care institutions fall under the field
of application of the procurement directives? Therefore  institutions do not
have to be a formal part of the state, but could be said to be active in name
of the state. In the public market it is not the commercial characteristics of
private entrepreneurship that prevail in as much as the aim of the public
sector is not the maximisation of profits, but the serving of public interest.
Consequently, whenever bodies or entities, like health care institutions,
perform activities not with a commercial intention and to maximize profits, but
to provide goods and services for the public and thus in the general interest,
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these institutions are active on the public market and therefore the public
procurement laws will be applicable. However procurement rules will apply,
irrespective of the fact whether it pursues a general interest needs or just
commercial interests. Health care institutions purchasing for their own
purposes equipment and buildings, will therefore have to apply the public
procurement directives. In the case of health care institutions that provide
benefits in kind, the public procurement directives apply to relations between
the health care institutions and the performers of services. 
During the last years the private sector is also becoming increasingly involved
in delivering public services. In this public private cooperation the state no
longer delivers the services. If contracting authorities award their public
contracts via private undertakings under their control, these entities cannot
be classified as contracting authorities within the meaning of the directives.
In a certain way the Court of Justice found a response to this by stating in
cases where a contracting authority has established an undertaking in order
to enter into contracts for the sole purpose of avoiding the requirements
specified in public procurement law, then the relevant directives should
apply. 
Concluding remarks
The whole problem of the application of competition rules is dealing with the
question which criteria an insurance system has to meet to be considered as
“a social security system” allowing it to escape from full application of the
internal market rules. It is remarkable that exactly an important aspect of what
is social security , is answered differently by the Court, most of the time
depending on the European instrument in question.  A crucial policy question
is thus at what point of this “balance of solidarity” the degree of solidarity in
a given scheme will not suffice to be exempted from European economic law.
Are certain types of solidarity (income solidarity, solidarity by scope, risk
solidarity, intergenerational solidarity and solidarity between schemes ) more
decisive than others for the outcome of this weighing exercise and which?
How far can the Court go in this respect without compromising its own
authority? The different cases have however shown that social objectives can
be introduced as a safeguard against full application of the competition rules
and this not only in the public sector. Article 86 (2) could thus be successfully
invoked in order to set aside the application of the competition rules, in
particular when the activity does not fulfil the conditions in order to qualify as
a “core” solidarity activity but, still, displays enough solidarity aspects,
including compulsory affiliation. A balance is herewith found between
competition law and social law.  This tendency is important in a time where
social security is more and more shifting from a public to a mixed private-
public system. Even when private elements are introduced in social security
systems, it doesn’t seem that the free market will apply without mercy. 
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III.The Notion of “Social Services of General Interest” as
counterweight to the internal market rules
1) Services of general interest
The last part of our report examined a concept in Community law that could
constitute a safeguard or counterbalance to this increasing influence of
market-based rules. The practicability of this concept is to be viewed in the
first place on a looser conceptual level under the denominator of “services of
general interest”, which are tackled in a recent Commission White Paper. The
topic of services of general interest has acquired an inerasable place on the
political agenda of the European Union. 
To this very day, at the level of the European Union, the services of general
interest debate is still very closely linked to the “services of general economic
interest” concept in Article 86(2). This is not surprising, as the Treaty itself
concentrates mainly on economic activities.  The term “services of general
interest” is only used where it is not necessary to specify the specific nature
of the services concerned or where the text also refers to non-economic
activities.  This could lead to new Babylonian misunderstandings, as the term
“services of general interest”, conceived to function as a general term, thus
becomes (maybe too) strongly related to non-economic services, with the risk
of ending up as a synonym of “non-economic services”.  On a strictly legal
level however it is only the sub-concept of “services of general economic
interest” as it appears in the Treaty that can be used as a decisive derogation
to the provisions of Community law.
Article 86 has been described as the “Article reconciling Community
objectives with the fulfilment of the mission of general economic interest
entrusted by public authorities”.  
The interpretation of this article has produced a long list of complex and from
time to time puzzling case law from the Court of Justice, however showing an
obvious change in approach of the Court of Justice to its interpretation, from
economic measurement to value judgement. This certainly points to future
opportunities with regard to recourse to Article 86(2) as a counterweight for
the normal application of Treaty rules before the Court of Justice. This status
is reinforced by Article 16 EC. 
2) Health care as a social service of general interest
Putting the Babel-like confusion relating to the term and the historical
connection of the concept to the network industries aside, one
straightforwardly agrees that the concept of services of general interest, as
services of which the provision to the citizens is deemed very important in a
given society and therefore is submitted to a number of common values and
principles (like human dignity, solidarity, social justice, social cohesion…), fits
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perfectly for health care.  As a strongly person-oriented sector, health care is
to be considered as a “social service of general interest”, -independent of the
question whether the health care sector and its subdivisions are to be
considered economic or non-economic-   and therefore subject to additional
requirements.  In a nutshell, health care evidently is a part of this “pillar of the
European model of society”.
But legally binding provisions on “services of general interest” are as we have
seen absent in Community law.  We have only article 86 §2, which aims at
“economic” services, which as we have also seen is exactly a troublesome
qualification. It is impossible to draw up a list of “a priori non-economic
services”: what is sheltered from internal market and competition rules today,
can be an economic activity tomorrow, depending on changing views on the
role of the state and political reorientations in the Member States.  In this view
the importance of Article 86(2) for justifying national measures aiming at
solidarity or other social objectives could be major and this Article could
become the key element in finding a balance between the application of EU
competition rules and socially inspired activities, as a “third way” next to the
“state prerogative” and “solidarity”-exemptions.  
But should this issue continue to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis?  Is
Art. 86(2) EC case-law considered to be the right path to mitigate potential
undesired impact of European economic law on health care policy?  Should
the Treaty provide for a general derogation clause for social security and if so,
how to define “social security”?  Must the answer rather be found in
secondary legislation?  Could e.g. a consensus be reached on a European
legislative framework on standards for health care as a service of general
economic interest, in which common values are laid down and thus legal
safeguards as to solidarity, equality, accessibility, affordability, etc…, would
become a part of Community law?  Expressing this kind of considerations
could be building castles in the air, but touching on emanations of the legal
uncertainty regarding the relation between national health care policies and
the EU internal market and competition policies, there is a strong case for
these issues to be sorted out within the scope for policymaking of the
Community.  If not, the legislative powers of the Community probably
condemn themselves, as they are still doing,  to tail along after the case-to-
case solutions of the Court .  
Either way, it could be argued that also basic health care insurance can be
qualified as an economic activity, without being robbed of the elemental
solidarity grounds it is based on.  The final result probably will not differ much
from the current situation, but the institutions managing health care schemes
would then be put in a situation of more legal certainty, as their activities
would be considered as an economic activity, to which competition law is
applicable in principle, but for which clear safeguards (on the basis of Art.
86(2) EC, future primary or secondary legislation) can be provided in order to
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protect the fundamental principles most health protection schemes are
based on.  
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Health care is a booming source of economic activity. Therefore, it's an
important issue in the framework of the Lisbon agenda. Whilst recognizing
that the creation of an internal market for services can stimulate economic
growth and create jobs, it is equally important to stress that this should be
done in a balanced way, especially in the case
Access to good quality health care is one of the major preoccupations of the
European citizens. Health care systems in the Member states have developed
over time for the well-being of people. Access to health care nowadays is
considered as a fundamental right in Europe and the principles the systems
are based upon- solidarity, inclusion, quality, access for all, - are core values
for the European social model. For this reason, health care should never be
considered as just an internal market issue. It should also be a common social
challenge in the framework of the European social agenda. 
However, as clearly demonstrated by professor Jorens, the competence of
the EU in the field of health care remains rather limited. This limited
competence of the EU makes the EU interventions, in the form of a positive
integration, still rare. Given the very sensible character of national health care
and social protection issues, a certain reticence is even understandable. 
However, there are many reasons why the EU should get more involved in a
positive way with health care.
- Firstly, although member states have different systems of organising and
financing health care, the systems are facing many common challenges:
the ageing of the population and the changing care needs of the elderly,
the development of medical science and techniques, the need for more
prevention care, the lack of sufficient qualified care providers, f.e. 
- Secondly, citizens in Europe use their right to free movement more
frequently. They live or reside in another member state and have access
to care
- Thirdly, health care is not excluded from the application of the internal
market rules. The European Court of Justice has repeatedly recognised
health care as a service within the meaning of the Treaty and confirmed
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that patients, as recipients of services, must be able to enjoy the free
movement of services that the Treaty guarantees.
The process of positively coordinating health care at the EU level has been
very modest and slow up till now.
Already in 1992 the Council stated in a recommendation that the "Member
States should maintain and develop high quality health care systems". And
although in 1999 the Council recommended health care as one of the four
areas of social protection, where reinforced cooperation is necessary, there
still is no real strategy at EU-level. After delivering its joint report in March
2003, Council did not show overwhelming enthusiasm to the work more
ambitiously on health care at EU level.
Last week the European Parliaments' Committee on employment voted its
report on the European Commissions' Communication on "Modernising
social protection for the development of high quality, accessible and
sustainable health care and long-term care". We warmly welcomed the fact
that the European Commission wants to assist Member States in de
modernisation and reform of their health care systems through the "open
method coordination". We also strongly supported the 3 basic objectives of
universal access for all to health care, high quality of care and long-term
sustainability. 
Parliament considers this Communication as a useful supplement to the
Commissions Communication on the 'High level process on patients mobility
and the development of health care in the EU", because together they could
constitute at last a more comprehensive strategy to develop common views
for European health care systems and social protections systems. It surely is
high time to deliver! 
Despite of this (still rare) initiatives of positive integration of European
initiatives in the field of health services, we observe however a growing
impact of the European internal market rules (by negative integration). The
qualification of health services as a service in the sense of the Treaty makes
the competition rules, the free provision of services, the state aid rules and
the procurement directives apply. The full application of these kind of rules
(especially the competition law and state aid rules) to our national health
systems, could, as underlined by Jorens, put the accessibility to our systems
under huge pressure. Therefore, it's absolutely necessary that a fair balance
should be found between social issues (accessibility, high quality of health ...)
and internal market topics. 
An analysis of recent rulings of the Court of Justice makes me more hopeful
in this regard. It seems to me that efforts are made to find such a balance: the
Court does not apply in a blind way its competition rules to health systems,
but tries to take all aspects and characteristics of the national health system
at stake in consideration.    
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Despite of this 'good' rulings of the Court of Justice in the field of the health
services, being member of the EP, I am, of course, not fully happy with the
evolution that a 'European policy in the health sector' is developed by the
judges of the ECJ. Indeed, doing nothing on the political side is not a good
option. Health care policies should be directed by politicians, not only by
judges.
But although the EU health Ministers already acknowledged this in 2002,
progress is limited. There was no real enthusiasm to start a real Open Method
of Coordination with clear objectives, action plans and indicators. And in the
outcome of the modernisation process of the regulation 1408/71, the
problems of reimbursing costs of health care, were not properly addressed. 
On the other hand, I miss such a fair balance between social topics and
internal market rules in the proposal for a directive concerning services in the
internal market of January 2004. This directive will have an enormous impact
on health care. Indeed, it does not only deal with reimbursement of costs, but
also deals with the health care sector as it does with any other service sector. 
For the majority of the European Parliament this is unacceptable. Health care
services do not belong in an internal market directive that does not consider
the specific features and requirements of this sector. Let me give tree reasons
for this. 
1. As I said before, in EU access to high quality health care is a fundamental
right. European health care systems are therefore based on solidarity and
universal coverage and embedded in social protection systems.
Provision of high quality care, equally accessible to all citizens is
considered a core task of public authorities, that invest large amounts of
public money in this sector. 
2. Health care providers form part of complex system of interactions
between many players and there are many built-in checks and balances.
Not only customers and suppliers are involved, but also a third party that
pays the major part of the bill. Price mechanisms based on the supply
and demand do not work here. Therefore healthcare financiers make
agreements with care providers on price, content and volume of care.
3. Patients are not ordinary consumers of care. They are vulnerable and
dependent. Health care is increasingly complex and patients do not have
access all necessary information. Information asymmetry between
patients and health care providers is a specific feature of the health care
sector.   
The services directive does not respect these specific features at all.
The chapter on freedom of establishment obliges member states to simplify
and remove a large number of authorisations and licensing procedures and
to limit the number of documents required for access and exercise of a
service. It also obliges member states to set up a major screening exercise to
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identify and assess procedures and conditions that service providers have to
comply with. If these are not non-discriminatory, necessary and proportional,
they should be abolished.
However, authorisations and licensing procedures in health care aim to
guarantee the quality of care providers and equal access to care and the
conditions that should be screened include national legislation on planning,
price fixing mechanisms, the not-for-profit character of health care, staff
requirements in health care institutions and referral systems. But these are
basic instruments of health care authorities to ensure quality, accessibility
and sustainability of health care!
The chapter on free movement of services introduces the principle of the
country of origin. According to this principle, health care providers wishing to
provide care on a temporary basis abroad would only be subject to the
provisions of the member states of their establishment. These provisions
include requirements governing the behaviour of the care provider, the quality
or content of care, advertising, contracts and the care providers' liability.
Although some of the general and specific exceptions to the country of origin
principle may be helpful to avoid the worst-case scenarios for health care
systems, it is obvious that, given the enormous diversity in the organisations
of health care between the 25 member states of Union and without any
previous harmonisation, the principle of the country of origin can simply not
be applied to health care. It would open a door for competition between
health care conditions and legal requirements. And provide a spiral of
deregulation. Such a scenario could only be detrimental for patients and the
quality of care.
Therefore I am convinced as rapporteur the European Parliament will follow
my advice to exclude health care services completely from the scope of the
services directive.
Having said that, this does not mean that health care will be safeguarded from
the application of internal rules. Indeed, the European Court of Justice will
continue to jurisdict on these issues and the European Commission started
several infringement procedures. 
Furthermore, the application of internal market rules is not limited to cases
where patients move abroad for health care reasons, but also applies to
cases where care providers move.
Finally, there is a need for positive impulses for development of national
health care systems and cross border cooperation. 
Therefore, the EU should speed up its legislative and coordinating action in
this field. 
(1) Firstly, the legal uncertainty for patients getting their care abroad without
prior authorisation in unwilling member states, that do not comply with the
ruling of the European Court of Justice should be stopped by law. 
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The report of the high level process on patient mobility recommended that
secondary legislation could include further provisions updating the regulation
on the coordination of social security systems (Reg 1408171), or general
provisions on free movement of patients or specific clarifications on the
application of community law to health services.
It is a missed opportunity that Council did not solve part of this problem whilst
dealing with the modernisation regulation 883/2004.
I think that - whilst exempting health care services from the services directive
- Council should at the same time reach a political agreement on the issue of
reimbursement of health care costs.
(2) Secondly, health care services must be safeguarded in a positive way
through a framework directive on services of general interest. In its white
paper on SGI, the commission fully recognised the general interest of social
and health services. The Commission argued for a systematic approach to
identify the specific characteristics of social and health services and to clarify
the framework in which they can operate and can be modernised. Therefore,
the Parliament is happy with the initiative taken by the European Commission
to publish a communication on social services of general interest, taking into
consideration the particularities of the health care sector. This could be an
important step towards a proposal for a special legislative instrument dealing
exclusively with the social and health services. 
I know that this is not an easy thing to do, given the differences in health care
systems between member states and the sensitiveness of the issue. But a
clear definition recognising the specificity of social and health care services
of general interest could provide the building blocks for a legal provision that
would stop internal market rules from being blindly applied to these services.
Recently, a majority in parliament supported the idea of a framework directive
on services of general interest. The future constitution provides for a new
legal basis for such a framework directive. (art. 86§2) But the commission
should not wait for ratification of the constitution to start working on such a
framework directive.
(3) Thirdly, the open method of coordination on health care and long term care
must be launched as soon as possible. The 3 basic objectives (quality,
accessibility and sustainability) need to be worked out more in detail in order
identify common principles for the definition of health care as a service of
general interest.
If the open method of coordination is taken seriously, it will also contribute to
a process of mutual learning and exchange of best practices and thus to
improvement of health care systems of the member states. 
I sincerely hope that this high level conference will convince European
politician of the need for action and bring them some fresh ideas to build out
a coherent strategy on health care in Europe.
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SESSION 1
HEALTH SERVICES IN THE 
INTERNAL MARKET

Robert KIEFFER
PRESIDENT
UNION DES CAISSES DE MALADIE
LUXEMBOURG
1) Introduction
Dans la première partie de son rapport sur l’accès aux soins de santé dans
un marché unique, le professeur Jorens nous a dressé un état des lieux
extrêmement détaillé quant à la coexistence des deux procédures d’accès
aux soins transfrontaliers. Il s’agit, d’une part, de la procédure traditionnelle
prévue à l’article 22 du règlement 1408/71 avec l’exigence d’une autorisation
préalable. Il s’agit, d’autre part, de la procédure nouvelle résultant
directement du traité instituant la Communauté européenne (articles 49 et 50)
qui se fonde sur le principe de la libre prestation des services à l’intérieur de
la Communauté.
En outre, il a mis en évidence les difficultés pour les systèmes nationaux de
santé qui résultent de la nature particulière des soins de santé en tant que
services. En effet, la prestation de ces services se déroule dans un cadre
triangulaire ou intervient à côté du médecin et du patient également
l’organisme de financement. Elle nécessite donc un certain
conventionnement entre les prestataires et l’organisme de financement.  
N’étant pas un expert en droit communautaire, mais un gestionnaire de
l’assurance maladie, je voudrais vous présenter mes réflexions concernant
les conséquences pratiques de cette jurisprudence sur la gestion des
systèmes de soins de santé.     
Je vais vous présenter ces conséquences de la perspective d’un petit pays,
qui, à l’opposé de la plupart des pays européens, subit les répercussions de
cette jurisprudence avec un impact amplifié. En effet, le Grand-Duché de
Luxembourg avec sa population résidante de 450.000 habitants présente
certaines particularités qui le distinguent des autres pays.
En premier lieu, la taille réduite de la population entraîne nécessairement que
l’offre de soins de santé ne peut pas couvrir tous les domaines spécialisés de
la médecine à l’intérieur de son territoire et que le Luxembourg est obligé de
recourir aux soins de santé offerts par les autres pays européens. Ainsi, le
nombre de transferts à l’étranger sur autorisation préalable concerne plus de
2% de la population résidante.
Ensuite, l’exiguïté du territoire fait que chaque résidant du pays se trouve à
moins de 30 kilomètres d’une frontière, de sorte que la distance aux
prestataires étrangers ne constitue guère de barrière pour l’accès aux soins. 
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De même, la pratique répandue des langues française et allemande supprime
toute barrière linguistique vis-à-vis des pays avoisinants que sont
l’Allemagne, la Belgique et la France.
Le problème de l’accès aux soins à l’étranger se pose donc du point de vue
quantitatif d’une manière beaucoup plus aiguë que tel ne semble être le cas
dans les autres pays européens.  
2) Le problème du conventionnement des prestataires de soins
Dans ce contexte, je voudrais focaliser mon attention sur une caractéristique
essentielle des systèmes de soins nationaux, caractéristique qui me semble
totalement mise en cause au niveau européen par les libertés fondamentales
incluses dans le traité. 
2.1 La situation au niveau national
La caractéristique particulière des systèmes de soins de santé est
précisément celle que les prestataires de soins de santé ne peuvent pas
fournir librement leurs services à l’intérieur d’un pays, lorsque ces services
sont financés par la collectivité sur la base du principe de solidarité. 
Dans tous les Etats membres, on constate que le développement de la
sécurité sociale sous quelque forme que ce soit en matière de soins de santé,
a conduit historiquement à des formes de régulation extrêmement poussées
du marché des soins de santé. Que cette régulation ait lieu dans le cadre de
services nationaux de santé, centralisés ou décentralisés ou qu’elle ait lieu
dans le cadre de systèmes d’assurance sociale, type remboursement, type
prestation en nature ou type mixte (comme au Luxembourg), cette régulation
a en définitive comme objectif de contrôler l’offre de soins de santé. 
La finalité de ce contrôle consiste évidemment dans la limitation de la
croissance des dépenses de santé en vue d’assurer l’équilibre financier. En
effet, dans la mesure où ces soins de santé sont pris en charge totalement ou
partiellement par un tiers, à savoir la collectivité publique, les mécanismes
économiques classiques de l’offre, de la demande et de la fixation des prix
ne fonctionnent plus normalement. Il s’agit justement de maîtriser la
demande induite par l’offre des prestataires et de restreindre le hasard moral
résultant du fait que les patients n’ont plus à supporter le coût intégral des
services.
Ce contrôle a également pour objectif de garantir la qualité des soins et d’agir
sur l’asymétrie d’information entre le patient et le prestataire.
Que cette régulation ne soit pas un simple accessoire de la politique sociale,
mais constitue un pilier fondamental de cette politique, peut être documenté
par le fait que, dans la législation sur l’assurance maladie au Luxembourg, le
chapitre relatif aux relations conventionnelles avec les prestataires occupe un
quart des articles de la loi sur l’assurance maladie.
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Quelles que soient les formes que cette régulation du marché des soins de
santé ait prises au niveau national, cette régulation s’inscrit depuis toujours
dans le cadre de la compétence des Etats membres pour aménager leurs
systèmes de sécurité sociale, compétence qui ne devrait pas être mise en
cause par le droit communautaire.
2.2 La situation au niveau européen
Que se passe-t-il maintenant, si l’on passe du niveau national au niveau
européen. Que le principe de la régulation du marché des soins de santé par
des relations conventionnelles avec les prestataires ait une raison d’être est
documenté par le fait que chaque Etat membre la pratique avec des degrés
de contrainte plus ou moins forts. Il faudrait donc conclure que le principe de
la régulation du marché des soins de santé a également une validité au niveau
européen puisqu’il est pratiqué dans tous les Etats membres qui composent
l’Union européenne et qu’il constitue une caractéristique fondamentale du
système de soins de chaque Etat membre. 
Mais tel n’est pas le cas. 
La Cour de justice européenne a jugé que malgré la nature particulière de
certains services – et dans le cas présent des soins de santé – cette nature
particulière ne saurait faire échapper ces activités au principe fondamental de
la libre circulation. Il s’ensuit que toute tentative par une législation nationale
de restreindre la prise en charge de prestations transfrontalières - soit par le
déremboursement, soit par un remboursement  réduit, soit par une
autorisation préalable - au motif que le prestataire étranger ne soit pas
soumis aux relations conventionnelles, est considérée comme une entrave à
la libre prestation de services. A remarquer que ces restrictions restent
parfaitement valables à l’intérieur de chaque Etat membre. 
On constate donc qu’en passant du niveau national au niveau européen, on
est en présence d’une rupture dans la logique de la prise en charge des
prestations. Les prestations d’un médecin non conventionné doivent être
prises en charge différemment selon que le médecin réside de ce côté de la
frontière ou de l’autre côté de la frontière. Il s’ensuit que la régulation prévue
au niveau national ne fonctionne plus pour les prestations transfrontalières. 
Il est évident que cette situation affecte davantage un petit pays où la
demande transfrontalière de soins de santé est importante en comparaison
avec les grands pays où cette demande est nettement plus réduite, en raison
de l’offre plus complète de soins à l’intérieur de leur territoire. Pour un petit
pays, comme le Luxembourg, la question de la possibilité d’un contrôle de
l’offre de soins se pose donc concrètement.  En outre, la proximité de l’offre
transfrontalière qui n’est plus soumise aux contraintes de la régulation du
marché luxembourgeois, provoque un fort sentiment de discrimination à
rebours des prestataires luxembourgeois, ce qui rend extrêmement difficile
les négociations avec le corps médical.
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Ce qui est paradoxal, c’est le fait que la grande majorité des soins de santé
en Europe soient délivrés dans le cadre de prestataires de soins
conventionnés sous une forme ou une autre avec leur système de santé. Ce
n’est qu’une minorité de soins qui sont prestés en dehors d’un tel système
(notamment les patients privés et les personnes ne disposent pas de
couverture sociale). Et ce sont les caractéristiques commerciales de cette
minorité de soins de santé qui devraient maintenant s’appliquer à tous les
soins transfrontaliers.
3) Quelles conséquences au niveau politique ?
Il faut se demander si ce défaut de continuité dans le traitement des
prestations transfrontalières correspond à une véritable volonté politique au
niveau européen ou s’il résulte d’une application mécanique d’une certaine
hiérarchie des principes, à savoir que la libre prestation de services
transfrontalière prime le droit des Etats membres d’aménager leur système
de sécurité sociale.
La première hypothèse d’une volonté politique explicite au niveau européen
de ne plus restreindre la libre prestation de services devrait logiquement
aboutir au niveau national dans la suppression de toutes les limitations quant
à la prise en charge de prestations fournies par des prestataires non
conventionnés. Face aux difficultés croissantes du maintien de l’équilibre
financier des systèmes de soins de santé nationaux, une telle volonté n’est
manifestement pas décelable dans les différents Etats membres. 
La deuxième hypothèse d’une résultante mécanique de l’application d’une
certaine hiérarchie des normes me semble davantage plausible.
Aussi se pose-t-il la question de savoir s’il est possible de maintenir au niveau
européen cette caractéristique fondamentale des systèmes de santé
nationaux, à savoir le principe du conventionnement des prestataires en dépit
du principe de la libre circulation des services.
Comme le principe de la libre prestation de service figure directement dans
le traité, il ne suffira pas d’exclure de la Directive relative aux services dans le
marché intérieur les services de santé et les services d’intérêt général
financés par des fonds publics.
En effet, il faut se demander s’il est justifié de qualifier indistinctement tous
les soins de santé comme services au sens de l’article 50 du traité. En raison
de la relation triangulaire particulière entre le patient, le prestataire et
l’organisme de financement et de la nécessaire régulation existant dans cette
relation, il faudrait distinguer entre les soins de santé financés par la solidarité
et les soins de santé ne tombant pas sous un tel financement solidaire.
A mon avis personnel, il sera nécessaire de créer au niveau du traité une
dérogation à la libre circulation des services pour les services de santé qui
sont financés par la solidarité, quitte à prévoir qu’un règlement ou une
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directive spécifique fixe les règles applicables aux soins transfrontaliers
financés par la solidarité. 
Par exemple, pour un pays comme le Luxembourg avec un niveau élevé des
coûts des soins de santé, il serait parfaitement possible d’accepter la prise
en charge des soins transfrontaliers sans autorisation préalable aux tarifs
sociaux du pays d’accueil, à la condition que ces soins de santé soient
prestés par des prestataires conventionnés dans le pays d’accueil et selon
les règles applicables dans ce pays d’accueil.  
Un tel type de solution pour les soins transfrontaliers qui se réfère aux
principes de la coordination contenue au règlement 1408/71, respecterait
cette caractéristique essentielle des systèmes de soins de santé. 
D’ailleurs, il fournirait une solution pour des cas problématiques qui
subsistent actuellement au Luxembourg. Pour des traitements
indispensables qui ne peuvent pas être réalisés au Luxembourg, il n’existe
aucun tarif au Luxembourg puisqu’il n’est pas possible d’en déterminer le
coût de revient. Quel montant rembourser à un patient qui s’est fait traiter à
l’étranger chez un médecin ou dans un hôpital non-conventionné et qui
présente des factures établies pour un patient privé ?  Le fait de s’adresser à
un médecin ou un hôpital conventionné produirait au moins des factures
selon les tarifs sociaux du pays d’accueil.   
Toutefois il est évident que cette solution ne serait pas, pour le moment,
économiquement supportable pour les pays où le niveau des coûts des soins
de santé est nettement inférieur à celui du pays d’accueil du patient.
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Les services de santé sont des services: il y a toujours une offre et une
demande, celui qui offre et celui qui demande-reçoit. Mais ils sont des
services spéciaux. 
Dans le système sanitaire public espagnol, il y a quelques nuances à la
conception classique de service. Celui qui offre c’est celui qui paie et celui qui
reçoit ne paie pas, au moins directement (avec l’exception des médicaments)
Les services sanitaires publics sont gérés par les régions. Les professionnels
de la santé qui travaillent dans les centres de santé ou les hôpitaux sont des
fonctionnaires. Ils doivent passer un concours, ils reçoivent un salaire et il y a
toute une procédure pour changer de poste de travail. Ils ne sont pas des
professionnels indépendants qui offrent ses services et qui sont payés par
acte médical.
C’est l’Administration, de l’État et régionale, qui planifie, organise, finance,
offre et fournie les services et soins de santé. C’est pour cela que pour
l’Espagne les services de santé son des services, mais spéciaux. 
Les système de santé privé est parallèle, un système séparé.
Jusqu’à récemment, les patients n’avaient pas beaucoup de choix. Chaque
personne, chaque citoyen était attribué un médecin généraliste, en fonction
du domicile. Et selon le médecin généraliste, sont attribués le médecin
spécialiste et l’hôpital de référence. Mais, cela permet avec pas beaucoup
d’argent, plus ou moins 1000 Euro par personne et par année, d’avoir un état
de santé pas mauvais, le septième dans la classification de l’OMS et avoir
une espérance de vie qui est entre les meilleures du monde, surtout pour les
femmes. Et tout ça avec une protection sociale dans d’autres domaines qui
est loin de celle d’autres pays (il n’y a pas d’allocations familiales directes, on
commence seulement maintenant à discuter la couverture de la dépendance,
les soins pour les personnes âgées ne sont pas grandement publics, etc).
Notre système de santé n’est pas un système de sécurité sociale. C’est très
difficile à faire comprendre cela. La Sécurité Sociales est une chose et la
Santé une chose différent. Ce sont des Ministères différents, ce sont des
services différents, ce sont des budgets différents et ce sont des objectives
différents. Les soins de santé sont payés par les impôts. Les payement pour
la sécurité sociale (une partie du salaire du travailleur et une partie payée par
l’employeur) sont destinés à la pension de retraite, le chômage, les payement
du salaire en cas de maladie, maternité ou invalidité, entre autres.
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La carte sanitaire européenne est une carte de sécurité sociale pas une carte
de santé. Non seulement parce qu’elle n’a pas des donnés de santé, mais
parce que il y a des personnes qui ont droit à des soins de santé (tous les
résidents en Espagne ont droit aux soins de santé), mais ils n’ont pas de
couverture de sécurité sociale. La carte sanitaire espagnole est octroyée à
toutes les personnes ayant le droit aux soins du système national de santé
(dans les différentes régions ou régimes). Mais la carte «sanitaire»
européenne est seulement pour les personnes qui ont la sécurité sociale.
Cela laisse à l’écart au moins 2 millions de personnes, par exemple les
fonctionnaires. Le droit à la sécurité sociale, c’est un droit pour les
travailleurs/pensionnés, de protection sociale, mais les droits à la santé sont
liés à la résidence en Espagne et parfois à la citoyenneté.
Le règlement 1408/71 n’est pas la panacée. Il y a aussi des situations à côté:
les accords transfrontaliers, avec le Portugal ou la France, les citoyens
européens qui se déplacent «sans papiers» pour obtenir traitement, les
fonctionnaires, les personnes qui vivent entre deux pays, etc.
L’Espagne est un pays avec des caractéristiques spéciales, on a le soleil, les
gens aiment bien y venir en vacances et même s’y installer pendant la retraite.
Je voulais vous montrer une figure avec la réalité en Espagne. La première
colonne, ce sont les résidents de l’Espace Économique Européen (l’Islande
et le Lichtenstein non compris) qui résident légalement –avec carte de
résidence- en Espagne, par région. La deuxième colonne montre les
ressortissants des mêmes pays (sauf la Suisse) qui sont inscrits à la
Commune.
414.610 ressortissants de l’Espace Economique Européen avec une carte
légale de résident en Espagne, mais 598.990 qui sont inscrits dans la
commune, c’est-à-dire qui habitent en Espagne. C’est-à-dire, qu’il y a 180
000 personnes plus qui réellement habitent que celles qui sont censées
habiter. Ce sont des ressortissants européens, ils n’ont pas de problèmes
pour avoir une carte de résidence légale, mais, pour une raison ou l’autre ils
préfèrent avoir une double résidence, une effective dans leur pays d’origine
et une en Espagne. 
Cela rend la planification sanitaire très difficile. Le fait que vous êtes inscrit à
la commune donne le droit à la carte sanitaire, aux soins de santé. Mais, au
même temps, vous n’êtes pas un résident légal et le service régional de santé
ne reçoit pas d’argent pour vous. 
Cette population «flottante» provoque des problèmes de planification
sanitaire (on sait qu’ils sont là, mais pas d’une façon régulière). Au même
temps, provoque des problèmes de soins, parce que parfois ils reçoivent les
soins de santé en Espagne et parfois dans leurs pays d’origine. 
Les ressortissants étrangers qui font recours aux soins de santé peuvent se
classifier en 4 domaines:
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- les personnes à la retraite qui habitent en Espagne
- les personnes à la retraite qui passent des séjours assez longs (6 mois)
mais qui gardent ses droits de pension dans le pays d’origine
- les touristes
- les touristes sanitaires (ils profitent du tourisme pour se faire soigner; la
reproduction artificielle est bien connue dans ce domaine, et les prothèses
de hanche; ou bien le recours au urgences hospitalières comme une façon
de rentrer sans payer et sans liste d’attente, il en est de même pour les
médicaments pour les personnes à la retraite qui ne sont pas payants).
Il y a deux sujets différents qu’on veut signaler et délimiter clairement: l’argent
et les patients, le remboursement des soins donnés et le traitement adéquate.
Le règlement 1408/71 garantie le droit aux soins et le remboursement, mais
ne s’occupe pas du traitement, des problèmes d’information, de suivie, etc.
Les Ministères de la Santé s’occupent des patients; cela veut dire faire le
suivi, les personnes arrivent avec une histoire de santé ou non et elles
repartent avec une histoire de santé ou non, mais le suivi du dossier médical,
les données du patient est une affaire non réglé. Il faut se mettre d’accord
avec les médecins traitants dans le pays d’origine et dans le pays de
destination. Il y a des sujets cliniques, des sujets personnels (les personnes
très malades parfois veulent retourner dans son pays d’origine pour être avec
leurs proches, la langue, la méconnaissance du système, etc.). Les
problèmes du déplacement de patients en Europe n’est pas seulement un
problème de reconnaissance du droit et de remboursement, est beaucoup
plus large.
Le g al ly re s id en ts In s c rip t io n s  at  th e Co m m u n e
E E E  ( fa lta  Is la nd ia  
y  L iec h s th e in )
E E E  ( fa lta  S u iz a,  Is la n di a 
y  L ie c h s th ein )
T O TA L 4 14 .6 1 0 5 9 8 .9 90
AN DAL U CÍA 81 .0 3 2 1 0 9 .0 18
AR AG Ó N 4 .0 3 1 3 .9 41
AS T UR IAS  ( P R INC IP AD O  DE ) 3 .7 7 8 3 .9 65
BA LE A RS  ( IL LE S ) 37 .2 6 3 5 6 .8 56
CA NAR IAS 54 .6 9 4 8 1 .8 73
CA NT AB RIA 1 .7 7 4 1 .8 85
CA S TI LL A Y  LE Ó N 8 .9 0 7 1 0 .5 99
CA S TI LL A- LA  M A NC HA 2 .7 9 0 3 .4 06
CA TA LU ÑA 64 .4 6 4 7 6 .2 19
CO M UN ID AD V A LE NC IANA 73 .5 4 1 1 5 7 .9 13
E X T RE M AD UR A 3 .1 1 4 3 .1 55
G AL ICIA 13 .0 3 3 1 6 .3 44
M A DR ID ( CO M U NID AD DE ) 45 .7 1 7 4 7 .1 21
M U RC IA ( RE G IÓ N D E ) 7 .6 8 2 9 .8 80
NA V ARR A ( CO M UN . F O RA L DE ) 2 .4 4 8 4 .0 15
P AÍS  V A S CO 8 .5 6 0 1 0 .4 81
RIO J A ( LA ) 1 .2 4 5 1 .8 54
Ce ut a y  M elil la 4 3 3 4 65
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Eva LUKACS
COUNSELLOR
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AND EU AFFAIRS
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, SOCIAL AND FAMILY AFFAIRS
HUNGARY
Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a pleasure for me to be here, and let me address
some questions which are relevant from the Hungarian point of view. As it has
been outlined by the previous speakers, we have three main reference points
here regarding health services and the internal market: the Treaty of Rome,
especially its provisions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to
provide services; Regulation 1408/71/EEC concerning the coordination of
social security connected to the free movement of persons and, as third, the
new Services Directive proposal. Regarding the Treaty of Rome, Hungary
tries to deal with the principles of freedom of establishment and freedom to
provide services along the same lines: stress is put on the persons who
render and receive services. 
As regards service provision, we believe that in order to maintain a high-
quality service, the person actually providing the service must be taken as a
reference point. The Hungarian regulation is the same for persons rendering
health care services as self-employed or employees of a company,
established either in Hungary or in another Member State. The basis for
health care service provision is the possession of an appropriate (Hungarian
or foreign) degree, the recognition of EC diplomas gains grounds in the
directives on the mutual recognition of diplomas. In Hungary, there is an
independent authority, designed for dealing with applications, and since our
accession in May 2004, we have received and approved 1,240 applications,
out of which 70% were doctors, and then 10-10% dentists and nurses. These
health care professionals are welcome in Hungary, they are offered the
opportunity to provide services on the same footing as their Hungarian
colleagues, being active privately or in a contracted form, for a longer period
or only incidentally. This framework for service provision is very useful in
Community Law and there are numerous possibilities to pursue cross-border
activity to persons as well as to companies. 
However, in our opinion the Treaty itself has its limits. In respect of health
care, the Treaty lays down that “Community action in the field of public health
shall fully respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the
organisation and delivery of health-services and medical-care”. In our opinion
this provision enjoys priority over the general rules laid down for free
movement of services, and certain Member State competencies shall be
preserved. In our view, Community action, thus, cannot intervene into
national competencies in the way envisaged by the Services Directive
proposal, hence the country of origin principle and the planned elimination of
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certain authorisations, territorial restrictions, tariff setting and so on, would
definitely be an interference with both national sovereignty and national
competencies. Based on this, Hungary at present is not able to support the
inclusion of health-care services into the Services Directive proposal, aimed
at conserving the right of Member States to fully effectuate their regulatory
and controlling powers.
However, it is only one side of the coin. As regards service provision, since
the famous judgment of the ECJ in Luisi and Carbone, it is clear that the
freedom to provide services also encompasses the right of service recipients
to receive services. In this regard, the Hungarian position is completely
different from our position concerning the Services Directive proposal. This
way of thinking already brings us closer to the framework of Regulation 1408/
71/EEC on the coordination of social security schemes and to Article 23 of
the Services Directive proposal. In order to highlight the Hungarian position,
it is necessary to mention, that since the EU accession, based on Regulation
1408/71/EEC, Hungary issued 200,000 E111 forms - the European Health
Insurance Card is going to be issued as from the 1st of January, 2006 - and
out of these 200,000 E111 forms, up to now, only 175 pieces have been
invoiced by other Member States. This is a very small number, even if
invoicing sometimes happens years after the actual medical treatment was
provided. Similarly, we issued a small number of E112 forms, namely 122,
meaning that prior approval was given to foreign medical care in only 122
cases. In both cases, the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) is required
to bear the total cost of the treatment, which, taking into account the potential
tariff differences, might be rather unpredictable. Clearly, the Kohll and Decker
case and the subsequent case-law have brought a new element into the
system of patients’ rights. Now it is common sense, following these
judgments, that Member States are obliged to reimburse the costs of non-
hospital services even if prior approval has not been given. In these cases no
E form is used, and the level of reimbursement is equivalent to the tariffs used
in inland financing. Theoretically, hence the actual costs do not exceed
Hungarian tariffs, this case law might not really affect finances, and is not so
much unpredictable as is Regulation 1408/71/EEC. Let us take a couple of
remarks regarding the legal situation and the actual practice connected to the
Regulation and the case law.
In 1998, when Hungary first faced the challenging Kohll and Decker
judgment, it has been quite undisputed that it is not going to have any
concerns to Hungary. There has been a consensus that benefit-in-kind
systems – such as the Hungarian one –, in which the service provider
possesses an authorisation to operate, on the basis of which it is contracted
and subsequently reimbursed by the NHIF, and patients are given free of
charge health care services, does not fall within the ambit of this judgement.
However, with the passage of time and the announcement of new cases
(Vanbraekel etc.) it became clear that the decisions had far reaching legal
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consequences also for the Hungarian system and new procedures has to be
invented for its implementation. Being in the course of the accession
negotiations and the legal approximation process, we tried to establish
connecting points between Regulation 1408/71/EEC and the Kohll and
Decker case law and finalise the legal amendments accordingly. As a result,
as from the 1st of May 2004, the Hungarian Act LXXXIII of 1997 on
Compulsory Health Insurance and its implementing government decree
contain express provisions both on the application of Regulation 1408/71/
EEC and on the application of the Kohll and Decker case-law. According to
Article 27 of the Act, insured persons are entitled to obtain non-hospital
medical care without prior approval in other Member States, and they have
entitlement to reimbursement according to the Hungarian tariffs not
exceeding the actual cost of the treatment. The Act expressly defines “non-
hospital care”. It includes services of a general practitioners’ practice, dental
treatments and in certain cases, after due consultation with a general
practitioner, it can be extended to other medical services as well. From a legal
point of view, the Hungarian law contains already what has been put forward
by the judgements of the ECJ and what is planned to be accomplished by
Article 23 of the Services Directive proposal. This is the reason, why Hungary
has not expressed serious concerns regarding Article 23 of the Services
Directive proposal. Indeed, support has been emphasised throughout the
consultation process with a stress to place this implementing provision into
Regulation 1408/71/EEC due to transparency and legal certainty reasons. 
It should be noted, however, that in the last one year, we have received not a
single application based on the provision implementing the Kohll and Decker
case law (Article 27 of the Act). It means, that there was not one Hungarian
insured person who wanted to avail himself of this provision. On the contrary,
as it has been mentioned already, we issued 200,000 E111 forms among
which 300 forms have been required after the treatment has been obtained.
Though on a very small scale, practice has shown that persons who had
obtained medical treatment in a Member State without an E111 form rather
applied for it after the treatment instead of referring to the Kohll and Decker
opportunity. It is quite understandable as the reimbursement tariffs are very
different. Regulation 1408/71/EEC provides for total reimbursement (in terms
of the hosting states’ norms) while the Kohll and Decker case law only
provides for Hungarian tariffs. It is noteworthy to emphasise, that a country
with low(er) health care tariffs, like Hungary, is much more challenged by
Regulation 1408/71/EEC (speaking also of Regulation 631/2004/EC) than by
the Kohll and Decker case law in financial terms. 
In sum, Hungary applies both the Regulation and the relevant case-law,
however, in our view, further elaborations might be necessary regarding the
additional payment principle appearing in the Vanbraekel case. The additional
payment principle in the Vanbraekel case, even if seems logical from a legal
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point of view, might be very difficult to apply in practice, and abuses might
not be excluded. We would put it forward for further discussion. 
I would lastly reiterate our position regarding the Services Directive proposal.
Hungary does not have any problems with Article 23 of the proposal, hence
we already apply its Hungarian implementation (at least the legal basis has
been invented). It would be, however, an appropriate step to insert this article
or an article of similar wording into Regulation 1408/71/EEC. In our view, it is
misleading to apply two different sets of rules for the same groups and
reason, only because there are different reimbursement mechanisms. 
And last but not least, based on our experiences with EC law, it seems to us
that the provision of services in the field of health-care is most delicate in
cross-border areas, especially between Hungary and Slovakia or Hungary
and Austria. That is why we have frontier co-operations with Slovakia, outside
the scope of Regulation 1408/71/EEC or partially inside, and we firmly believe
that this sort of co-operations are going to result in very fruitful sorting out of
the issues of patient mobility. 
Ladislav ŠVEC
DIRECTOR
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL REIMBURSEMENT
  CZECH REPUBLIK
As everybody knows the legal basis for discussions of last few years are
judgements of ECJ providing repeatedly, that health care has to be
considered as a service in the sense of free movement of services. 
Jurisdiction of ECJ comes at the same time, when many European systems
feel the necessity of reforms in order to reach higher effectiveness, taking into
account future common European challenges like ageing of population and
introducing of a new high costly methods of health treatment. 
Surely it is not just a game of chance that these breaking judgements and
reforming effort of particular states met at the same time, time which can be
described as an epoch of new technologies, time of even easier access of
patients to informations, time of even higher privat sector influence to public
services, time where borders are loosing their sense, time when processes
runing in one place are directly influenting happenings in other part of the
planet, time which is usually defined as a globalisation,. 
In this situation issue of cross border providing health care in a framework of
EU can be seen from two perspectives. As more or less unneccessary further
financial burden of already embarassed public health insurance schemes, or
we can see it positively, as an accelerant of neccessary changes in national
law on public health. 
Anyway, discussions about health care as a service are all the more
complicated due to the fact, that there are a very different systems among
particular EU countries and that is why their approach to particular decisions
of ECJ has also to be different. In that situation it ´s hard to find uniform view
which would be in compliance with free movements of services on one side
and all the interests of member states on other side. State by state also differs
possible financial, legal and organisational impact of ECJ judgements and
following EU commision proposals introduction to the practice. 
Approach of particular states differs, but one aspect of public discussion is
the same probably for most of them. It is the fact, that everything what is
connected with access to public services, financing of system and costs of
health care is considered as one of the most important and sharpest political
issues. Due to this fact discussions and consideration on posibilities of free
european market of health services are not probably everywhere and always
based only on objective analysis and assessments,  but very often also on
fear of changes.
202 Bulletin luxembourgeois des questions sociales
Summarising very briefly the Czech approach to the problemacy it´s
neccessary to state, that we consider jurisdiction of ECJ and it´s
interpretation of Treaty, binding on us and on the practise of our institutions.
Of course this approach concerns situations, where decision of ECJ is clear
and where are no doubts about the right way of its interpretation.
Unfortunately there are still many questions staying and further jurisdiction of
ECJ is inpatiently expected. 
Current situation, when decisions of ECJ, concerning entitlements of insurees
are not transposed to any other EU legal act we consider undesirable and
bringing legal uncertainty not only to insurees, but also to institution which
should apply national, but also EU law in practice. 
From our point of view the best solution would be to add results of ECJ
jurisdiction to directly applicable Regulation 1408/71 (resp. 883/2004),
dealing beside others with issues concering reimbursement of health care
provided to insurees of one state in the territory of other state. The advantage
of this solution is coverage of all issues connected with insurees entitlements
in one legal act. Anyway, the results of ECJ jurisdiction should be as soon as
possible transposed to EU legal act, either to the Regulation or to the
Directive. 
Talking about movement of patients, which is the most important part of
issue, we know already first figures concerning 2004. During first year of our
membership, Czech health insurance funds authorised treatment abroad in
23 cases. Seven applications were refused. On the other hand 210 foreign
insurees were treated in the Czech Republic on E112 basis.
Unfortunately we have no exact figures about number of reimbursements on
the basis of free movement of services principles. We know only that number
of reimbursements according Czech tarrifs is not too high. The fundamental
barrier for more often use of this freedom by Czech insurees is low level of
reimbursements tarrifs according Czech law in comparison with costs of
treatment provided in countries, which are potentialy interesting for our
insurees.
According known figures and further assessments we can generally see, that
Czech Republics´ system is more provider of health care to foreign citizens
and insurees than a consumer of health care abroad.
Talking about free movement of providers we suppose that the way of
facilitation of services providing has to be more discussed  and that the
principle of state of origin cannot be fully applied in this sector. Especially
without strenghten of trust and cooperation between particular countries we
can hardly move on.
As it was mentioned before, there are stil many questions not explicitly
responded by ECJ. One of these questions concerns providing of services by
foreign provider in the territory of the state of insurance. Especially for the
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systems based on contracting the providers, where insurees are not entitled
to any reimbursement if they were treated by not contracted doctor, it seems
to be very interesting and important to find out, whether current or future ECJ
judgements can constitute legal basis for patient´s reimbursement. Positive
answer could probably lead to concrete changes not only in our national law.  
Finally we can say, that development in the field of EU law is actually pushing
to liberalisation of health sector and partially weakens regulatory power of
member states. On the other hand this move of EU law can be seen also
positively as an accelerant and as a part of neccessary changes in our
national legislations and as a pressure to improving of services providing in
the framework of our public schemes.
In other words possible problems of our national health systems are not and
are not going to be caused by application of EU freedoms, but more by
objective challenges of todays world and lack of political courage on national
level to respond to them and to make a neccessary changes in time. 
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Géraldine FAGES
ADMINISTRATOR
DG INTERNAL MARKET AND SERVICES
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Je suis contente de prendre la suite de Monsieur Švec qui nous a donné une
vision si positive du futur. Ma présentation portera sur la proposition de
directive relative aux services dans le Marché Intérieur1). D’autres en ont parlé
avant moi. 
Je souhaiterais vous expliquer pourquoi la précédente Commission
européenne a adopté cette proposition de Directive et pourquoi elle a décidé
d’inclure les services de santé dans cette proposition.
1. Pourquoi une Directive services ? 
Cette proposition de Directive, puisqu’il s’agit d’une proposition, trouve son
origine dans le processus de Lisbonne. Elle vise à établir un véritable marché
intérieur pour les services afin d’exploiter le potentiel en terme de création
d’emplois et de croissance qui réside dans le secteur des services. 
Cette Directive vise à faciliter l’exercice de la liberté d’établissement des
prestataires de services et la prestation de services à l’intérieur de l’Union
européenne. 
Cette proposition trouve aussi son origine dans un rapport de juillet 20022) sur
le fonctionnement du marché intérieur des services. Rapport qui a été très
mal intitulé puisqu’en fait on aurait du l’appeler « rapport sur le non-
fonctionnement du marché intérieur des services » ! Ce rapport est un
véritable constat d’échec de mise en œuvre de ces libertés fondamentales.
La réponse de la Commission à ce défi que représente la création d’un
véritable marché intérieur des services dans l’Union européenne s’inscrit
dans cette constatation que jusqu’à présent l’application directe des libertés
garanties par le Traité n’a pas fonctionnée. 
2. Pourquoi une approche horizontale ? 
L’approche suivie par la Commission est une approche horizontale. Elle
choque dans le domaine des services. Tous les orateurs l’ont dit : les services
de santé ne sont pas des services comme les autres. Pourquoi donc avoir
suivie cette approche ? 
Parce qu’en fait, lorsqu’on se détache de la nature du service: service de
santé, de tourisme, de sécurité privée, on se rend compte que d’un point de
vue juridique, les prestataires de services dans l’exercice de leurs libertés se
1) COM (2004) 2 final du 13.01.04.
2) COM (2002) 441 final du 30.07.02.
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heurtent aux mêmes obstacles. Ce n’est pas avec cet objectif en tête que
nous avons mis tous les services dans le même panier. Nous avons cherché
à établir une nomenclature des obstacles auxquels se heurtent les
prestataires de services et à y remédier. 
De plus, je dois souligner que la proposition « Services » prend en compte la
spécificité des services de santé. De nombreuses références sont faites dans
les articles de la Proposition à la nécessité de protéger la santé publique. La
Commission ne l’avait peut-être pas assez fait et la Présidence
luxembourgeoise a bien amélioré le texte de ce point de vue. La Présidence
luxembourgeoise a publié un nouveau texte qui se trouve sur le site Internet
sur lequel les modifications apportées par le groupe de travail du Conseil sont
clairement indiquées. Vous constaterez, si vous le lisez, que la plupart des
ajouts concernent les questions de santé.
3. Pourquoi la précédente Commission a-t-elle décidé d’inclure les
services de santé dans la Directive services ?
La responsabilité initiale en incombe à la Cour de Justice. Tout le monde a
évoqué ici les arrêts Kohll, Decker et suivants3). La Cour a confirmé, réitéré
que les services de santé sont des services au sens du Traité. A partir de là,
la Cour a développé une jurisprudence sur le remboursement des soins de
santé. C’est cette question de la mobilité des patients qui, si je peux
m’exprimer ainsi, encombre le rôle de la Cour et les armoires de la
Commission.
Certains qui se sont exprimés avant moi, ont attiré l’attention sur les
questions suscitées par la proposition de directive, dans sa partie concernant
la liberté d’établissement. Oui, il y a des problèmes en matière de liberté
d’établissement et nous avons reçu des plaintes de la part de professionnels
qui font face à des difficultés dans l’exercice de cette liberté. Oui, il y a
quelques plaintes en matière d’application du principe du pays d’origine au
domaine des services de santé. Mais, ce n’est rien à côté des plaintes que
nous recevons de patients qui se heurtent à des refus d’autorisation pour se
rendre dans un autre Etat Membre afin d’y être soignés ou à des refus de
remboursement de la part de leur organisme de sécurité sociale.
L’article 23 relatif à la prise en charge des soins de santé est la raison pour
laquelle la Commission a décidé d’inclure les services de santé dans le
champ d’application de la Directive. En effet, les patients ne comprendraient
pas que cette Directive services qui est l’instrument historique de mise en
oeuvre de la libre prestation de services ne traite pas de cette question qu’ils
considèrent comme cruciale. On l’a dit, la santé publique est une des
préoccupations essentielles du citoyen européen et le citoyen européen ne
3) Arrêt Kohll, affaire C-155/96 du 28.04.98, arrêt Decker, affaire C-120/95 du 28.04.98, arrêt Smits et
Peerbooms, affaire C-157/99 du 12.07.01, arrêt Vanbraekel, affaire C-368/98 du 12.07.01, arrêt Müller-
Fauré et Van Riet, affaire C-385/99 du 13 mai 2003, arrêt Inizan affaire C-56/01 du 23.10.03,  arrêt Leichtle,
affaire C-8/02 du 18 mars 2004. 
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comprendrait pas que finalement cette Directive « Services» soit une
Directive business et pas une Directive citoyenne.
4. La prise en charge des soins de santé – L’article 23 de la proposition 
Toute une section de la proposition de Directive est consacrée aux droits des
destinataires de services. L’article 23 en est une composante essentielle. Cet
article 23 constitue la  transposition pure et simple des jugements de la Cour.
Nous ne sommes pas allés plus loin en ce qui concerne les éléments
essentiels. 
L’article 23 stipule que les Etats membres doivent rembourser les soins non
hospitaliers même en l’absence d’autorisation préalable. En ce qui concerne
les soins hospitaliers, une autorisation peut toujours être exigée. En ce qui
concerne les conditions de fond d’octroi de cette autorisation, la proposition
renvoie aux conditions établies par le Règlement 1408/71 sur la coordination
des systèmes de sécurité sociale. Elle impose aussi le respect de conditions
de transparence destinées à encadrer le pouvoir discrétionnaire des Etats
membres. 
En ce qui concerne la question des tarifs de remboursement, l’article 23
précise que les soins doivent être remboursés aux tarifs applicables dans
l’Etat membre d’origine du patient. L’article 23 précise dorénavant à la
demande de certains Etats membres que le patient ne peut pas tirer profit de
la libre circulation. En aucun cas, il ne pourra lui être remboursé plus que ce
qu’il a dépensé. 
Cet article 23 a pour objectif de garantir les droits des patients tels qu’ils ont
été reconnus par la Cour de Justice. Certains diront pourquoi la jurisprudence
ne suffit-elle pas ? Parce qu’à l’évidence, elle ne suffit pas, elle n’apporte pas
la sécurité juridique nécessaire pour que les patients puissent en toute
sérénité d’esprit franchir une frontière pour aller voir un médecin. Certains
l’ont dit avant moi, la grande majorité des Etats Membres n’ont pas transposé
la jurisprudence. Les services de la Commission ont rédigé un rapport sur la
base des contributions des Etats Membres dont il ressort que la plupart des
Etats Membres n’ont pas pris de mesures de mise en application de la
jurisprudence4).
Ainsi, à l’heure actuelle, au sein de l’Europe il y a des patients qui peuvent
circuler parce que leurs Etats Membres se sont mis en conformité et d’autres
qui ne circulent pas parce que leurs Etats Membres ne se sont pas mis en
conformité. Et tout ça finit devant la Cour de Justice.
Sept arrêts ont été rendus par la Cour de Justice. Nous avions quatre
questions préjudicielles devant la Cour. Nous n’en avons plus que deux,
puisque la Cour d’un Etat membre a estimé que compte tenu de ses
développements, la jurisprudence de la Cour était assez claire et lui
4) SEC(2003) 900 du 28.07.03.
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permettait de rendre ses propres jugements. Nous avons cependant deux
nouveaux cas devant la Cour et nous continuerons à avoir des recours
préjudiciels de la part des cours nationales qui seront de plus en plus souvent
saisies et nous aurons des arrêts rendus sans recours préjudiciels par les
Cours nationales si nous ne prenons pas la peine de clarifier dans un texte
communautaire les droits des patients en matière de remboursement. Les
objectifs de la directive Services sont de garantir les droits des patients et
d’améliorer la sécurité juridique. Ce dernier point répond à une demande
explicite du High Level Reflection Group on patient mobility and healthcare
development, qui réunissait les Etats Membres, ceux-là mêmes qui
aujourd’hui hésitent à franchir le pas. Un troisième élément est aussi très
important, plusieurs orateurs l’ont souligné: il ne faut pas laisser s’établir une
« République des Juges ». Il appartient maintenant au législateur
communautaire de se saisir de cette question. Tout le monde dit que c’est
une question importante et que le législateur communautaire doit s’en
préoccuper. Je ne crois pas que la meilleure façon de s’en préoccuper soit
de renvoyer cette question à plus tard. De toute façon et tout le monde l’a dit,
les règles du marché intérieur continueront à s’appliquer avec ou sans
Directive «services» et dans ce cas, nous aurons de la jurisprudence.
Une attention particulière doit être portée à la définition des soins de santé
qui figure dans la proposition. Sur ce point, nous allons plus loin que la
jurisprudence. Il s’agit d’une question importante puisqu’elle permet de
rendre opérationnelle la distinction entre soins hospitaliers et non hospitaliers
et donc de déterminer le champ d’application de l’obligation de disposer
d’une autorisation. Le législateur communautaire doit trancher cette
question. 
5. Autres dispositions particulièrement pertinentes pour les services de
santé
Mis à part l’article 23, d’autres dispositions de la proposition de la Directive
doivent être évoquées en relation avec les services de santé. Elles
concernent la liberté d’établissement et l’application du principe du pays
d’origine. 
Je traiterai de ces sujets très brièvement compte tenu du temps qui m’est
imparti. 
En ce qui concerne la liberté d’établissement, l’article 15 de la proposition a
été souvent évoqué en relation avec les services de santé. Cet article établit
une liste des exigences souvent imposées par les Etats membres aux
prestataires de services. Ces exigences produisent des effets restrictifs
importants pour la liberté d’établissement. Cependant, elles peuvent être
justifiées selon les circonstances et compte tenu des objectifs poursuivis par
les Etats membres en les imposant. Il s’agit donc d’une différence
fondamentale avec l’article 14 qui identifie  des exigences interdites c’est à
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dire des exigences qui ont été déclarées incompatibles avec la liberté
d’établissement par la Cour. Par exemple, l’article 15 fait figurer parmi les
exigences à évaluer, « les exigences qui imposent un nombre minimum
d’employés » (article 15 f)). Imposer un nombre minimum de personnel
médical par lits d’hôpitaux apparaît justifié par des raisons de santé publique.
En revanche dans un autre secteur, cette exigence pourra ne pas être
justifiée.  
En ce qui concerne les exigences à évaluer, l’alternative est la suivante : soit
nous procédons à cette évaluation en commun selon la procédure prévue par
la Directive soit nous laissons la Cour décider. A nouveau, il est dans l’intérêt
de tous de procéder à cette évaluation mutuelle. Outre qu’elle permet
d’écarter les aléas du contentieux, elle permet aussi un échange
d’expérience et de bonnes pratiques qui ne peut être que profitable à toutes
les parties intéressées. 
Le principe du pays d’origine, l’article 16 de la proposition n’a jamais été
envisagé de manière absolue par la Commission. Il est assorti d’un grand
nombre de dérogation et d’exceptions. Dans le domaine de la santé, son
application sera limitée dans la mesure où déjà, en pratique, ces services
exigent souvent un établissement. Dans ce cas, il n’y a pas d’application du
principe du pays d’origine et le prestataire de services relève de la législation
de l’Etat membre dans lequel il est établi. 
Dans les cas de prestation de services transfrontalières, par exemple, un
docteur ou une sage-femme qui se rendent chez des patients, dans un autre
Etat membre, pour des consultations, il est important de noter que la directive
prévoit une dérogation au principe du pays d’origine pour les matières
couvertes par la directive sur la reconnaissance des qualifications
professionnelles. Ceci signifie que l’Etat membre de prestation pourra vérifier
les qualifications professionnelles du prestataire (dans la mesure où elles ne
sont pas harmonisées au niveau communautaire) comme il le ferait pour un
prestataire établi sur son territoire. Les Etats membres pourront exiger une
déclaration préalable à la prestation de services ou un enregistrement
temporaire pro-forma à l’ordre professionnel. Ils pourront également imposer
leurs règles disciplinaires directement liées aux qualifications
professionnelles. Outre cette dérogation, la directive comprend d’autres
dérogations qui permettent d’empêcher par exemple, la prestation de
certains services pour des questions de santé publique – ce qui permet
d’interdire la prestation de certains traitements ou service médicaux. 
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6. Conclusion
En conclusion, je voudrai rappeler les déclarations du Commissaire
McCreevy au Parlement européen, au Conseil et à la presse. Il a clairement
indiqué que la balle était dans le camp du Parlement. C’est maintenant au
Parlement à prendre ses responsabilités et à amender, comme il le souhaite,
la proposition de Directive. Le Commissaire McCreevy a indiqué que si des
amendements dans le sens d’une exclusion des services de santé étaient
proposés, il pourrait les considérer favorablement.
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It is a great pleasure to be back in this illustrious hall, where in 1998 so many
people convened to discuss the effects of the famous Decker and Kohll
rulings. These rulings shocked quite a few people because, for the first time,
the European Court of Justice had set aside national social health insurance
legislation which had been in place for ages and which everyone considered
so solid. Certain governments were very shocked; they were even afraid that
their national systems would fall apart. Well, seven years later we know that
no system has fallen apart, but we have become very much aware how much
European internal market regulations influence our national health systems
and in fact, any change that you would consider, has to be examined under
European law. Sometimes the confrontation of plans with European law
threatens to stifle things too much. We sometimes are even afraid to bring
about changes, because someone may say: “It is contrary to European law”. 
I want to illustrate this on the basis of recent experience in the Netherlands
where we are bringing about a new universal health insurance system as from
January 1st 2006, if our Senate approves because they are at stake at the
moment. 
This morning we heard a lot about a draft for a services directive. We all know
that we have in place since about 15 years three directives for non-life
insurances. Insurance is a very complicated product. It has to do with
confidence, with trust. People pay for something unexpected that they do not
want to happen, but that might happen in the future. Every European Union
Country had a whole set of national rules to cover this area. To complete the
internal market in direct insurances it was considered absolutely necessary to
have these directives, because we wanted more freedom for companies to
provide insurance services all through the European Union. 
Two interesting features of these directives are: 
- one single authorisation is valid for an insurer to become active throughout
the Community; 
- supervision, particularly the prudential control, is done by the home
Member State. 
Perhaps you notice certain parallels with the services directive that we
discussed this morning. Of course all the rules of the insurance directives are
there to make sure that the consumer gets what he expects. If a Danish man
wants to buy insurance from a Portuguese firm, he has to be just as certain
that he gets what he pays for, as when he goes to a firm of his own country. 
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Now these directives do not apply to insurances forming part of a statutory
system of social security. And here you see the dichotomy that we seem to
have under European law: we have statutory systems of social security where
Member States have a great deal of autonomy to set their own rules on the
one hand, and on the other hand we have free insurances where European
law applies. Now, as Professor Jorens stated in his report, it is unfortunately
not always very clear, where a social security system starts or ends, and
where private insurance begins. There is an area of uncertainty in between. 
Of course we all have a feeling of what social security and social health
insurance means – everybody having access to a certain benefits package,
reasonable premiums etc – but there is no clear definition of social security. 
There is one certainty that we have, and, as is often the case when there first
was uncertainty, it has been the European Court of Justice that provided it.
The European Court of Justice in a famous case, Commission versus
Belgium1), ruled that insurance undertakings covering the risk of accidents at
work remain within the scope of the insurance directives, even when they act
in the context of a statutory scheme of social security, if those undertakings
operate at their own risk with a view to profit. So what shows us this ruling?
That at the same time, you can be a private insurance company, and part of
a statutory social security scheme. If a country leaves the execution of a
social security scheme to private companies, with a profit orientation and
running a certain insurance risk, then they have to meet the conditions of the
insurance directives. 
Now in the Netherlands for many years there have been efforts to create a
new health insurance system. We have a long-standing desire in our country
to bring about more competition among insurers in health care and among
providers of care. We wanted a system that responds better to demands,
desires, needs of patients and insurers. We want a social system that offers
some choice to the citizens. You have to realize at the moment we have
“duality” in our system. We have a statutory system for about 60% of the
population and we have private insurance for about 40% of the population.
And with this history of a split system you can imagine that there has always
been a big debate, whether a new system for all should be a public health
insurance model with more competition among the insurance agencies, or if
it should be a private health insurance regime with a certain degree of
necessary regulation applying to all insurance agencies. That was the choice:
public or private. 
1)  European Court of Justice, Commission/Belgium, case C-206/98, ECR 2000, I-3509.
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From the beginning a shroud of legal doubts has surrounded any proposal. In
particular it was unclear if, in a private system, public preconditions the
government wanted to impose on insurers were in accordance with EU
competition law and the European insurance directives. And it was also
unclear if you can materialize a public system, based on competition among
insurance agencies. In fact, it was a lawyer’s paradise and, as I am a lawyer,
I enjoyed myself a great deal in the last few years. There were many different
opinions, one saying “this cannot be done”, and another saying “that cannot
be done”. There were interesting paradoxes, because from our private
insurance side there were appeals to the government to make the system
private and, when the government expressed doubts if it could impose rules
on private insurers, these insurers would say “Oh yes, you can, European law
leaves a lot of room for you to impose certain rules on us which are necessary
for the public good”. 
But a clear framework to examine reform plans was lacking and this of course
forced the government to be very careful. It led to the dilemma that I alluded
to: change is so risky from a European law perspective that you do not
change at all. 
Under the last cabinets politically speaking there was a preference with the
government to install a system of just ordinary private insurance, where every
citizen would be privately insured against the health-care risk, but with certain
preconditions: 
- an obligation for citizens to have themselves insured against the risk of
health care costs for a basic package;
- any insurer wanting to be in the system should have to accept any citizen
that wanted to have health insurance with that company;
- insurers should be free to set their nominal premiums, but they should not
differentiate in their rates on the basis of age, sex, social background and
health condition of the insured people;
- to make that possible, a system of risk structure compensation should be
installed. 
These elements were considered vital in the public interest. Now as things
turned out, we made a law exactly containing these elements. The law (Health
Insurance Act) has been accepted by the second Chamber of Parliament and
is now pending with the Senate2). We succeeded in finishing for the time
being our debate on the European law aspect of the new legislation. As there
were so many different opinions the new Minister who came into office in
2003, decided to start serious consultations with the European Commission
on this issue. There were talks with DG internal market, DG employment and
social affairs and DG public health. And the debate ended with, what some of
2) The Senate accepted the law on 14 June 2005; Zorgverzekeringswet, Staatsblad, 2005, 358.
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you may have heard of as, the Bolkestein letter3) which is another Bolkestein
product than the services directive discussed this morning, but in fact, the
content of that letter was enough for the Dutch government to see it as the
green light to proceed as they wanted. Of course, the Commission did not
commit itself entirely, but came up with a rather strong opinion giving an
answer to the question whether the legislation that we wanted to develop,
could be considered compatible with the insurance directives. Here article 54
of the Third non-life insurance directive plays a role, because it contains a
possible exemption for Member States to regulate insurances in a specific
manner. This Article reads “Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, a
Member State in which contracts covering health risks may serve as a partial
or complete alternative to health cover provided by the statutory social
security system, may require that those contracts comply with specific legal
provisions adopted by the Member State to protect the general good”. 
There had been a lot of discussion on the extent to which you could use this
exemption. The Bolkestein letter says in this respect that “this proviso also
covers the situation where a Member State decides to entirely assign the
cover of statutory social security health insurance to private insurance
undertakings which must conduct such an activity at their own risk, following
insurance techniques and on the basis of contractual relationships governed
by private law”. In short the letter says there is ground to impose certain rules
on private insurers, when an insurance scheme fulfils the function of a social
insurance. Although the letter does not give legal guarantees, these parts of
the letter are very important. The Commission says: the objective of the Dutch
government is to guarantee health-care as a basic social right. This means
that all residents in the Netherlands should have access to health insurance
guaranteeing a basic package of essential care in return for acceptable
premium. To ensure that goal the Dutch government wishes to require that
the proposed health insurance regime is based on a few principles: 
- open enrolment; 
- a basic minimum cover defined by the government and which must be
provided by any health insurer;
- the right of insurers to set their own premium rates as long as there is no
discrimination on the basis of age, sex, health status and other
circumstances;
- an equalisation fund to compensate insurers’ losses because of the risk
profile of their portfolio.
3) Letter of Commissioner F. Bolkestein on the Dutch Health Insurance System, 25 November 2003, CAB/
PvB/D(03)0848.
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And then a crucial quote: “I believe that these principles could be justified
under Article 54 of the Third non-life insurance directive, as they appear
necessary to ensure the legitimate objectives pursued by the Dutch
government”. 
This statement which, of course, did not take away that the Dutch
government fully has to take its own responsibility for the framework of law
that they are staging, is an important opinion of the European Commission. I
think it reflects a trend which we have also seen in the EC-CoJ jurisprudence
that social objectives have a mitigating influence on free market principles.
And this trend, on its turn, can be seen as a recognition of the fact that
governments of Member States must be able to aim for social objectives also
outside the strictly public domain. We do not have the situation in Europe
that, what is in the public interest, should fully and only be a State
responsibility, and that the alternative is only the free market. That is not the
choice of the European social model. There are in-between areas where you
have to recognize, that certain social values have to be balanced with the
internal market principles. I want to emphasize that this is an important trend
in European legal development. 
When we look back at the last seven years, since our Decker and Kohll
conference, we see much more clarity now on the importance of public
service within an internal market context, and the possibilities to find social
solutions in a market environment. On what has happened in law and
jurisprudence Professor Jorens has written his magnificent report showing all
the new answers which bring about more legal certainty, although the
ultimate level of legal certainty of course has not yet been obtained. 
But we are making progress in certain fields. I want to finish by referring to
another part of the Bolkestein letter. And that is where the commissioner
writes: “I do not think that it would be proportionate to apply the requirements
to any complementary insurance cover offered by private insurance which
goes beyond the basic social security package of cover laid down in the
social security framework”. So, governments do not have much room to
regulate complementary health insurance in the public interest. I would like to
remind you that already in the year 2000 the European Parliament, so
eloquently represented here this morning, passed a resolution on
supplementary health insurance4). In it the European Parliament expressed
the notion that supplementary insurance will play increasingly important roles
in covering various health risks. The Commission was called upon to present
a green paper and there was a call for a proposal for a directive where
elements like no-discriminatory use of medical data, no medical
examinations, life-long insurance could be part of rules that may be
necessary also for complementary insurance. 
4) Resolution of the European Parliament of 2000 (2000/2009 INI).
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The position of the Dutch Ministry of Health is that it would be very interesting
to revitalise the discussion on this resolution, because it did not have a proper
follow-up yet. What was called for is not yet there. Nevertheless the
relationship between basic coverage and complementary coverage is a very
important one, in for instance France, in Germany, in many different
countries. So I would like to hear what the feelings are among this audience.
Do not you think that particularly the situation for complementary insurances
requires a new discussion on the inclusion of social elements in insurance
regulations in Europe? 
Thank you very much.
Dermot SMYTH
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND CHILDREN
IRELAND
I wear three hats: I look after the budget of the Irish health system, I also have
a role as head of International unit and I am also responsible for the regulation
of private health insurance. 
Let me start by giving a brief account of the Irish system because I do regard
it actually as unique. 
- We combine public and private health care. 
- In private health insurance, we have an open market following on from the
single market provisions. Three private health insurers are competing: one
quite recently, one is an international organisation (BUPA), and one is a
semi-state company which is on the road to deregulation. 
- We have quite an extraordinary situation where half our population have
private health insurance and yet the entire population has general eligibility
for hospital services in public hospitals. For GP services, only 30% are
eligible. 
- A further complication is that half of the total private beds in our country
are delivered in public hospitals. 
This very Irish patch work actually works. As confirmed by OECD, it does
deliver quality care, with choice both in terms of accessibility to public or
private beds as well as what must be one of the cheapest private heath
insurance  regimes in the world, albeit subsidised to a certain degree by the
State. Also the majority of our hospital consultants have public contracts but
they are allowed to engage in public and private practice outside public
hospitals. We have tax relief available on health insurance premiums and we
have private hospital developments encouraged through generous capital tax
allowances. So the background is really a combination of systematic
encouragement by the government towards generating extra capacity on the
private side while at the same time ensuring sufficiently large public capacity
delivered. 
Let me briefly describe the derogatory framework for private health insurance
we have in our country. 
- Community rating: the same premium for a specific level of benefit
irrespective of health status, 
- Open enrolment: insurers are obliged to accept all candidates that are on
the waiting list for some firm irrespective of the beneficial cover and pre-
existing conditions, 
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- Life-time cover: an insurer cannot refuse to renew an insured person’s
health insurance cover irrespective of age or changes in health status, 
- A basic minimum level of benefit: in fact it is the lowest level of benefit of
private care available in the public hospital system. It covers about 10%
of the plans that are actually covered by health insurance in Ireland. 
- We also operate a risk-equalisation scheme although it has not actually
started yet because the conditions under which it would start have not yet
commenced. But that may change at any point depending on how the
market is going. And that would involve compensating for natural transfers
between insurers, or to members with profiles differing beyond specified
levels, which I think has some elements we have different from the Dutch
system. I must say that it is interesting for our teams to relate more to
actual pathology of experience according to the report by Professor
Jorens. 
- We will be looking at life-time community rating in the future for this will
allow persons of all ages to take out health insurance or provide that those
who do not do so until older will be subject to late entry loadings. Up to
now we have extended community rate for open enrolment up to people
under 65. 
So what is the perception by people in the country about it? According to
recent research by an independent health insurance authority, people prefer
if community rating were really straight. An overwhelming majority consider
the type of medical cover to be much more important than the type of
combination offered. So people are interested more in access to care
immediately than in a choice of French wines. 94% of those with health
insurance agree that insurance is a necessity and not a luxury, and is seen as
a vehicle that provides fast access to services. The public system has not
delivered access to people quickly enough and has waiting lists which we are
trying to address. 
As to the internal market issues, we are very acutely aware that developments
in our market must take account of the EU regulatory framework. We have
had a lot of dealings with the European Commission when introducing our
system, which came into effect after legislation in 1994. The Commission has
recognised on a number of occasions that private health insurance in Ireland
can be regarded as alternative to the statutory social regime and confirmed
our right to benefit from the rules referred to in Article 54 of the non-life
insurance Directive. 
They also recognised the need for risk-equalisation, and rejected a notion
that involves State aids. However while the Commission has accepted our
right to have these legal provisions it has noted that anything we do must be
proportionate. The EU principles of necessity and proportionality obviously
come into effect which we fully recognise. 
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At the moment the regulatory framework we have is challenged before the
Court of First Instance. We are confident that what we do is consistent with
European legislation. I would like to quote the OECD in this context:
“Adequate regulatory and informational tools are required to steer insurers
towards efficiency-based competition, especially when equity considerations
are paramount. As for when private health insurance represents a primary
form of cover for certain sections of the population it only covers essential
services. Regular safeguards are needed to enhance competition in the
private health insurance market because of market imperfections such as
information asymmetry, and insurance incentives to encourage enrolment and
retention of lower risk persons”. 
Obviously the extent to which community rules should extend to individual
Member States is open to debate. But given the role private health insurance
has played in the provision of care to the Irish population, it is essential in our
view that this continues to be recognised by the Community. And I think there
are lessons to be learned from the Irish experience. There is not one
necessary system to be into effect in any one country, but maybe a
combination of systems which can help to address what is a fundamental
problem of resourcing.
As a deviation from the script, let me just say that it is not an easy position for
politicians to address the issues discussed today, also given the complexity
of health care. Anything which damages their system or maybe filters proper
control is a problem, exposing them to criticism at home. However, the fact
is that ECJ have intervened because there isn’t anything in place. The
Commission has worked very hard over recent years in different fora to
produce a framework which meets a problem, a case-law problem which
exists now and is not going to go away. I was very interested to hear an
official from the Veneto region talk about contracts before regulation. I
understand that point of view - in fact as a pragmatist I have a lot of sympathy
for it – but I also think we should continue to work in the context of the high
level process. That is where the influence on the political system at Council
level can be felt best and most directly. That is the highest level of decision-
making, these people are accountable. It is through the work of the high level
group on for instance exchange of information – that may sound anaemic,
believe me it is not, exchange of information is crucial for having a proper
market - that we may get an answer to the problem. 
And we must get an answer and we do not have much time. I must remind
people that we have a case coming up next year, the Watts case, where the
undue delay issue on inpatient care, is up for judgement. If that decision goes
against the UK government position and if undue delay is more easily defined,
everything is up for grabs then. A solution must come through the
governments, the civil servants, influenced by fora like this. How to do it? I
think it is through a proper assessment of where the real problems are. I was
surprised to hear from the Czech delegate that so little use is made of the
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Kohll and Decker judgments for non-hospital care. We have the same
experience in Ireland. We have a public treatment purchase fund for people
traveling abroad directly. We see very little take-up of it. It makes one think. 
Thanks very much.
Daniel LENOIR
GENERAL DIRECTOR
FRENCH MUTUALITY
FRANCE
Merci. Je dois dire que c’est un peu une surprise pour moi d’intervenir cet
après-midi puisque je n’avais pas prévu de le faire. Mais c’est volontiers,
puisque les responsables de l’AIM me l’ont demandé. Je demande un peu
d’indulgence puisque j’ai improvisé cette intervention dans la matinée Ce
n’est pas celle d’un représentant du Gouvernement français, puisqu’il n’est
pas là, mais l’intervention d’un point de vue personnel de quelqu’un qui est
attaché aux valeurs de solidarité et mutualistes, des réflexions issues de mon
engagement en France depuis plus de 10 ans dans la gestion de l’assurance-
maladie obligatoire et complémentaire. Je voudrais féliciter au passage Yves
Jorens pour son rapport qui a le mérite de présenter un état complet de la
question. Je voudrais revenir sur le contexte auquel nos systèmes nationaux
de protection sociale, en général et d’assurance-maladie, en particulier, sont
confrontés.
Ces faits de la jurisprudence, en réalité, même si les critères ne sont pas
toujours très précis, ont conduit, de facto, à séparer ce qui relève de la
sécurité sociale, un régime public obligatoire de ce qui relève de la protection
sociale complémentaire. C’est parti d’une distinction essentielle entre
l’activité et le statut de l’organisme, et la jurisprudence européenne a
considéré dans de multiples arrêts -la France a été à l’origine d’un certain
nombre d’entre eux- que c’était l’activité qui primait sur la nature de
l’organisme, et ce depuis 1993, l’arrêt Poucet-Pistre. Chacun s’en souvient et
en particulier je m’en souviens puisque quelque temps après j’ai pris la
direction de la Mutualité Sociale Agricole. L’arrêt COREVA disait l’inverse,
c’est-à-dire que la MSA, organisme chargé d’un régime public, dès lors qu’il
s’agissait d’un régime facultatif, était considérée comme une entreprise. Et
récemment cette jurisprudence a été confirmée par un arrêt de 2004. 
En conséquence, les régimes obligatoires ont été considérés comme étant en
dehors du champ de la concurrence relevant de la compétence des Etats. Il
a été dit par les principaux intervenants que les régimes complémentaires
facultatifs, étaient dans le champ de l’article 85 du Traité. C’est bien le
résultat de la jurisprudence et c’est bien la Cour de Justice qui a eu un effet
réglementaire bien plus que les Directives assurances elles-mêmes. Il faut
bien voir les conséquences que cela a eu sur les systèmes de type
bismarckien, comme le système français car historiquement, il y avait dans
ces systèmes une porosité entre les dispositifs obligatoires et facultatifs.
C’est le cas en France où la protection sociale s’est étendue à partir de 1945
par la généralisation de dispositifs facultatifs progressivement généralisés et
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rendus obligatoires. Cela a été le cas, par exemple, des retraites
complémentaires qui ne sont pas considérées comme étant dans le champ
de la concurrence. Il en fut de même plus récemment pour l’assurance-
maladie avec la mise en place d’une généralisation puisqu’elle date de la loi
CMU de 1999, ou l’extension de la couverture générale aux indépendants qui
est également récente. Je m’honore d’avoir contribué à cette extension pour
les accidents du travail dans l’agriculture.
Il ne faut pas oublier que cette distinction plus stricte, cela a été aussi rappelé
tout à l’heure, s’est faite dans un contexte où la volonté des pouvoirs publics
a été de maîtriser les forces sociales et, pour dire les choses plus
brutalement, plus schématiquement, de plafonner le niveau de prélèvement
obligatoire dans notre société. Je voudrais dire un mot sur les difficultés de
maîtrise de ces dépenses.
Aujourd’hui, on assiste à une augmentation sans croissance apparente des
dépenses publiques de protection sociale pour les deux principaux segments
que sont l’assurance-maladie ou la retraite. La retraite, par l’effet du
vieillissement, n’a plus de croissance apparente puisqu’on a abandonné
l’idée d’abaisser l’âge de la retraite, mais chacun sait que l’espérance de vie
continue à augmenter. C’est vrai aussi de l’assurance-maladie puisque
chacun sait que les coûts de couverture de l’assurance-maladie - à niveau de
couverture équivalente - ont augmenté du fait de l’évolution des techniques
médicales.
Ces effets de croissance spontanée ont été accentués par la difficulté de
gérer le risque, notamment, en maladie et d’optimiser la dépense de santé, le
rapport entre la dépense et la réponse en termes d’offres de santé. Cela a des
conséquences qui ne sont pas récentes sur les restrictions de la prise en
charge d’un certain nombre de domaines tels que le handicap, mais on peut
penser à un sujet qui est devant nous, celui de la dépendance. Il existe
également une tendance à un désengagement ou à un moindre engagement
par rapport aux besoins en matière de maladie ou de retraite.
Je crois que l’on peut analyser les différentes réformes et, notamment la
réforme de l’assurance-maladie du 13 août 2004 en France, comme étant la
mise en place d’une responsabilité plus importante des régimes
complémentaires d’assurance-maladie. Je termine sur ces éléments de
contexte de la situation française, mais je pense qu’elle est vraie au niveau
européen, cette responsabilité croissante des régimes d’assurance, sociaux,
mais facultatifs, fait face à une aspiration à la couverture des risques et,
notamment des risques aux personnes, en étant peut-être le signe d’une
société qui vieillit. Les risques, même s’ils ne sont plus pris en charge
totalement ou bien dont on voit qu’ils ne pourront plus l’être totalement par
des régimes obligatoires, restent par nature des risques sociaux. Je parle
évidemment de la maladie ou l’on peut parler, comme je l’ai dit tout à l’heure,
de la retraite ou de la dépendance. Des risques sociaux par la généralité de
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l’aspiration à la couverture. Tout le monde aspire à être couvert en maladie
par extension, à l’ensemble de la population sans le risque que ferait courir la
société une non-couverture d’une partie de la population quelle qu’elle soit.
Je rappelle –j’ai parlé de la loi sur la couverture maladie universelle– que la
mise en place d’une couverture complémentaire au titre de la CMU était le
résultat du fait que la part complémentaire avait augmenté et qu’une partie
des citoyens français n’avaient plus accès à une complémentaire par leurs
propres moyens. Cela a conduit à un effort public.
Face à cette situation, je crois qu’un des enjeux dans l’Europe de demain,
c’est de développer une approche solidaire et facultative. Solidaire et
facultative, cela veut dire à la fois qui n’est pas dans le monopole public mais
qui ne relève pas pour autant des seules règles de l’article 85, des règles de
la concurrence qui s’appliquent au marché unique. Je vais développer dans
les deux minutes et demie qui me restent principalement le premier point qui
est l’expérience française.
Nous avons eu à faire face à une situation contentieuse, introduite par la
Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurance, sur les contrats d’assurance
mutualiste et qui était lié à l’existence d’une exonération sur la taxe des
contrats d’assurance -qui était très ancienne, puisqu’elle datait de 1944–
exonération liée au caractère solidaire et non lucratif de la prise en charge du
contrat d’assurance-maladie. Bien sûr, la France et la Mutualité ont défendu
les principes sur lesquels s’appuyaient cette exonération, notamment le
caractère non lucratif de la couverture, le caractère solidaire, prévu dans le
code de la mutualité. Il n’en ressort pas moins que finalement l’idée qui est
au centre de la jurisprudence européenne s’est imposée: ce n’est pas la
nature de l’organisme qui a conduit à l’exonération, mais bien la nature de
l’opération. Cela a conduit les pouvoirs publics français à mettre en place une
exonération liée à, ce qu’on appelle, les «contrats solidaires», c’est-à-dire les
contrats qui ne prévoient aucune sélection médicale ni de tarification en
fonction de l’état de santé des personnes qui sont couvertes.
Cette idée de règles relatives au contrat se développe aujourd’hui par la
réforme française, puisque les contrats complémentaires sont appelés à
devenir également des «contrats responsables», c’est-à-dire des contrats qui
évitent l’inflation inutile des dépenses et respectent le cadre d’organisation
des soins prévu par la réforme. C’est d’ailleurs le point de vue de la Mutualité
Française et c’est l’idée qu’elle avait évoquée et à laquelle nous tenons, de
généraliser ce type de dispositif au travers d’un crédit d’impôt qui, certes, a
pour objectif de favoriser l’accès à une complémentaire pour l’ensemble de
la population, mais aussi de respecter les critères de responsabilité et de
solidarité. On voit bien que derrière cela – et ça rejoint l’atelier suivant sur les
services sociaux d’intérêt général – on introduit l’idée que les aides publiques
en France sont des aides sociales et fiscales, liées à l’activité et non plus au
statut. J’ajoute que cela conduira nécessairement les Etats à clarifier les
critères d’intérêt général. 
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Mais cela pose aussi d’autres questions. Il me semble que nous tenons à
cette solution, mais que probablement, nous devrons aller plus loin. La
première question: est-ce que nous pourrons (cela fait allusion à la situation
aux Pays-Bas) nous limiter ou accepter que sur les risques sociaux, des
critères de solidarité et de responsabilité ne soient respectés qu’à travers des
mesures incitatives? Est–ce que ces domaines qui servent de relais du
marché, de la libre adhésion, ne doivent pas faire l’objet, compte tenu de leur
importance, d’une réglementation propre? Je pense notamment à
l’assurance-maladie, et l’on voit aujourd’hui à travers la croissance de la
dépense en fonction de l’âge, la nécessité de garantir le caractère viager pour
tous de l’assurance-maladie. Est-ce qu’il ne faudra pas aussi, même si le
critère d’activité s’est imposé face au critère d’entreprise, que ce type
d’activité ne soit pas prioritairement exercé par des organismes dont c’est la
vocation, c’est-à-dire qui maintiennent des principes chers à l’AIM: la gestion
par les adhérents et le caractère non lucratif?
Est-ce qu’il ne faudra pas enfin, dès lors qu’on a réussi à concilier le caractère
solidaire et le libre jeu, sinon de la concurrence du moins de la libre adhésion
dans le marché intérieur de demain, développer notre capacité d’acheteur
avisé? Certes, et j’y suis particulièrement sensible, l’ouverture du marché des
services de santé doit respecter, cela a été dit ce matin, des critères de
sécurité et de qualité, mais il doit aussi être l’occasion de peser sur l’offre sur
ces coûts et sur son organisation. Je finirai par un dernier point. Je crois que
la question qui se posera dans les organismes internationaux est la suivante:
quels sont les outils de mesure que nous avons? Car il me semble
qu’aujourd’hui l’outil de mesure est assez fruste, comme l’étaient les PIB
d’hier, ne prend que le taux de prélèvement obligatoire. Je crois qu’il faudra
que les organismes internationaux s’attachent au niveau de prélèvement
social selon les différentes formes qu’ils peuvent prendre.
Je vous remercie de votre attention.
Susanne WEBER-MOSDORF
MINISTRY DIRECTOR
FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY
GERMANY
Ich nehme das Wort auf Deutsch, herzlichen Dank.
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,
ich werde nicht versuchen, Ihnen das deutsche Sozialversicherungssystem
oder auch nur die Krankenversicherung zu erklären, das ist so komplex mit
seiner Selbstverwaltung und unserem föderalen System, das könnten andere
hier im Saal, die von der deutschen Krankenversicherung kommen, auch
besser. Ich möchte nur darauf eingehen, wie wir in Deutschland die
Rechtssprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes anwenden und ich
möchte noch ein paar allgemeine gesundheitspolitische Bemerkungen zu der
Rechtssprechung des EUGH machen. 
Herzlichen Dank zunächst noch einmal an die Veranstalter. Ich finde, es ist
wichtig und nützlich, einmal die Gesamtschau der europäischen
Rechtssprechung herzustellen und diese in Bezug zur nationalen
Gesundheitsvorsorge zu setzen. Meine Einschätzung ist, dass der Bericht,
der uns vorgelegt worden ist, ein sehr nützlicher und umfangreicher Bericht
ist. Ich glaube, es ist die erste umfassenden Gesamtschau überhaupt. Also
herzlichen Dank dafür.
Wenn wir jetzt in dieser Konferenz über Urteile des Europäischen
Gerichtshofes sprechen, dann sprechen wir über hochpolitische Fragen,
nämlich über die Frage der Balance der Binnenmarktregeln mit den Regeln
der nationalen Gesundheitsversorgung. Wenn man jetzt die Urteile des
Europäischen Gerichtshofes nimmt und wie Fähnchen auf ein Puzzle setzt,
dann wird die Landschaft der Patientenfreizügigkeit immer weiter abgesteckt.
Es kommt dann ein Gesamtbild heraus, das manche von den Mitgliedstaaten
erst gar nicht sehen und erkennen wollten. Vereinfacht gesagt, sieht dieses
Gesamtbild so aus, dass wir erstens zur Kenntnis nehmen müssen, dass die
nationalen Gesundheitssysteme nicht gegen den Binnenmarkt abgeschottet
werden können - der Watts-Fall wird das – auch für die staatlich organisierten
Gesundheitssysteme - sehr deutlich machen. Zweitens, dass es die
Freizügigkeit von Patienten ist, die die nationalen Regelungsgrenzen
überschreitet. Wenn wir dieses sehen und wissen, dann müssen die national
Verantwortlichen im Gesundheitswesen für sich beanspruchen, dass sie
selbst als national Verantwortliche die Balance und die Grenzen der
Binnenmarktfreiheiten auch abstecken – nicht, indem sie fragen: Was ist
juristisch machbar, was ist juristisch mit dem Binnenmarkt vereinbar?,
sondern: Was wollen wir politisch und was ist politisch notwendig? Die
deutsche Bundesregierung hat diese Entscheidung für sich so getroffen,
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dass die Binnenmarktfreiheiten für die Bürger umgesetzt werden In einem
Land mitten in Europa mit so vielen Grenzen wie Deutschland sie hat, ist es
selbstverständlich, dass die Bürger über die Grenzen gehen, um die
nächstgelegenen Gesundheitsdienstleistungen – Ärzte, auch Krankenhäuser
– in Anspruch zu nehmen. Die Krankenversicherungen haben sich darauf
eingestellt und haben sehr pragmatisch hier auch Lösungen gefunden. Die
deutsche Regierung hat die europäische Rechtssprechung deshalb auch im
Gesundheitsmodernisierungsgesetz umgesetzt. Die Bürger, die in anderen
Ländern ihre Gesundheitsdienstleistungen in Anspruch nehmen, können
danach die Kostenerstattung in Deutschland geltend machen. Das ist neu in
einem System der Sachleistungen. Und es wurde zweitens folgendes
geregelt: Die Krankenversicherungen können auch mit Dienstleistern in
anderen Ländern Verträge abschließen. Der ungarische Kollege hat heute
Morgen darauf hingewiesen, dass mehr Deutsche nach Ungarn kommen als
umgekehrt. Das ist so, wir haben dieses ermöglicht. Wir haben dieses auch
vor allem im Sinne der Patienten so ermöglicht. Gleichzeitig hat die
Bundesregierung im Gesundheitsmodernisierungsgesetz auch dafür gesorgt,
dass national der Wettbewerb verstärkt wurde, der Wettbewerb zwischen
den Anbietern, der Wettbewerb zwischen den Krankenkassen, weil wir die
Effizienzmöglichkeiten des Wettbewerbs auch nutzen wollen. Insofern, denke
ich, können wir durchaus mit den Grundaussagen der europäischen
Rechtssprechung leben. Wir wollen mehr Wettbewerb, aber Wettbewerb um
Qualität, um bessere Qualität, und keinen Wettbewerb um die geringsten
Kosten. Deshalb müssen wir immer im Auge haben, dass die
Dienstleistungen nicht nur einfache Dienstleistungen im Sinne des
Gütermarktes sind, wie es heute Morgen gesagt wurde, sondern
Dienstleistungen im Gesundheitswesen sind etwas ganz Besonderes. In
Deutschland haben wir seit der Einführung der sozialen Marktwirtschaft nach
dem Zweiten Weltkrieg im Konsens darüber festgehalten, dass es für die
Gesundheitspolitik und die Marktwirtschaft insgesamt einen stabilen
ordnungspolitischen Rahmen geben muss – ganz besonders im
Gesundheitswesen, wo es um die Sicherheit und Gesundheit der
Menschenen geht. Dieser bewährte Konsens sollte in einem sozialen Europa
genauso gelten. Ich denke, die Politik muss sicherstellen, dass dieser
Konsens auf der europäischen Ebene auch hergestellt und überhaupt erst
einmal diskutiert wird. Frau van Lancker hat heute Morgen darauf
hingewiesen, dass sich die Gesundheitsminister zu wenig darum kümmerten,
wie der Binnenmarkt auch auf die nationale Gesundheitssysteme wirke. Ich
denke, sie müssten dieses tun, sie müssten selbst diesen Konsens auf
europäischer Ebene herstellen. Es ist nämlich eine politische Frage und keine
reine Binnenmarktfrage, wer, wenn er krank ist, Zugang zu welchem
Gesundheitssystem und zu welchen Konditionen hat. Wir haben in Europa
auch unter den Gesundheitsministern den Konsens, dass unabhängig vom
Gesundheitszustand und unabhängig von der jeweiligen finanziellen Situation
der einzelne an allen Orten Europas eine notwendige Behandlung erhalten
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soll. Dieser Konsens hat Eingang gefunden in die Regelungen zur
Koordinierung der sozialen Sicherung. Das Krankheitsrisiko darf nicht ein
existentielles Lebensrisiko werden, und die Erhaltung der Gesundheit und die
Versorgung bei Krankheit kann nicht den Kräften des freien Marktes von
Angebot und Nachfrage überlassen werden. Dies gilt ganz besonders auch
für das System der Risikovorsorge und die Frage, in welcher Weise die
Risikovorsorge finanziert wird, nämlich über eine solidarische Versicherung
oder eine private Versicherung. Die deutschen Bürger sind zu 90 % in
gesetzlichen Versicherungen versichert und zu 10 % in privaten. Vor dem
Hintergrund waren wir auch sehr froh über die Rechtssprechung des
europäischen Gerichtshofes zum Festbetragsurteil. Er hat entsprechend eine
solidarische Versicherung oder eine gesetzliche Versicherung, wie sie in
Deutschland vorherrsche, mit obligatorischen Beiträgen und gleichen
Leistungen unabhängig vom Beitrag, kein Unternehmen sei und deshalb
nicht dem Wettbewerb ausgesetzt werden darf. Ich glaube aber, dass dieses
Urteil uns nur eine kurze Atempause gibt. Welche Auffassung wird der EuGH
vertreten, wenn die gesetzliche Versicherung durch private Elemente ergänzt
würde. Verschiedene Vorstellungen sind hier im politischen Raum, und
möglicherweise kommt dann der Europäische Gerichtshof zu einer anderen
Auffassung. Und dies ist ein Beispiel dafür, dass die Politik die Prärogative
hat, zu bestimmen, was dem Binnenmarkt überlassen werden soll und was
nicht. Es sind die national verantwortlichen Gesundheitsminister, die sagen
müssen, wie die Balance zwischen Freizügigkeit einerseits und
Qualitätsstandard für den Patienten, den Bürger andererseits herzustellen ist,
auch die Balance zwischen dem Wettbewerb der Anbieter und der
Versorgungssicherheit, sowie die Balance zwischen
Versorgungsverantwortung einerseits und Wahlfreiheit andererseits wie auch
der Nachhaltigkeit der Finanzierung. Vielleicht brauchen wir so etwas wie eine
Gesundheitscharta der Gesundheitsminister für die europäische Ebene,
einen Kompass als Rahmen für die Binnenmarktinitiative, die derzeit in den
unterschiedlichen Bereichen der EU unternommen werden. Gerade die
Diskussion um die Dienstleistungsrichtlinie hat dazu geführt, dass sich die
Gesundheitsminister sehr darüber bewusst werden, dass andere
Kommissionen ihre nationale Gesundheitspolitik mitbestimmen. Ich denke,
insofern sind sie auch inzwischen bereit, eine gemeinsame Haltung zu bilden
zu all den Initiativen, die derzeit zu entscheiden sind, so die gesamte
Fragestellung um die Daseinsvorsorge. Die Gesundheitsminister haben sich
bei der Dienstleistungsrichtlinie schon darauf geeinigt, dass der
Gesundheitsbereich gar nicht zum Anwendungsbereich gehören solle und
dass die Frage der Kostenerstattung für die Inanspruchnahme
grenzüberschreitender Gesundheitsdienstleistungen nicht dort verankert
werden solle, sondern in der 1408, der Verordnung zur Koordinierung der
sozialen Sicherheit. Diese müsse angepasst werden an neue Bedürfnisse,
neue Anforderungen. Die Gesundheitsminister müssen weiter eine Haltung
gewinnen zum Monti-Paket, zur Daseinsvorsorge insgesamt: Nämlich welche
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Spezifikation sie hat und welche Freiräume zur Gestaltung der
Daseinsvorsorge auf nationaler Ebene gesichert werden sollen. Vor allem
müssen sich die Gesundheitsminister auch darüber im klaren werden, auf
welche Weise, mit welchen Instrumenten Rechtssicherheit zu schaffen sein
wird für die Bürger, die die Freizügigkeit zur Nutzung der
grenzüberschreitenden Möglichkeiten in Anspruch nehmen wollen. Insofern
war die Gesamtschau an Rechtsprechung, die wir heute bekommen haben
eine wichtige Grundlage, aus deren Analyse die politischen Entscheidungen
zu treffen sind.
Ich danke Ihnen.
Anne HOUTMAN
DIRECTOR
DG INTERNAL MARKET AND SERVICES
  EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Bonjour à tous. Je voudrais remercier les organisateurs et tout
particulièrement le Professeur Jorens, qui a pu rassembler dans son rapport
une expertise sur un domaine extrêmement complexe qui est la santé et
l’impact de la législation communautaire.
Je me limiterai à rappeler la logique et les principes généraux de l’approche
de la Commission européenne plutôt que de présenter des règles détaillées.
D’abord, il faut remarquer, qu’il n’y a pas en droit communautaire, de droit
secondaire spécifique à l’assurance-maladie. On applique certaines
Directives et en particulier la Directive sur l’assurance non-vie de 1992.
D’autres textes horizontaux s’appliquent également, notamment les
Directives en matière de marchés publics ainsi que les règles en matière de
concurrence, qui couvrent à la fois les règles anti-trust et les règles en matière
d’aides d’Etat.
Dans cette approche, on s’appuie, en réalité, sur le Traité. C’est aussi ce que
fait la Cour de Justice qui a déjà rendu un certain nombre d’arrêts qui
concernent le secteur de l’assurance maladie. Il faut savoir qu’il s’agit surtout
des questions préjudicielles. Il n’y a que de très rares arrêts où la Commission
a apporté des cas d’infraction devant la Cour. 
Alors quelle est la logique du Traité? Le Traité permet une coexistence de
plusieurs objectifs et de valeurs: 
des règles en matière de concurrence, d’anti-trust, qui interdisent les aides
d’Etat et les accords entre entreprises; 
des articles qui concernent spécifiquement le marché intérieur notamment le
principe de la libre prestation des services et le principe de liberté
d’établissement; 
des articles qui fixent des objectifs en matière de santé publique, de cohésion
sociale, de politique sociale;
l’article 16 qui précise que les services d’intérêt général faisant partie du
modèle social européen permettant une meilleure cohésion sociale et
territoriale. 
Le Traité fixe aussi les compétences et des responsabilités partagées entre
le niveau communautaire et celui des Etats membres, pour assurer que les
opérateurs puissent remplir leurs missions de service public dans des
conditions acceptables.
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La question d’aujourd’hui est de trouver en fait un équilibre entre ces
différents objectifs pour l’assurance maladie. L’article du Traité qui permet de
comprendre la philosophie de cette recherche d’équilibre est l’article 86.
L’article 86 dit, d’une part, que les règles du marché intérieur et les règles de
concurrence s’appliquent à toutes les activités économiques, peu importe la
forme juridique (publique ou privé) de l’opérateur. 
Mais cet article porte une nuance qui est très importante quand il s’agit des
missions d’intérêt économique général et des obligations de service public. Il
dit essentiellement que ces règles du marché intérieur et de la concurrence
s’arrêtent de s’appliquer au moment où elles empêcheraient l’opérateur
chargé d’une mission de service public de remplir sa mission dans des
conditions normales. Il faut donc trouver un équilibre entre ces deux groupes
d’objectifs sur base des principes de nécessité et de proportionnalité. Et c’est
là évidemment que se trouve toute la difficulté.
Un autre équilibre difficile à trouver concerne les compétences. Le Traité et la
Cour reconnaissent la compétence des Etats membres pour déterminer le
type de système de santé qu’ils souhaitent. Il appartient également aux Etats
membres de déterminer leurs objectifs en matière de politique de santé.
Toutefois, dans l’exercice de ce droit de choisir le type de système et
d’organisation, ils doivent respecter certaines règles communautaires. C’est
un peu comme si on disait, vous pouvez aller n’importe où dans le monde,
vous pouvez choisir aussi le mode de transport, mais à partir du moment où
vous choisissez de prendre une voiture, vous êtes tenus de respecter le code
de la route.
Les Etats membres décident du choix de leur système, qui ils veulent couvrir
par leur système de sécurité sociale, et des risques qu’ils souhaitent couvrir.
Le droit communautaire intervient pour déterminer, en fonction de ces choix,
quelles sont les règles à appliquer. Pour être plus spécifique, je vais illustrer
ce point par l’application de la Directive sur l’assurance non vie à l’assurance
santé. Tout d’abord, il faut rappeler qu’elle ne s’applique pas aux systèmes
de sécurité sociale obligatoires publics de base. La Cour a indiqué à plusieurs
reprises que la gestion de ce système ne constitue pas une activité
économique. Et il est bien clair que les règles du marché intérieur ne
s’appliquent que là où il y a un marché. Le critère principal pour la Cour pour
déterminer s’il y a un marché ou pas se reflète dans la rencontre entre l’offre,
la demande et un prix qui constitue une rémunération pour un service. Est-ce
qu’il y a vraiment un échange d’un service pour un certain prix? La Cour
considère que les cotisations sociales qui dépendent, en fait, du salaire de
l’individu et qui n’ont aucun rapport avec le risque couvert ne constituent pas
un prix, et on n’est donc pas en face d’un marché. Pour la Cour un tel
système est purement basé sur un système de solidarité; on n’est donc pas
dans une économie de marché.
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Mais, la Directive s’applique à tous les autres systèmes d’assurance
complémentaires et supplémentaires. La Directive s’applique également à
partir du moment où l’Etat décide que son système de sécurité sociale de
base va être géré par des entreprises privées. S’il fait ce choix là, il fait un
choix qui le soumet à la Directive sur l’assurance non-vie.
Toutefois, cette Directive prévoit que, pour un système de sécurité sociale de
base, l’Etat membre peut imposer des obligations et des restrictions au libre
marché pour autant que ces restrictions et obligations sont nécessaires pour
atteindre l’objectif que s’est fixé l’Etat. Par ailleurs, les mesures prises doivent
être proportionnelles par rapport à cet objectif et ne doivent pas aller au-delà
de ce qui est nécessaire pour atteindre cet objectif. Enfin, il faut également
appliquer le principe de transparence. Les restrictions possibles sont
énumérées dans un considérant de la 3ème directive assurance non-vie.
L’Etat peut, par exemple, imposer à l’assureur privé l’absence de restriction
d’adhésion. Il peut imposer aussi la couverture à vie. Il peut imposer une
interdiction de segmentation des risques, par l’imposition d’une tarification
uniforme par type de contrat. Il peut aussi imposer des conditions types de
couverture qui doivent être respectées par les assureurs au nom de l’intérêt
général.
Enfin, les Etats membres peuvent prévoir un système de compensation des
risques entre les opérateurs prenant en charge la couverture de base des
citoyens. La question s’est posée si ce type de système serait aussi accepté
pour les assurances-maladie complémentaires. La position qui a été prise par
la Commission en attendant que la Cour se prononce est que, a priori, pour
les systèmes complémentaires, ces conditions iraient probablement au-delà
de ce qui est nécessaire. Dans le dossier irlandais la Commission s’est bien
rendu compte que la frontière entre le système de base et le système
complémentaire devenait floue et était, en fait, assez difficile à déterminer. La
Commission a accepté dans ce dossier un système de compensation de
risques qui, en réalité, va probablement au-delà de ce qu’on appellerait
strictement l’assurance de base. Le dossier a été attaqué devant la Cour par
un concurrent. 
A mon avis, la Cour, jusqu’à présent, a été d’une énorme sagesse dans ses
arrêts. Je pense que la série d’arrêts qui ont été rendus, aussi bien sur le droit
des patients que sur la notion d’activité économique que sur l’application des
règles en matière de marché public, sont d’un grand équilibre. Ils permettent
aussi d’utiliser les règles du marché intérieur et de la concurrence comme
instruments pour améliorer la qualité et l’efficacité du système de santé
publique, ce qui va, à mon avis, dans le sens recherché par les Etats
membres tout en maintenant leur budget en équilibre.
Je vous remercie.
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SESSION 3
THE NOTION OF 
“SOCIAL SERVICES OF GENERAL INTEREST” 
AS COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE 
INTERNAL MARKET RULES

Bernhard SPIEGEL
HEAD OF UNIT SOCIAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT
FEDERAL MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
 GENERATIONS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
AUSTRIA
Einleitung
Mein Beitrag ist zweigeteilt: Einerseits werde ich über meine Erfahrungen als
Vorsitzender der Freiwilligengruppe des Ausschusses für Sozialschutz (SPC)
für die sozialen Dienstleistungen von allgemeinem Interesse berichten und
andererseits auch auf die österreichischen Überlegungen zu diesen Fragen
näher eingehen. Die nur sehr knapp bemessene Zeit für den Vortrag erlaubt
natürlich keine Detailüberlegungen, sondern nur kurze Hinweise auf die
wesentlichen Themen.
1. Arbeiten der informellen Arbeitsgruppe des SPC
Im Rahmen des SPC wurden die Arbeiten an den Fragen der sozialen
Dienstleistungen von allgemeinem Interesse1) in unmittelbarer Folge des
Grünbuchs über Dienstleistungen von allgemeinem Interesse2) aufgenom-
men. Dazu wurde eine Freiwilligengruppe3) eingesetzt, mit deren Vorsitz ich
betraut wurde. Ziel der Arbeiten dieser Gruppe ist es, dem SPC die in diesen
sehr technischen und oftmals auch sehr formaljuristischen Fragen
erforderliche Unterstützung zu geben. Als erster Schritt wurde ein Bericht an
das SPC erstellt, der zum einen auf die verschiedenen Aspekte der Einflüsse
des EG-Rechts auf die sozialen Dienstleistungen verwies und zum anderen
auch das große Bedürfnis nach mehr Klarheit betonte.
Diese Vorarbeiten wurden im Weißbuch der Kommission insofern
berücksichtigt, als die Sonderstellung der Sozial- und Gesundheitsdienst-
leistungen anerkannt und eine Sondermitteilung über diese Dienstleistungen
für 2005 angekündigt wurde4). Das SPC sowie die „Hochrangige Gruppe für
das Gesundheitswesen und die medizinische Versorgung“ wurden
beauftragt, an der Vorbereitung dieser Sondermitteilung mitzuwirken. Zur
Unterstützung dieser Arbeiten legte die Freiwilligengruppe des SPC den
Mitgliedstaaten einen Fragebogen und ein Hintergrundpapier vor. Der
Fragebogen sollte abklären, welche Elemente für die Definition der
1) Ich wähle bewusst diesen im Einklang mit dem EG-Vertrag stehenden Ausdruck um allfällige Unschärfen
bei der Verwendung des Ausdruckes „Daseinsvorsorge“ zu vermeiden.
2) KOM (2003) 270 endg. vom 21.5.2003.
3) Dieser Gruppe gehörten die folgenden Staaten an: Belgien, Dänemark, Deutschland, Finnland,
Frankreich, Griechenland, Niederlande, Österreich, Portugal, Polen, Spanien und das Vereinigte
Königreich.
4) KOM (2004) 374 endg. vom 12.5.2004 – Abschnitt 4.4.
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wesentlichen Kriterien der sozialen Dienstleistungen von allgemeinem
Interesse herangezogen werden können, welche nationalen Erfahrungen mit
den verschiedenen Aspekten des EG-Rechts bereits gemacht wurden, was
für Bereiche näher vertieft werden könnten und schließlich, welche Strategie
die Union hinsichtlich der sozialen Dienstleistungen von allgemeinem
Interesse weiterverfolgen sollte. Das Hintergrundpapier enthält eine kurze
Zusammenfassung der wesentlichsten Aspekte des EG-Rechts. 
Einen wichtigen Input lieferte auch die Brüsseler Konferenz am 28. und
29.6.20045), deren Schlussfolgerungen bereits den Versuch einer Definition
der wesentlichen Kriterien der sozialen Dienstleistungen auf europäischer
Ebene enthalten.
Die nationalen Antworten aller 25 Mitgliedstaaten, aber auch jene
verschiedenster sonstiger Akteure (insbesondere jene verschiedener NGOs)
liegen nunmehr vor. Ein Studium dieser Berichte gibt einen guten Überblick
über die Position der Mitgliedstaaten zu diesem Thema. Die Kommission
stellte diese Fragebögen-Beantwortungen bei einem Seminar am 1.4.2005 in
Brüssel vor. Bei dieser Gelegenheit hatten auch die Vertreter der NGOs auf
europäischer Ebene die Möglichkeit, sich vor einem größeren Forum zu
äußern.
1.1. Untersuchte Bereiche
Der Fragebogen an die Mitgliedstaaten hatte zum Ziel. einen möglichst
weitreichenden Bereich abzudecken. Als „sozialen Dienste“ konnten
insbesondere die Systeme der sozialen Sicherheit, die Gesundheitssysteme,
die sonstigen Sozialschutzsysteme (z. B. Fürsorge, Pflegedienste, Altenbe-
treuung usw.), soziales Wohnen aber auch die Systeme der
Beschäftigungspolitik und die Bildungssysteme dargestellt werden. Ziel war
auch die Herausarbeitung europäischer Gemeinsamkeiten und der Versuch
einer Definition. Hinsichtlich des EG-Rechts, das Auswirkungen auf diese
sozialen Dienste haben kann, standen die Binnenmarktsvorschriften (Waren-
und Dienstleistungsverkehr), die Wettbewerbsregeln (einschließlich der
Beihilfenvorschriften), die Vergaberegelungen aber auch die Außen-
handelsbeziehungen (z. B. das GATS) zur Diskussion. Die Mitgliedstaaten
hatten große Wahlfreiheiten, welche Punkte jeweils näher behandelt werden
sollten.
5) Konferenz „Soziale Dienste von allgemeinem Interesse in der Europäischen Union – ihre besonderen
Charakteristika, ihre Leistungsfähigkeit und Rahmenbedingungen der Dienstleistungserbringung“.
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1.2. Ergebnisse der Antworten auf den Fragebogen
Die Gesundheitsdienstleistungen waren einer der wichtigsten Punkte der
einzelnen Reaktionen. Die eingereichten Antworten lassen in diesem Bereich
bereits einige Schlüsse zu: Hauptsorge für den Gesundheitsbereich dürfte die
Dienstleistungsrichtlinie sein, und zwar insbesondere das im
Kommissionsentwurf uneingeschränkt vorgesehene Herkunftslandprinzip
aber auch die Regelung betreffend die Patientenmobilität6). Die Grundsätze
des Wettbewerbsrechts dürften im Unterschied dazu keine all zu großen
Schwierigkeiten für die Gesundheitsdienstleistungen bereiten. Unter
Berufung auf die Urteile des EuGH in den Rechtssachen Pucet und Pistre7)
sowie AOK8) sind die meisten Mitgliedstaaten der Auffassung, dass die
Einrichtungen ihrer Gesundheitssysteme keine Unternehmen im Sinne des
EG-Wettbewerbsrechts seien. Daher würden auch die Grundsätze des Art. 81
EG („Kartellverbot“), Art. 82 EG (missbräuchliche Ausnutzung einer
beherrschenden Stellung) und Art. 87 EG (Beihilfenverbot) für die
Gesundheitssysteme keine Probleme bedeuten. 
Man kann sich natürlich die Frage stellen, warum nur diese Priorität der
Dienstleistungsrichtlinie gesehen wird. Zieht man auch die Antworten in den
anderen Bereichen der sozialen Dienste heran, so drängt sich die Vermutung
auf, dass immer jene Bereiche als prioritär eingestuft werden, in denen
gerade die Kommission Initiativen in Richtung einer gemeinschaftlichen
Regelung gesetzt hat9). Aus diesem Blickwinkel verwundert daher nicht, dass
das Wettbewerbsrecht bei den Gesundheitsleistungen derzeit kein Thema ist
(weil diesbezüglich eben derzeit keine Kommmissionsvorschläge auf dem
Tisch liegen).
Auf der anderen Seite haben aber die Fragebogenbeantwortungen ein weites
Feld aufgezeigt, in dem Gesundheitsleistungen durch das EG-Recht
beeinflusst und beeinträchtig werden können. Ein gutes Beispiel ist der
Hinweis eines Mitgliedsstaats auf die Richtlinie 93/104/EG betreffend die
Arbeitszeit, die ja aufgrund des SIMAP-Urteils10) im Spitalsbereich
tiefgehende Auswirkungen haben kann, wenn nämlich die Bereitschafts-
dienstzeiten der Ärzte auf deren Arbeitszeit anzurechnen sind11).
Als Ergebnis der Fragebogenbeantwortungen kann daher gesagt werden,
dass die Mitgliedstaaten sehr wohl die mannigfaltigen Auswirkungen des EG-
6) Art. 23 des Kommissionsentwurfs. Viele Mitgliedstaaten verlangen eine Regelung sämtlicher Aspekte der
Patientenmobilität in der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 1408/71 über die soziale Sicherheit der
Wanderarbeitnehmer.
7) Urteil vom 16.2.1993, Rs C-159/91 und C-160/91.
8) Urteil vom 16.3.2004, Rs C-264/01 u.a..
9) So wurde z. B. bei den sozialen Wohnraummaßnahmen das Schwergewicht auf die Beihilfenproblematik
gelegt, wo ja im Rahmen des „Monti-Pakets“ gerade dieser Bereich ausdrücklich angesprochen wird.
10) Urteil vom 3.10.2000, Rs C-303/98.
11) Dieses Urteil hat somit ganz wesentliche finanzielle Auswirkungen und die Mitgliedstaaten müssen das
gesamte Personalwesen in den Spitälern überdenken.
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Rechts im Gesundheitsbereich erkannt haben. Der angelaufene Prozess ist
somit ein erster Schritt, um voneinander zu lernen, Erfahrungen
auszutauschen und nach guten Vorbildern bei bestimmten Fragestellungen
zu suchen12). Wichtig ist dabei auch, dass die verschiedenen Experten in den
Mitgliedstaaten, aber auch in der Kommission, voneinander lernen. Bisher
war nämlich wenig Verständnis vorhanden, wenn Wettbewerbsexperten mit
Sozial- oder Gesundheitsexperten zusammentrafen. Nunmehr ist aber klar,
dass diese beiden Bereich immer mehr verschränkt sind und daher eine enge
Zusammenarbeit unbedingt notwendig ist.
2. Österreichische Überlegungen zu den Gesundheitsdienstleis-
tungen von allgemeinem Interesse
Nach der Zusammenfassung der bisherigen Arbeiten im SPC sollen auch
noch einige speziell auf die österreichische Situation abgestellte
Überlegungen angefügt werden.
2.1. Position Österreichs
Wegen der starken Ähnlichkeit der österreichischen Krankenkassen zu den
deutschen Kassen ist auch Österreich durch das AOK-Urteil beruhigt
worden. Wir gehen daher in Österreich davon aus, dass unsere
Krankenkassen keine „Unternehmen“ im Sinne des EG-Wettbewerbsrechts
sind13). Allerdings ist die Gewissheit natürlich nicht absolut! Hat doch der
EuGH selbst darauf hingewiesen, dass die Ausnahme vom EG-
Wettbewerbsrecht nur die Festsetzung von Festpreisen für Arzneimittel nach
den deutschen Rechtsvorschriften betraf, dass aber auch die deutschen
Kassen bei anderen Aufgaben möglicherweise als Unternehmen anzusehen
sind. Es bleibt also die bange Frage, ob und allenfalls in welchen anderen
Bereichen die österreichischen Kassen als Unternehmen anzusehen sind.
Natürlich wird oft darauf hingewiesen, dass selbst bei Klassifizierung einer
Krankenkasse als Unternehmen das EG-Wettbewerbsrecht nicht
uneingeschränkt zur Anwendung gelangen muss. Nach Art. 86 Abs. 2 des
EG-Vertrags ist nämlich ein Schutz dieser Dienstleistungen zur Erfüllung der
übertragenen Aufgaben von allgemeinem Interesse vorgesehen. Allerdings
befindet man sich bei Anwendung dieser Regelung bereits auf der
Rechtfertigungsebene. Aus der Sicht eines Mitgliedstaates ist es also viel
sicherer, wenn die Einrichtungen der Gesundheitsdienste gar keine
Unternehmen im Sinne des EG-Wettbewerbsrechts sind, als wenn im
12) Ohne es so zu benennen, hat somit hinsichtlich der sozialen Dienstleistungen bereits eine „Methode der
offenen Koordinierung“ begonnen.
13) Als wesentliches Unterscheidungskriterium ist bei den österreichischen Krankenkassen noch darauf
hinzuweisen, dass in Österreich – anders als in Deutschland – keine freie Kassenwahl besteht, sondern
dass durch eine nahezu absolut wirkende Pflichtversicherung die versicherten Personen jeweils einer
Kasse gesetzlich zugeordnet werden. Damit liegen in Österreich wohl noch mehr Elemente, die gegen
eine Qualifikation als „Unternehmen“ sprechen, vor als in Deutschland.
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Einzelfall versucht werden muss, Beschränkungen des Wettbewerbs nach
Art. 86 Abs. 2 zu rechtfertigen.
Um die Gefahren deutlicher zu machen ist zunächst davon auszugehen, dass
gerade der Gesundheitsbereich kein einheitlicher Markt ist, sondern dass
viele verschiedene Märkte nebeneinander bestehen (z. B. Allgemeinmedizin,
Zahnmedizin, Krankentransport usw.). Daher ist auch ein Querausgleich der
Risiken in einem Marktsegment durch die Vorteile eines anderen Marktes nur
sehr eingeschränkt möglich14). Vor allem wird es dann bedenklich, wenn ein
solches Unternehmen nicht (mehr) in der Lage ist, die an sich durch den Staat
übertragenen Maßnahmen zufriedenstellend zu erfüllen15). Wenn wir ein
Beispiel herausgreifen wollen, könnten wir die Regelungen im Bereich der
Zahnmedizin wählen. Viele Mitgliedstaaten führen gerade in diesem Bereich
mehr oder weniger strenge Sparmaßnahmen verbunden mit
Leistungsreduktionen ein. Wenn die gesetzliche Krankenversicherung ein
Unternehmen ist, wird dann nicht möglicherweise irgendwann der Rubicon
überschritten, ab dem Privatversicherungen viel effektivere Behandlungen
anbieten können und das System der Pflichtversicherung das Monopol der
gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung missbraucht? Wegen der getrennten
Märkte ist es schwer zu argumentieren, dass ein Ausgleich zwischen allen
Risikobereichen der Krankenversicherung erforderlich ist.
Daher ist aus meiner Sicht auch zur Garantie der einheitlichen Regelung aller
verschiedenen Risiken (Solidarprinzip), die von den Gesundheitssystemen
der Mitgliedstaaten üblicherweise abgedeckt werden, ganz wichtig, dass die
Einrichtungen der österreichischen Krankenversicherung nicht als
„Unternehmen“ im Sinne des EG-Wettbewerbsrechts betrachtet werden.
Anderenfalls sehe ich persönlich die Gefahr, dass die Marktmechanismen
das Gesundheitssystem auf ein System der Mindestversorgung (Notfälle,
Großrisiko) beschränken und die anderen (lukrativen) Bereiche der
Privatwirtschaft überlassen werden. Sozial- und gesundheitspolitisch kann
eine solche Entwicklung wohl von keinem Mitgliedstaat begrüßt werden.
2.2. Österreichische Erfahrungen mit dem EG-Recht
Nach diesen eher allgemeinen Überlegungen möchte ich auf die konkreten
Erfahrungen eingehen, die Österreich bereits mit dem Spannungsverhältnis
zwischen den politischen Anforderungen an das Gesundheitssystem und
dem EG-Recht gemacht hat:
- Vergabewesen: In Österreich wurde beschlossen, die moderne nationale
Krankenversicherungskarte nicht direkt durch die Sozialversicherung
produzieren zu lassen, sondern durch privatwirtschaftliche Unternehmen.
14) Hinsichtlich der getrennten Märkte des Krankentransports und des Notfallstransports siehe z. B. EuGH in
seinem Urteil vom 25.10.2001, Rs C-475/99, Ambulanz Glöckner.
15) Hinsichtlich der Unfähigkeit des Arbeitsvermittlungsmonopols zur Vermittlung von Spitzenarbeitskräften
und der sich daraus ergebenden EG-Widrigkeit des Monopols siehe EuGH, Urteil vom 23.4.1991, Rs C-
41/90, Höfner und Elser.
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Die Betrauung eines Unternehmens erfolgte zwar im Wege eine
Vergabeverfahrens; die komplexen Verfahrensschritte aber auch die sich
in der Folge ändernden politischen Vorgaben16) führten dazu, dass bereits
zwei Verfahren hinsichtlich des EG-Vergaberechts beim EuGH anhängig
wurden17). Diese Verfahren weisen auf die Probleme hin, die die
öffentliche Hand haben kann, wenn Beschaffungsvorgänge
ausgeschrieben werden müssen (z. B. Bestbieter muss nicht unbedingt
der wirtschaftlich leistungsfähigste sein, mangelnde Flexibilität bei sich
ändernden politischen Zielvorgaben).
Aber noch ein weiteres österreichisches Vergabeverfahren soll erwähnt
werden. In der Rechtssache Tögl18) entschied der EuGH, dass auch für die
Verträge einer Krankenkasse mit Krankentransportunternehmen des EG-
Vergaberecht anzuwenden ist. Nach meiner Kenntnis war es das erste
Urteil des EuGH, das dies für den Gesundheitsbereich dermaßen klar zum
Ausdruck brachte.
- Hinsichtlich der Dienstleistungsfreiheit hat der EuGH in der Rechtssache
Gräbner19) entschieden, dass das österreichische Verbot der Tätigkeit als
Heilpraktiker durch Personen, die nicht Inhaber eines Arztdiploms sind,
nicht den EG-Grundfreiheiten widerspricht. Aus meiner Sicht handelt es
sich bei diesem Urteil um einen ganz wichtigen Grundsatz, der auch durch
die geplante Dienstleistungsrichtlinie nicht in Frage gestellt werden darf.
- Im Urteil in der Rechtssache Jauch20) wurde entschieden, dass das
österreichische Pflegegeld eine nach der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 1408/71
zu exportierende Geldleistung bei Krankheit sei. Dabei handelt es sich
somit nicht um den Kernbereich der untersuchten Bereiche des EG-
Rechts. Allerdings hatte dieses Urteil, das in manchen Fällen zu
ungewollten Kumulationen von Pflegesach- und Pflegegeldleistungen
führte, dennoch die nationale österreichische Systematik des
Pflegegeldes in Frage gestellt. Somit kann auch das EG-Recht betreffend
den freien Personenverkehr unmittelbare und tiefgehende Auswirkungen
auf das nationale System der sozialen Dienstleistungen von allgemeinem
Interesse (wie auf das österreichischen Pflegegeldsystem) haben.
- Diese potentiell weitreichenden Auswirkungen des EG-Rechts auf das
nationale Gesundheitssystem beziehen sich nach den österreichischen
Erfahrungen auch noch auf einen anderen Bereich. Durch das Urteil des
EuGH in der Rechtssache Unterpertinger21) wurde entschieden, dass
16) So wurde erst in der Folge verlangt, dass die Krankenversicherungskarte (e-card) nicht nur zur
Dokumentation der Anspruchsnachweise, sondern auch als Bürgerkarte zum Einsatz kommen sollte.
17) Urteil vom 18.3.2004, Rs C-314/01, Siemens AG Österreich, und Rs C-229/02, Debis, noch nicht
entschieden.
18) Urteil vom 24.9.1998, Rs C-76/97.
19) Urteil vom 11.7.2002, Rs C-294/00.
20) Urteil vom 8.3.2001, Rs C-215/99.
21) Urteil vom 20.11.2003, Rs C-212/01.
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ärztliche Untersuchungen z. B. zur Feststellung der Invalidität im Rahmen
eines Pensionsverfahrens nicht unter die Steuerbefreiung nach der
sechsten Mehrwertsteuer-Richtlinie 77/388/EWG fallen. Auch eine solche
Steuerpflicht der ärztlichen Berufe kann zu großen finanziellen
Rückwirkungen auf die Gesundheitssysteme führen und damit die
Funktion als Dienstleistung von allgemeinem Interesse beeinflussen.
- Ein weiterer Bereich, in dem das österreichische Gesundheitssystem
bereits mit dem EG-Recht Erfahrungen sammeln musste, ist die
Verschreibung von Arzneimitteln durch die Krankenversicherung.
Österreich war der erste Mitgliedstaat, bei dem festgestellt wurde, dass er
die Transparenzrichtlinie 89/105/EWG nicht korrekt umgesetzt hat22).
Dabei wurde erstmals entschieden, was unter einer „Positivliste“ im Sinne
dieser Richtlinie zu verstehen ist. In der Folge mussten die
österreichischen Verfahren zur Verschreibung von Arzneimitteln durch die
Krankenversicherung zur Gänze überarbeitet werden, was bei dem großen
wirtschaftlichen Interesse der Pharmaindustrie nicht gerade leicht war.
2.3. Fragen aus österreichischer Sicht
Gerade aus dem Blickwinkel des österreichischen Gesundheitssystems sind
aber noch immer wesentliche Fragen der (möglichen) Auswirkungen des EG-
Rechts auf Dienstleistungen von allgemeinem Interesse ungeklärt.
So wurde in letzter Zeit möglicherweise zu viel Gewicht auf die
Dienstleistungsfreiheit gelegt; der freie Warenverkehr wurde sträflich
vernachlässigt. Dabei ist gerade der „Einkauf“ von Leistungen durch die
Gesundheitssysteme ein Bereich, in dem noch viel umgewälzt werden
könnte. Sicherlich ein wichtiges Urteil in diesem Zusammenhang ist die
Entscheidung in der Rechtssache FENIN23). Darin hat der EuGH ja ganz klar
entschieden, dass nationale Gesundheitssysteme nicht als „Unternehmen“
gelten (Solidarprinzip) und daher diese Eigenschaft auch fortwirkt, wenn zur
Erfüllung dieser Aufgaben Waren eingekauft werden24). Auf der anderen Seite
hat der EuGH in einer Entscheidung Kommission gegen Belgien25) aber
entschieden, dass Belgien dadurch gegen den freien Warenverkehr
verstoßen hat, in dem für die Kostenerstattung der Krankenversicherung für
bestimmte Heilbehelfe und Hilfsmittel (z. B. Rollstühle) zusätzliche
Voraussetzungen vorgesehen wurden (Kriterien z. B. hinsichtlich der
Radgröße bei Rollstühlen). Wie passt das zusammen? Immerhin werden ja
22) Urteil vom 27.11.2001, Rs C-424/99, Kommission gegen Österreich. Hinsichtlich der in dieser
Rechtssache noch nicht entschiedenen Fragen ist bereits ein weiteres Verfahren gerichtsanhängig (Rs C-
54/03, Austroplant, das allerdings noch nicht entschieden ist). 
23) Urteil vom 4.3.2003, Rs T-319/99.
24) Kein Missbrauch einer beherrschenden Stellung, wenn die Schulden gegenüber den Mitgliedern des
Systems viel später als gegenüber anderen Wirtschaftsteilnehmern gezahlt werden.
25) Urteil vom 13.1.2005, Rs C-38/03.
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auch die Rollstühle eingekauft um sie dann - außerhalb einer wirtschaftlichen
Tätigkeit – den Leistungsberechtigten der sozialen Sicherheit zuzuführen
(nach FENIN müsste doch auch dieser Einkauf damit seine wirtschaftliche
Bedeutung verlieren). Ich gehe davon aus, dass die meisten Mitgliedstaaten
solche Zusatzkriterien vorsehen, wenn die Erstattungsfähigkeit durch die
Sozialversicherung festgelegt wird.
Mir ist schon bewusst, dass das FENIN-Urteil zum Wettbewerbsrecht, das
Urteil gegen Belgien zu den Binnenmarktvorschriften ergangen ist. Aus
diesen beiden Urteilen wird aber das Dilemma sämtlicher sozialen Dienste im
Spannungsfeld mit dem EG-Recht deutlich. Einem politischen
Entscheidungsträger kann man diese Unterschiede nicht mehr erklären.
Dadurch ist bei der politischen Diskussion der sozialen Dienstleistungen von
allgemeinem Interesse zwar immer eine latente Angst vor den möglichen
Einflüssen des EG-Rechts vorhanden; eine Bekämpfung dieser Ängste durch
allgemeinverständliche Informationen ist aber nahezu ausgeschlossen.
Als Erklärungsversuch dieses scheinbar völlig unerklärlichen Nebeneinanders
verschiedenere Urteile könnte man das Heil im Freskot-Urteil26) suchen, das
eigentlich viele erhellende Aussagen enthält. Das untersuchte griechische
Pflichtversicherungssystem entfaltet keine wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit (damit ist
automatisch auch das gesamte EG-Wettbewerbsrecht nicht anwendbar, da
die Einrichtungen nicht als „Unternehmen“ zu betrachten sind). Auch handelt
es sich bei der Versicherung um keine Dienstleistung nach Art. 49 EG.
Allerdings könnten durch die Pflichtversicherung Dienstleistungserbringer
(Versicherungsunternehmen) aus anderen Mitgliedstaaten an der Ausübung
ihrer Dienstleistungsfreiheit behindert werden. Da können dann die
sozialpolitischen Zielvorgaben als Rechtfertigungsgrund herangezogen
werden. Aus diesem Blickwinkel könnte (wohlgemerkt: für die Gruppe der
eingeschworenen Experten) dieser aus erster Sicht zwischen dem FENIN-
und dem Belgien-Urteil vermutetet Widerspruch beseitigt werden. Deutlich
wird hier aber jedenfalls, dass in der politisch hochbrisanten Frage, wie ein
Gesundheitssystem EG-konform gemacht werden muss und wann die
Grundsätze des EG-Rechts bereits verletzt sind, selbst Experten Probleme
haben, sich zurechtzufinden. Mehr Rechtsklarheit - aus meiner Sicht selbst
wenn das gemeinschaftsrechtliche Regelungen erfordert - ist daher
unbedingt notwendig.
Eine konsequente Weiterverfolgung des Freskot-Urteils könnte aus meiner
Sicht auch etwas Licht in das Dunkel bringen, das sich nach den Kohll- &
Decker-Urteilen über die Mitgliedstaaten gebreitet hat. Wäre es nicht viel
leichter verständlich, wenn der EuGH gesagt hätte, die nationalen
Krankenversicherungssysteme selbst sind keine wirtschaftlichen
Dienstleistungen; allerdings wird die Inanspruchnahme von Dienstleistungs-
26) Urteil vom 22.5.2003, Rs C-355/00.
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erbringern in anderen Mitgliedstaaten behindert, wenn dafür keine
Kostenerstattung geleistet wird. Dann wären nämlich die derzeit noch
gerichtsanhängigen Fragen, ob reine Volksgesundheitssysteme wie das
britische NHS auch von Kohll & Decker betroffen sind27), bereits geklärt. Aber
leider hat der EuGH bei dieser Frage der Patientenmobilität für die
Gesundheitssysteme keine Klarheit geschaffen, so dass wir auf weitere
Urteile angewiesen sind.
2.4. Patientenmobilität aus österreichischer Sicht
Die vorangehenden Überlegungen leiten über zur Frage, welche Haltung
Österreich überhaupt zur Patientenmobilität (Kohll- & Decker-Prinzip)
einnimmt. Gerade dabei handelt es sich nämlich um einen wesentlichen
Aspekt der Gesundheitsleistungen in ihrer Rolle als Dienstleistungen von
allgemeinem Interesse. Nach der österreichischen Rechtslage können
Versicherte, die nicht die Vertragseinrichtungen der Krankenkassen
aufsuchen, immer und ohne vorherige Genehmigung eine Kostenerstattung
nach österreichischem Recht beantragen. In der Folge werden die für die
Behandlung durch einen vergleichbaren Vertragspartner der zuständigen
österreichischen Krankenkasse vereinbarten Tarife erstattet, wobei allerdings
z. B. bei Behandlung durch einen Nichtvertragsarzt 20% des Tarifs aufgrund
der höheren Verwaltungskosten der Kasse abgezogen werden. Diese
Rechtslage hat Österreich immer schon bei Behandlung durch
österreichische Nichtvertragseinrichtungen aber auch weltweit für die
Behandlung durch ausländische Leistungserbringer angewendet. Daher ist
Österreich der Auffassung, dass wir bisher keine Umsetzungsprobleme bei
der Kohll & Decker-Judikatur haben.
Umso schmerzlicher ist, dass in der nunmehr vorliegenden Studie der
Universität Gent diese österreichische Rechtslage wegen der 20%-igen
Reduktion ebenfalls als Behinderung der Dienstleistungsfreiheit
gebrandmarkt wird28). Sollte diese Frage tatsächlich einmal vor dem EuGH
landen, könnte das ein spannendes Verfahren werden. Wie bereits gesagt,
handelt es sich bei dieser 20%-igen Reduktion nämlich um die erhöhten
Kosten, die bei der Inanspruchnahme von Nichtvertragspartnern automatisch
erwachsen. Nicht vergessen darf dabei werden, dass diese Reduktion auch
bei der Inanspruchnahme österreichischer Nichtvertragspartner eintritt.
Außerdem wurde auch der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof bereits
mit dieser Frage befasst. Er kam zum Schluss, dass die Reduktion sachlich
wegen der erwiesenermaßen (!) höheren Bearbeitungszeiten gerechtfertigt
sind und damit keine Beeinträchtigung des Grundsatzes der freien Arztwahl
27) Rs C-372/04, Watts, noch nicht entschieden.
28) Siehe Fußnote 142 des Berichts.
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vorliegt29). Könnte der EuGH dann überhaupt zu einem anderen Schluss
kommen? – Wir sind davon überzeugt, dass das nicht der Fall sein kann!
Allerdings blieb Österreich bisher durch die Patientenmobilität nicht völlig
unberührt. Das EG-Recht kann nämlich auch durch ausländische Systeme
bewusst in Anspruch genommen werden. So ist es denkbar, dass sich ein
Mitgliedstaat entscheidet, bei bestimmten sehr teuren Behandlungen30) nicht
selbst die erforderliche medizinische Infrastruktur aufzubauen, sondern seine
Versicherten gezielt mit einem E 112 in jene Mitgliedstaaten zu schicken, die
bereits diese Leistungen für ihre Versicherten anbieten. Das kann
wirtschaftlich gesehen durchaus rentabel sein. Für die solchermaßen
„überschwemmten“ Mitgliedstaaten können sich echte Probleme ergeben.
Im Extremfall können sich nämlich dann für die eigenen Versicherten
Wartelisten aufbauen, was sozialpolitisch ganz schlimm wäre („Europa
verschlechtert den Zugang der Inländer zu den Gesundheitsleistungen!“). 
Aber besteht eine rechtliche Möglichkeit, gegen eine solche Entwicklung
Maßnahmen zu ergreifen? Immerhin besteht ja auch die Verpflichtung, die
Dienstleistungsempfänger nicht zu diskriminieren. Natürlich kann der
betroffene Mitgliedstaat immer als letzte Notbremse Gründe der öffentlichen
Gesundheit als Rechtfertigung einer Diskriminierung ins Spiel bringen31). Ob
damit aber generell die Hintanreihung der ausländischen Patienten erlaubt ist,
kann angezweifelt werden. Bei den bestehenden Engpässen in manchen
nationalen Gesundheitssystemen und den unterschiedlichen Entwicklungs-
stufen in den verschiedenen Mitgliedstaaten könnten sich aus dieser
Rechtslage durchaus noch für einige Mitgliedstaaten erhebliche Probleme
ergeben, die einer Lösung auf europäischer Ebene bedürfen. Diese Fragen
wurden z. B. im Rahmen der laufenden Arbeiten an der Dienstleistungs-
richtlinie bisher überhaupt noch nie näher behandelt. Bei dieser Richtlinie
stehen nämlich bisher ausschließlich die Leistungserbringer als
„behandlungswillige“ Dienstleistungserbringer, die Patienten oder die
Sozialversicherungssysteme der Staaten, in denen die Krankenversicherung
besteht, im Mittelpunkt der Überlegungen. Natürlich macht es Sinn, über
solche Centres of reference oder Centres of excellence nachzudenken. Das
sollte aber auf europäischer Ebene geschehen, wobei sämtliche Aspekte wie
z. B. Planung, Forschung oder Finanzierung offen angesprochen werden
können. Von einer solchen europäischen Lösung sind wir aber noch weit
entfernt.
29) VfGH, Urteil vom 18.3.2000, G 24/98, V 38/98.
30) Z. B. Organtransplantationen, die nur bei einem hohen technischen, wissenschaftlichen aber auch
Erfahrungsstandard durchgeführt werden können.
31) Mögliche Beschränkungen des freien Dienstleistungsverkehrs nach Art. 55 iVm Art. 46 EG.
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Zusammenfassung
Die Gesundheitssysteme der Mitgliedstaaten sind derzeit auch auf
europäischer Ebene wohl einer der am heftigsten diskutierten Bereiche.
Dabei muss immer im Vordergrund stehen, dass jede Änderung die Funktion
dieser Systeme als Dienstleistungen von allgemeinem Interesse empfindlich
stören kann. Deswegen muss auf europäischer Ebene gerade bei den
Gesundheitsdienstleistungen mit großer Vorsicht vorgegangen werden.
Allerdings darf man nicht versuchen, sich vor jeglicher Diskussion auf
europäischer Ebene gänzlich zu verschließen. Es darf nämlich nie vergessen
werden, dass bereits derzeit viele Grundsätze des EG-Vertrages automatisch
auch für die Gesundheitssystem gelten. Daher wäre aus meiner Sicht eine
offensive Strategie in Europa der beste Weg um den notwendigen Stellenwert
der Gesundheitssysteme als Dienstleistungen von allgemeinem Interesse
abzusichern, sei es auch durch gemeinschaftsrechtliche Maßnahmen. Ein
„Tot Stellen“ indem nur z. B. eine Herausnahme der Gesundheitssysteme aus
der Dienstleistungsrichtlinie gefordert wird, ist jedenfalls zu wenig. Auch darf
die Stellung der Gesundheitssysteme in den anderen Bereichen des EG-
Rechts (z. B. Wettbewerbsrecht) nicht vergessen werden. Ein Nachdenken
über gemeinschaftsrechtliche Maßnahmen (z. B. im Rahmen des Art. 86 Abs.
3 EG) darf daher nicht tabuisiert werden. Die nächsten Jahre werden zeigen,
wie erfolgreich unsere Bemühungen zur Aufrechterhaltung des Standards
unserer Gesundheitssysteme waren.
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Jonathan MOGFORD
HEAD OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
  UNITED KINGDOM
Thank you for your invitation to speak this afternoon: can I also thank AIM for
an extremely well prepared conference with some very thought-provoking
literature which I think will really help take this debate forward. 
I will speak mainly from the perspective of the UK NHS, which is a tax-funded,
system integrating the financing, commissioning and provision of health
services. However, within that legally integrated environment, substantial
reforms are taking place, particularly about increasing the role of the
independent sector and devolving responsibility to the front line. some will
recognise the challenge of asking the UK for a view on possible secondary
legislation when we continue to argue - notably in the Watts case - that tax-
funded systems like the NHS are not subject to the Treaty.
As far as Europe is concerned, we have very substantial support to patient
mobility. I am responsible for an annual budget of nearly eighty million Euros,
which supports healthcare for UK citzens moving around Europe. 
As other people have already indicated, there are some very real tensions
within the Treaty between the health interests and the single market interests.
Slightly simplistically summarised, on the one hand Member States are
saying that it is important that they are responsible for the management and
organisation of their health systems and on the other hand the European
institutions are saying that this is true for as long as it is compatible with the
single market. We are still working out what that means. 
So, do we think that the social services of general interests are somehow a
counterweight to the internal market? This is certainly  worth exploring in
more detail. Certainly the UK does not underestimate how big a political issue
this question actually is in terms of the implications that lie behind it. 
The concept of social services of general interest is perhaps best seen as one
of a range of options on how to find the balance between the health interests
and the single market interests. But there still seems to be a considerable
amount of uncertainty about the difference is between the different concepts
of services of general economic interest, services of general interest and
social services of general interest. This needs to be further explored. We do
need to look very carefully at what are the implications of going down this
route. 
Another option might be to accept that there will be an element of ad hoc
development in this area, asking ourselves the question how big a problem
this is. Some might think, however, that the questions raised by the Services
250 Bulletin luxembourgeois des questions sociales
Directive are perhaps  indicating that time is running out on this particular
option.
A number of speakers have also mentioned revising Regulation 1408. I think
this highlights one of my main points, which is that we need to be careful
about what is the problem that we are trying to solve here. Is it a problem
about patient mobility? Is it a problem about health and the single market? Or
is it a much wider problem about economic and social aspects of health-
care? The answer to that question probably defines which sort of options you
are actually looking at: co-operation, guidelines, legislation. 
Underlying all of this, is the need for a more sophisticated dialogue between
the economic and social sectors. 
To sum up, this is a debate that is only just starting. I think today's conference
will be a very useful step forward in building a better understanding of the
problem and the real implications of some of the options available to us. What
is certain is that there are some very real tensions between the economic and
the social objectives in this area and that Member States are concerned to
discharge their responsibilities for managing and organising health systems.
In that context, the prospect of a Commission's Communication on Social
Services of General Interest is welcome. It can build on the outcomes of
events like this one. It can help focus discussions during the forthcoming UK
presidency. 
Thank you very much.
Kari VÄLIMÄKI
GENERAL DIRECTOR
MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND HEALTH
FINLAND
I would like to thank the organisers for organising this conference. There was
really a big need to discuss these very complicated issues. However I try to
be very brief and simplify these questions because I think Mr Mogford made
a really good question - what is the problem we are solving?
I do not think that it is very easy to answer this question.  But I would like to
say that one of the key problems is the fact that we have been trying to bal-
ance the two approaches – on the one hand we try to create internal markets
and on the other we have addressed the principle of subsidiarity in social pro-
tection.   
I think it is absolutely necessary to have more functioning markets in the Eu-
ropean Union in order to meet, for example the goals which we have with the
employment. And that is why we also need free markets for the services and
we welcome the Directive on Services. However, the problem is that it is quite
difficult - I would say  - almost impossible to claim that social and health serv-
ices would be fully independent from the free markets.
Health and social services include always economic aspects.  Moreover, the
four freedoms the EU stresses have to be taken into account also in organis-
ing of social and health services at the national level.  In practice these two
facts mean that we have already gone over the border that separates purely
national health and social services and other services of economic interest. 
Another problem is that the EU stresses competition and free markets.  In so-
cial protection we stress solidarity and human rights and hence social protec-
tion has been mainly organised by the State and not by free markets.  It is very
challenging to combine these two approaches in the handlings of the Direc-
tive of Services.
As to the Finnish case I would like to say that the municipalities are responsi-
ble for providing social and welfare services.  If they produce these services
by themselves like in the most cases they do, we do not have any problems
with the internal market rules. But if they want to purchase these services
from the private or third sector, we are at once dealing with the market prin-
ciples. And then we have to take into account the competition rules.
The Draft Directive of Services concerns the situations where the municipali-
ties are buying these services from the private sector or from the NGOs.  The
main idea of the draft Directive is that we guarantee for the foreign enterprises
the same opportunities and rights to enter Finland and offer these services to
the municipalities.  The idea of the draft directive is absolutely OK for us. Al-
252 Bulletin luxembourgeois des questions sociales
ready today it is possible for the foreign companies to offer health and social
services.  We welcome foreign companies. The only thing, we expect them to
follow, are Finnish rules in social and health sector that are equal for both do-
mestic and foreign companies. 
Health and social services are naturally in the interest of the public.  However,
until today Finland and most of the other European Member States have been
able to live without defining the concept of services of general interest. It is
very difficult to define whether the services are of general interest or just serv-
ices of general economic interest.   For example when we speak about child
protection, in my opinion we could think that it is a kind of service of general
interest.  In Finnish case, it is possible to produce these child protection serv-
ices in the private sector or in the public sector.   So despite of the fact that
we could regard child protection as a service of general interest, we have to
apply the competition rules in child protection when the municipalities buy
these services from the private sector.  Thus health and social services can-
not be automatically regarded as services of general interest in order to be
able avoid the application of internal market and competition rules.  The ap-
plication of the competition rules depends on how the production of these
services is organised.
Competition rules have caused some problems for the Finnish municipalities
but these problems have nothing to do with the Draft Services Directive or the
services of general interest. And that is why we are a little bit worried about
the approach where we say that health services and social welfare services
should be fully excluded from the Services Directive. As I mentioned before
we have not needed the concept of service of general interest at all.  That is
why we think that at this stage, it would be wise to put all the efforts to amend
the draft Directive on Services.  The major amendment should concern the
application of the country of origin principle. If the Services Directive would
cover social welfare and health services but the country of origin principle
would not be applied to these services, we would not meet major problems
with the directive.  Naturally there are some other smaller problems with the
definitions because at the European Union level we do not have the concept
of social services.  
We hope that we could first solve the problems concerning the Draft Directive
on Services and then come back to question do we need at all the concept
of services of general interest. 
Jérôme VIGNON
DIRECTOR
DG EMPLOYMENT, SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES
   EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Je vais m’en tenir au thème de cet après-midi: la notion de services sociaux
d’intérêt général comme contrepoids du marché intérieur. Je m’exprimerai
donc en relation étroite avec le rapport du Prof. Jorens puisque ça vient de
son rapport. J’aimerais dire qu’il offre un concept global qui, pour l’avenir et
les difficultés abordées ce matin, apporte beaucoup, mais que la
Commission ne pourra pas complètement partager et je dirai en quoi. 
Néanmoins, en utilisant ce concept - et en particulier la référence très
précieuse à l’article 86.2 par lequel les services d’intérêt général économique
rentrent de plein droit dans la vie communautaire - il rejoint les besoins de
clarification auxquels veut répondre la Communication prochaine sur les
services sociaux et de santé d’intérêt général. A travers le concept global de
contrepoids entre l’intérêt général et le marché intérieur, mise en évidence
par le Prof. Jorens, ouvre en germe une perspective structurante qui englobe
les thèmes dont nous nous sommes saisis dans les sessions précédentes. En
effet, cette notion de contrepoids est une autre manière de parler de
conciliation entre, d’une part, la liberté d’accès aux soins - fondamentale
dimension du Traité - et, d’autre part, l’universalité de cet accès -
fondamentale responsabilité nationale encore soulignée par l’article 52. Il y a
donc là une tension et parler de contrepoids, c’est recourir de manière large
à une perspective de réconciliation.
Le rapport du Prof. Jorens montre la nécessité de ce contrepoids. Certains
se disent, mais est-ce qu’il y a un problème? Oui, il y a un problème et M.
Jorens le montre, dans la mesure où les services de santé, de soins,
d’assurance-maladie se rattachent clairement à des services d’intérêt
général sociaux, donc à une responsabilité directe des Etats et où, en même
temps, ils sont de plus en plus considérés comme services économiques,
même si, bien entendu, il y a des exceptions comme le cas britannique. Il est
donc clair que la réconciliation de ce double aspect pose question. 
Le rapport prône aussi une perspective, une forme de réponse, même encore
que très générale. La nature de ce contrepoids réside dans l’article 86.2 dans
la mesure où justement cet article est capable, dans son principe, de définir
les conditions de cette reconnaissance sur la base d’un des principes les plus
démocratiques, celui de la proportionnalité. Le Prof. Jorens nous dit qu’il faut
habiter, installer en quelque sorte les meubles de la santé, des services de
santé dans la perspective où, étant économiques (ce qu’ils ne sont pas
toujours), ils appartiennent au grand monde de la Communauté, de la libre
circulation, du marché intérieur, de l’ouverture des marchés économiques. 
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La Commission se reconnaît, dans cette approche, ne serait-ce parce
qu’avec le concours de la plate-forme sociale, des Etats membres, des
partenaires sociaux, elle a mis sur les fonts baptismaux cette notion de
services sociaux d’intérêt général. Elle est apparue pour la première fois dans
le Livre Blanc de mai 2004, qui est un point d’orgue dans une attitude
nouvelle proactive et co-responsable de la part de la Commission
européenne face à ces services économiques d’intérêt général particuliers
que peuvent être les services sociaux. Aujourd’hui, grâce au Comité de
protection sociale, au questionnaire qu’a évoqué M. Spiegel, aux réactions
très intenses de la plate-forme sociale, des partenaires sociaux, du forum de
la santé, nous avons énormément avancés dans la perspective d’un langage
commun sur, à la fois, ce qu’il y a de spécifiquement commun au-delà des
diversités nationales à ces services sociaux et de santé d’intérêt général,
mais en même temps sur l’identification de ce qui doit être clarifié, de ce qui
est obscur ou incertain pour les opérateurs et les Etats membres dans la
rencontre inévitable entre cette spécificité et le grand bain du marché
intérieur. 
Mais pourtant, la Commission ne peut pas tout suivre. La notion de
contrepoids risque, en effet, d’être défensive dans une vue dynamique. Il y a
même lieu de s’en distancier dans la mesure où contrepoids peut suggérer
une sorte d’antagonisme entre le marché intérieur qui serait
systématiquement dissolvant, négateur de l’intérêt général et la
responsabilité des Etats et des acteurs de veiller eux à cet intérêt général
qu’ils devraient seuls préserver.
Notre perspective n’est pas manichéiste. La perspective de tous les services
de santé, de soins de longue durée, d’assurance-maladie complémentaire ne
peut être uniquement enfermé dans une conservation en l’état. Elle est aussi
celle de leur développement. Or, ce développement passe aujourd’hui par
une diversification des acteurs, par de nouvelles sources de financement, par
de nouvelles garanties de qualité et donc aussi par une perspective d’entrée
proactive dans la dynamique européenne, celle des échanges qui - d’ores et
déjà d’ailleurs - pour ce qui est des soins de santé est organisés par les États
membres. 
Dans le but même d’éviter la polarisation, une médecine à deux vitesses, il
faut entrer dans cette modernisation, dans cette diversification qui est, en
même temps, une entrée dans l’Europe. Il n’y a pas de contradiction entre la
perspective du marché intérieur et celle du développement futur des services
de santé.
Les questions à traiter pour le futur ne sont pas seulement de maintenir des
droits exclusifs, mais aussi de se placer dans une évolution qui se dessine la
capacité régulatrice du marché intérieur. Comment les services de santé
actuels, en particulier ceux qui se réclament de statuts spécifiques -
notamment associatifs, mutualistes - vont-ils participer au futur
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développement dans les champs proprement économiques des services
d’intérêt sociaux général? Comment les marchés régulés, les partenariats
publics-privés, la fonction régulatrice des nouveaux Etats providence
resteront-ils compatibles avec les principes fondamentaux du Traité? C’est à
cela qu’il faut que nous répondions. Nous ne devons pas rentrer à reculons
dans la perspective du marché intérieur, mais nous pouvons adosser sur la
proportionnalité de l’article 86.2, dans une perspective créatrice,
respectueuse d’une diversité et promotrice d’un développement
indispensable.
Cette perspective dynamique me conduit, en revanche, à souligner la
convergence entre, d’une part, les questions à clarifier, qui seront l’objet de
la Communication et, d’autre part, le bon usage de l’article 86.2, le modus
operandi de cet article lorsqu’il s’applique à la situation particulière de ces
services économiques d’intérêt général, que seront, de plus en plus, les
services de santé, même si, bien entendu, tous ne le sont pas. La preuve du
Prof. Jorens déplace la question de la zone grise entre économique et non-
économique. Nous sommes invités à abandonner une perspective illusoire de
délimitation énumérative en revanche de la garantie d’un traitement équitable
au travers de cet article 86.2. Si clarification il y a, elle touche la prise de
conscience par les usagers et les opérateurs sociaux que cette frontière
accordera une place croissante à la perspective économique.
La seconde chose à clarifier est la notion d’acte légal au moyen duquel
l’opérateur de santé, de soins, d’assurance reçoit la mission d’intérêt général
social. Là encore, le Prof. Jorens énumère une variété de circonstances, mais
qui n’existent pas partout. La balle est dans le camp des Etats membres de
quelle façon établissent-ils le rattachement à l’intérêt général des services
sociaux et de santé et de tous ce qui contribuent à leur système de santé?
La troisième chose à clarifier concerne l’incertitude dans laquelle se trouvent
aujourd’hui les opérateurs, les prestataires, en particulier ceux qui jouissent
d’un statut spécifique et notamment non lucratif. Ce statut des droits
exclusifs sont-ils bien justifiés au regard de leur mission particulière? Ici M.
Jorens nous renvoie utilement à l’acquis de la jurisprudence qui considère
désormais une vue large de ces missions, de leurs contraintes, des
obligations de service public, pas seulement au nom de leur viabilité
économique, mais de l’ensemble de la valeur du service qu’ils rendent. 
Enfin, la question de la clarification porte sur la responsabilité systémique des
Etats membres, leur responsabilité d’organiser les systèmes de santé, mais
pas seulement celle d’accorder, au cas par cas, une autorisation, elle
concerne l’ensemble d’un système de soin qui a sa logique et qu’ils leur
arrivent parfois de transformer ou de modifier globalement, comme ce fut le
cas récemment aux Pays-Bas. Ici, l’article 86.2 pointe sur un test global de
proportionnalité qui permet de fonder, au regard du marché intérieur, les
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caractéristiques du nouveau système qui se présente souvent comme une
ouverture, une diversification.
J’ai conscience de ne pas avoir répondu clairement à la question de la
clarification, de ne pas avoir annoncé la réponse à Mme Van Lancker, qui
nous a présenté une vue forte et décisive qui va au-delà de la clarification et
de la sécurité juridique. Ma collègue, Mme Fages, ce matin s’est référée aux
paroles d’ouverture du Commissaire McGreevy et du Président de la
Commission Barroso. Elle a indiqué deux choses importantes. La
Commission actuellement s’attache au débat politique et parlementaire qui
se développe, ainsi qu’au débat citoyen de manière à mettre en perspective
l’ensemble des réponses qu’elle apportera de façon cohérente sur tous les
outils législatifs, y compris la Directive services mais aussi le paquet
concurrence, et qui touchent la spécificité des services sociaux de santé
appelés à être, un jour, d’une façon ou d’une autre, économiques.
Cette cohérence, je ne pourrai vous la délivrer aujourd’hui. Mais je crois
qu’au-delà de notre impatience pour l’obtenir, et notamment pour que cette
communication consacrée aux services sociaux et de santé touche son but,
il est important que nous soyons d’accord sur le fait qu’au-delà des
diversités, le niveau européen doit lui-même dire quelque chose de commun
et d’important au sujet de la dimension de droit fondamental, d’enracinement
social dans le modèle social européen de ces services sociaux et de santé,
et dire en quoi ceci est profondément respecté et respectable dans le cadre
du marché intérieur. Il nous faut à la fois avoir conscience de nos racines et
de nous donner des ailes. Je pense que la perspective ouverte par le rapport
Jorens nous y aide.
Jozef NIEMIEC
CONFEDERAL SECRETARY
EUROPEAN TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION (ETUC)
Au nom de la Confédération européenne des syndicats, je voudrais féliciter
les organisateurs de cette conférence et l’auteur de l’excellent rapport qui
sert de base à nos débats sur « les services sociaux d’intérêt général comme
contrepoids aux règles du marché intérieur » qui offrent une opportunité de
contribuer ainsi à la recherche de solutions adéquates dans ce domaine au
niveau communautaire.
Le séminaire organisé récemment par la Commission a témoigné qu’il y a un
large consensus quant à la reconnaissance des spécificités des services
sociaux et de santé, mais en même temps a confirmé – comme le fait aussi
ce débat - les divergences de points de vue par rapport à leur prise en
compte au niveau européen. Il n’est pourtant pas acceptable que l’incertitude
demeure quant au lien qui sera fait avec d’autres initiatives communautaires
dans le cadre du marché intérieur. La CES est d’avis que le projet de directive
sur les services dans le marché intérieur, les propositions de régulation
d’aides d’Etat (paquet Altmark) et le livre vert sur les partenariats publics-
privés sont susceptibles d’influencer profondément aussi bien la définition
que la mise en œuvre des services sociaux, avec un risque que la nature
économique de l’activité en constitue un facteur déterminant. 
Pour la CES, il n’est pas question de laisser uniquement au marché de
résoudre des problèmes sociaux, parce que c’est exactement ses
défaillances qui ont obligé les autorités publiques à réagir pour assurer à
l’ensemble de la société la réalisation des droits fondamentaux et pour
répondre à la demande sociale, en particulier de la part des personnes les
plus vulnérables ou exclues. Ces services répondent en fait à des besoins
sociaux collectifs et individuels,  et pour lesquels il est nécessaire que les
pouvoirs publics interviennent comme régulateurs du marché ainsi que
comme tiers subsidiant pour élargir l’accès des bénéficiaires aux prestations
et assurer certaines normes de qualité. 
Avant l’instauration du Marché unique c’étaient les Etats membres (EM) seuls
qui assuraient les conditions pour permettre la réalisation de la mission
publique par certains services, répondant aux attentes de ses citoyens.  Il
s’agit maintenant de retrouver au niveau européen cet équilibre qui existait,
même s’il pouvait être parfois  fragile et en évolution constante, dans le cadre
national. Dans ce sens, les SSIG sont perçus par la CES bien plus que
comme des contrepoids aux règles du marché intérieur. Si on arrive à trouver
des régulations européennes appropriées, elles permettront à l’UE de mettre
sur un pied d’égalité deux objectifs inscrits dans les traités: la réalisation des
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valeurs telles que la solidarité et la cohésion sociale avec les  libertés du
marché.
La CES, tout en reconnaissant le principe de subsidiarité et les compétences
des Etats membres en matière d’organisation et de financement de services
sociaux, reste convaincue qu’il est nécessaire d’introduire un (des)
instrument(s) communautaire(s).
D’un côté, les changements sociétaux et les politiques choisies pour faire
face aux défis multiples qui sont aujourd’hui posés, conduisent souvent à
l’externalisation des tâches réalisées jusqu’à maintenant par le secteur
public. Ceci conduit  à une concurrence croissante des opérateurs différents
(les Etats se réservant, dans ce contexte, le rôle de régulateurs), mais ils se
voient soumis de plus en plus aux règles européennes de marché qui
réduisent leur champ de manœuvre.
De l’autre côté, la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne de justice intervient
dans ce domaine, en l’absence des règles plus claires et précises décidées
par les politiques, pour résoudre des conflits entre les obligations de mission
publique et les libertés du marché unique. Cette situation n’est pas
soutenable, au moins pour deux raisons.  La jurisprudence est susceptible
d’évolution, et en plus, elle est appliquée à des cas concrets, donc s’il n’y a
pas de transposition dans la législation nationale, l’insécurité juridique
persiste.
Face à ces défis, le recours à la subsidiarité ne constitue pas du tout une
réponse adéquate. La Commission européenne avec le Comité de protection
sociale ont donc raison de poser la question, à savoir quel mécanisme ou
instrument communautaire servirait le mieux la cause. Pour la CES, le
processus lancé par le livre vert et repris par le livre blanc devrait aboutir à
l’adoption d’un (d’)instrument(s) qui compléterai(en)t l’ensemble des
dispositifs réglementaires communautaires afin de permettre aux services
sociaux d’intérêt général de se développer et de poursuivre leurs finalités au
bénéfice de la société. Il est nécessaire qu’il(s) prenne(nt) en compte la finalité
sociale des services sociaux d’intérêt général et la contribution essentielle de
ces services à la réalisation des objectifs de l’UE en termes d’emploi et de
cohésion sociale.  En effet, il ne faut pas perdre de vue que l’objectif de
cohésion sociale est et doit être recherché au niveau national mais également
au niveau européen.
Les mécanismes communautaires devraient être mis en œuvre à cet effet.
Concrètement, cela peut signifier, par exemple, l’échange de bonnes
pratiques entre les Etats membres sur l’apport de ces services en termes de
cohésion sociale. Pour que ce mécanisme soit vraiment utile, il doit impliquer
l’introduction et la définition d’objectifs communs, accompagnés
d’indicateurs qui rendraient possible une évaluation réaliste de la situation et
des progrès réalisés par le Conseil, autrement dit la mise en œuvre d’une
Méthode ouverte de coordination « complète ». Cette MOC pourrait s’inscrire
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dans les procédures existant déjà, telle la MOC inclusion pour les services
sociaux, ou récemment lancées –  telle la MOC santé.
L’idée de créer un observatoire européen sur la qualité des services est
intéressante. La CES l’a déjà demandé en 2000. Un tel observatoire,
fonctionnant d’une façon transparente, avec la participation des
représentants des partenaires sociaux et d’autres acteurs, faciliterait
l’analyse indépendante et objective des réalités.
Toutefois, pour la CES, le recours à la seule méthode ouverte de coordination
est insuffisant car les EM et les opérateurs de SSIG ont besoin de sécurité
juridique pour fournir des prestations de qualité sans être sous le coup d’une
jurisprudence fluctuante. 
La CES rappelle ses préoccupations (exprimées à plusieurs reprises, et
dernièrement dans sa résolution du mois de mars 2004 ayant trait à la
proposition de directive relative aux services dans le marché intérieur), à
savoir que les initiatives prises dans le cadre de la libéralisation du marché
des services ne doivent pas venir mettre en danger d’autres initiatives qui
seraient prises pour les SIG. En particulier, il serait erroné 
- de réduire les systèmes de réglementation là où cette réglementation est
un élément-clef de maîtrise des dépenses et l’assurance de la qualité et
de la continuité des services, 
- ou bien d’introduire le principe du pays d’origine qui va à l’encontre des
compétences des EM d’imposer leur propre législation aux prestataires
des services transfrontaliers. 
De plus, en ce qui concerne les services médicaux, un conflit potentiel entre
deux instruments juridiques européens (règlement 1408/71 et directive sur
les services) serait difficile à éviter.
En conclusion, pour la CES, il faut donc en premier lieu exclure tous les SIG,
et notamment les SSIG, du champ d’application de la directive services, ce
qui est une condition indispensable pour supprimer les contradictions entre
le plan de travail découlant du Livre blanc sur les SIG et la proposition de
directive sur les services dans le marché intérieur.  Et pour la CES, les
régulations quant aux soins de santé pourraient facilement être incluses dans
le Règlement 1408/71. 
Il est nécessaire aussi de donner la priorité dans le programme de travail de
la Commission à l’adoption d’un cadre législatif approprié.
C’est pourquoi la CES propose à nouveau de  construire au niveau européen
des principes communs en matière de SIG qui devraient faire l’objet d’une
directive cadre ou de loi(s) cadre(s) sur la base de l’article III-122 du projet de
Traité constitutionnel, dont la Commission pourrait anticiper la mise en
œuvre. Dans ce cadre, pourraient être définies des normes communes aux
SSIG, quant à leurs spécificités, leurs missions, leurs finalités et leur qualité.
260 Bulletin luxembourgeois des questions sociales
Laurent GHÉKIERE
VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE PERMANENT COMMITTEE ENTERPRISES,
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EUROPEAN CENTRE OF ENTERPRISES WITH PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
AND OF ENTERPRISES OF GENERAL ECONOMIC INTEREST (CEEP)
Permettez-moi de vous apporter quelques points de commentaires par rap-
port à ce que j’ai entendu aujourd’hui et notamment de la part des orateurs
précédents. 
J’aurai quatre observations à faire. 
La première, c’est que la Communication de la Commission sur les services
sociaux d’intérêt général portera sur l’ensemble des services sociaux, y com-
pris le handicap, le vieillissement, l’éducation, le logement et la formation.
Jusqu’à présent, le droit communautaire portant sur les services d’intérêt
général s’était concentré sur les réseaux (le transport, l’énergie, les télécom-
munications) et pas du tout sur des services qui relèvent de la mise en œuvre
de droits sociaux fondamentaux définis par les Etats membres et que l’on ret-
rouve dans la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. 
Quelle est la particularité de ces services sociaux d’intérêt général ? Ce sont
des services très sensibles et fondamentaux, ils relèvent de la compétence
des Etats membres et se traduisent par une régulation nationale très forte qui,
à un certain moment, peut entrer en tension avec le droit communautaire, la
libre concurrence et les libertés fondamentales du marché intérieur. 
Les membres du CEEP, qui sont prestataires de ces services sociaux, ont un
peu de mal à admettre qu’ils ont à appliquer des règles du marché intérieur,
alors que ces services sont développés parce que le marché ne permet pas
de les fournir de façon adéquate face aux  obligations d’universalité et d’ac-
cès universel à ces services.
Aujourd’hui, les Etats membres campent dans une position de subsidiarité,
qui est de dire qu’il relève de la compétence des Etats membres de définir
ces services et de mettre en œuvre les politiques y afférentes. Toutefois, cela
n’exonère pas les Etats membres d’appliquer les règles du Traité quant aux
modalités concrètes de mise en œuvre de ces politiques. Et c’est là où appa-
raissent des zones de tension importantes. 
On voit également dans ces services l’importance de la qualité. On est face
à des prestataires qui sont en situation de supériorité par rapport aux usag-
ers, qui sont généralement des usagers captifs et vulnérables, qui ont besoin
de ces services, qui n’ont pas d’autres modalités pour y avoir accès. La no-
tion de contrôle du prestataire, de l’opérateur, est très importante pour s’as-
surer que la qualité soit au rendez-vous final dans ce rapport de force inégal
entre le prestataire et le bénéficiaire. 
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Enfin, le financement de ces services est très important. Nous sommes sur
des financements de nature solidaire, relevant des budgets publics - d’où le
problème des aides d’Etat - et de déconnection du coût réel de production
du service par rapport au prix facturé à l’usager final, dans une logique d’ac-
cessibilité.
Donc, premier élément d’observation : une très forte spécificité qui, au-delà
des particularités des différents services couverts, est commun à tous ces
services sociaux d’intérêt général.
Deuxième point de l’observation : l’article 86.2 du Traité. C’est effectivement
le point clef de cette Communication. Comment assurer pour ces services
l’équilibre tout à fait subtil mais très important entre, d’un côté, le respect des
règles de concurrence et du marché intérieur et, de l’autre côté, le maintien
de la capacité des États membres à pouvoir mettre en œuvre ses missions
d’intérêt général, qu’ils aient un caractère économique, social ou non-
économique ?
Cet équilibre est tout à fait fragile. Il est à construire au quotidien. Il relève, en
général, d’un arbitrage final de la Cour de Justice basé sur les principes fon-
damentaux des Traités, et notamment le principe de proportionnalité. Cela
est non seulement peu démocratique et n’apporte pas la sécurité juridique
nécessaire. Alors comment concilier cet intérêt communautaire, défini par les
Traités, à l’intérêt général des Etats membres qui est tout aussi important et
légitime en terme de mise en œuvre de politique sociale ? C’est la grande
question à laquelle la Commission doit faire face à travers sa communication.
Il nous faut en quelque sorte un mode d’emploi. Comment utiliser cet article
86.2 ? Comment en tirer toute la subtilité et le sens de l’équilibre, mais égale-
ment sa potentialité ? D’un côté, nous avons des secteurs fortement régulés
par la puissance publique, de l’autre, nous avons des principes de concur-
rence qui voient toute régulation comme quelque chose étant potentiellement
une distorsion de la concurrence et une entrave aux libertés fondamentales
du marché intérieur. Nous avons des systèmes très intégrés où l’on voit très
bien le lien entre le prestataire, le client et l’autorité publique. On l’a vu avec
le système finlandais. Le droit communautaire nous oblige à segmenter, à
séparer le prestataire de l’autorité publique et au final, à nuire à la capacité de
l’autorité publique à mettre en œuvre clairement leurs missions sociales d’in-
térêt général.
Dans les zones grises où le droit ne dit rien, où on ne connaît pas vraiment la
potentialité de l’application du droit communautaire et il nous faut clarifier ce
maquis. 
Pour la troisième observation, je remercierai M. Bolkestein. Avec sa proposi-
tion de Directive sur les services il a permis de poser le problème de cette
rupture d’équilibre de l’article 86.2 en proposant une Directive générale, une
Directive cadre, qui couvre tous les services avec les mêmes règles d’appli-
cation, y compris les services sociaux d’intérêt général. Ainsi, cette Directive
Access to health care in an internal market: 
impact for statutory and complementary systems 263
interfère avec la compétence des Etats membres à réguler ce champ des
services d’intérêt général. Et si aujourd’hui, il y a un vrai débat au sein du Par-
lement, au sein de la société civile et à l’intérieur même de la Commission eu-
ropéenne, on le doit à cette proposition de Directive qui a le mérite d’avoir mis
cartes sur table.. Bien évidemment, nous comptons sur le Parlement eu-
ropéen pour l’amender en profondeur. Je me limiterai ici à citer simplement
deux exemples. 
En encadrant, voire en interdisant, des régimes d’autorisation particuliers, on
ôte toute capacité des Etats membres à contrôler, à priori, le prestataire de
services avant de lui confier une mission d’intérêt général, alors que cette
possibilité est reconnue par la Cour de Justice (arrêt Analir). 
En appliquant le principe du pays d’origine à tous les services d’intérêt
général, y compris les services sociaux d’intérêt général, on prive les Etats
membres de définir par un acte légal d’application interne ce qu’il entend par
ce service, son contenu, sa qualité qui, en cas d’application de ce principe,
sera défini par le pays d’origine du prestataire qui va assurer en libre presta-
tion le service d’intérêt général. A travers ce principe, on risque de remettre
en cause cet équilibre précaire mais subtil entre, d’une part, le marché in-
térieur et, d’autre part, la compétence des Etats membres à définir et à mettre
en œuvre leur politique sociale. Dernier point : le rôle de cette Communication
sur les services sociaux d’intérêt général est très importante et nous comp-
tons beaucoup sur la Commission pour y mettre du contenu, mais également
sur les Etats membres pour ne plus avoir une politique de l’autruche. A ce su-
jet, le CEEP a quelques revendications à exprimer en direction de la Commis-
sion.
Nous voulons à travers cette communication un mode d’emploi pour l’usage
de l’article 86.2, qui indique comment mieux concilier les impératifs de l’in-
térêt communautaire avec les impératifs de l’intérêt général définis par les
Etats membres.
Nous souhaitons obtenir un relevé complet de la jurisprudence communau-
taire, pour que nous sachions pour l’ensemble de ces services quel est l’état
du droit communautaire, quel est l’état de la jurisprudence. Le rapport sur la
Santé qui a été présenté aujourd’hui est tout à fait intéressant de ce point de
vue, car il démontre que ce travail est faisable. Nous souhaitons qu’il soit élar-
gi à l’ensemble du champ d’application de cette Communication. 
Nous souhaitons également que cette Communication identifie de façon la
plus transparente possible, les zones de tension. Je crois qu’il faut dévelop-
per une attitude proactive. Nous connaissons clairement, en tant que pr-
estataires, les zones de tension qu’il y a entre la capacité de nos membres à
réaliser leurs missions d’intérêt général et les contraintes du droit commun-
autaire. Il faudrait que ces zones soient clairement définies et que la Commu-
nication - certes elle ne pourra difficilement proposer un instrument juridique
unique pour les résoudre - au moins émette des pistes d’action par rapport à
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ces zones de tension en terme de recherche d’équilibre et de conciliation en-
tre l’intérêt communautaire et l’intérêt générale des États membres. 
Je vous remercie.
CLOSING SPEECH

Ron HENDRIKS
PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES (AIM)
Well, ladies and gentlemen I will try to keep my speech as short as possible.
It is already late and we still have a lot of things to do tonight I understood.
We have had a very good conference today, with a lot of good speakers, and
good discussions. I would like to thank all who contribute to these
discussions. The closing of this conference gives me the opportunity to say a
few words concerning the point of view of the internationalisation of
mutualities. I would like to change the title of this conference in “Access to
health-care for all in an internal market”. This Ladies and gentlemen is not as
obvious as it seems, despite of what everybody is saying. Looking at the
development of costs in health-care we can see that the problem is caused
by the development of medical technology, and also by the ageing of the
population. This means, looking at the costs that the sustainability of our
health-care systems is in danger. What means solidarity looking at the future?
Do we have to find an new balance in solidarity? There is also another danger
however and that danger is the internal market, especially the competition
rules. I do not think I have to explain to you that health-care is an economic
activity. Looking at technology we want to have a competitive pharmaceutical
industry in Europe. We all need a salary and nurses eating bread also. The
biggest danger in my opinion if health-care has to comply to the competition
rules lies in the health-care insurance. Insurance by definition means risk-
selection. And the question is: do we want that? My answer is no. There are
a lot, a lot of questions we have to find an answer for. How much pressure
will the stability pact put on the statutory systems in the different countries?
Can we expect that the European rules of co-ordination will quickly set the
standards to which all health systems in the EU have to respond? Will the
announced communication on health and social services of general interest
provide the automatic answer on how economic and social policy objectives
are to be balanced in the fields of social and health protections? 
I can go on like this but you have already heard a lot of questions this
afternoon. The point is, we are going to say it clearly: health-care is also an
economic activity. We have competition rules and we have social systems.
The question is what are we going to do with them? Does health-care have to
follow the competition rules? Do the health-care insurances have to follow the
competition rules? If the answer is yes, then risk-selection is unavoidable.
And that could be a problem. 
Ok ladies and gentlemen, a lot to think about in the future for the AIM, we are
very pleased that we have the opportunity to combine our meetings with this
conference. I would like to thank the Luxembourg organisers and especially
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Michel Schmitz who made this possible. We should also thank our
moderator. Where is he? Alex, you did a wonderful job. Thank you very much
for that. And last but not the least, ladies and gentlemen, what do you think
about the interpreters? Give them a big hand. Thank you. Have a nice
evening.
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